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The patent system exists to encourage the development of new products from 
which society will benefit. The strength of protection awarded to patented products is 
a policy decision, allowing states to balance the monopoly rights of patent-owners 
against the inherent social costs of monopoly protection. The effective policy space 
within which states may establish domestic patent policy is increasingly 
circumscribed by international rules prescribing minimum protection levels regardless 
of local circumstances or consequences.  
In international negotiations, developing states have attempted to resist policy 
space curtailment using arguments that rely on foundational principles of the 
intellectual property system: its public purpose and its commitment to balancing costs 
and benefits. This negotiating stance has not been effective; its opponents counter-
argue that stronger patent protection achieves the same ends. This dissertation 
examines the resulting circular discussions at the 2001-2003 Doha negotiations and 
the WIPO Development Agenda talks since 2004.     
I argue that the impasse stems from an inability to move beyond the costs-
benefits tension inherent in the patent system. Economists have been unable to resolve 
this tension by identifying optimal protection levels. Furthermore, intellectual 
property theory is unable to provide a bottom line at which the short-term social costs 
of patent monopolies must be deemed unacceptable, regardless of anticipated longer-
term benefits. 
The developing states‘ negotiating stance will be strengthened if a bottom line 
can be identified. I argue that the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights provides benchmarks to fulfil this function. ICESCR obligations are 
specific, objective, and measurable; they have international legitimacy; and they bind 
almost all states. I examine the Article 12 right to health to show that states violate the 
ICESCR if they ratify other treaties which reduce policy space and make it more 
difficult for states to adopt policies to meet their domestic or extraterritorial 
obligations. I also examine Article 15, concluding that it is insufficiently developed to 
offer firm guidelines. 
I use insights from international relations theory to examine the practical 
possibilities of adopting a human rights-based approach, and argue that the strategy 
will become progressively more effective as human rights norms are internalized 














This is a theoretical dissertation and research was conducted using published 
materials. These include the following: 
 
Primary materials 
International organizations: treaties; declarations; resolutions; recommendations; 
policy documents, statements and guidelines; reports of investigations; submissions 
and proposals to the organizations; minutes and reports of meetings; Special 
Rapporteur reports; General Comments; reported cases. 
Domestic government materials: statutes; regulations; policy documents; reports of 
investigations; reported cases. 
Non-governmental organizations: reports; policy documents; public statements and 
press briefings; submissions and proposals to international organizations. 
 
Secondary materials 
Books, journal articles and published papers in the fields of law, economics, politics, 













ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
Act-UP AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power 
AIDS acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
ARV antiretroviral 
  
CDMA Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association 
CDIP WIPO Committee on Development and Intellectual Property 
CESCR United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
CIPR United Kingdom Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
CLS critical legal studies 
CP-Tech Consumer Project on Technology 
  
DFID United Kingdom Department for Internal Development 
DHHS United States Department of Health and Human Services 
DNA deoxyribonucleic acid 
DSU WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 
  
EC European Community 
ECHR European Court of Human Rights 
ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council 
ESC economic, social and cultural rights 
EST expressed sequence tags 
EU European Union 
  
FDA United States Food and Drug Agency 
FDI foreign direct investment 
FTA free trade agreement 
  
GDP gross domestic product 
GFD Group of Friends of Development 














HIV human immunodeficiency virus 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICTSD International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 
IGC WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
IGO Intergovernmental organization 
ILC International Law Commission 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IP intellectual property 
IPC Intellectual Property Committee 
IPR intellectual property rights 
  
LDC least-developed country 
  
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
MFN most favoured nation 
MSF Médecins sans Frontières 
  
NGO Non-governmental organization 
NICE United Kingdom National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
NIH United States National Institutes of Health 
NHGRI National Human Genome Research Institute 
  
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
  
PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction 
PCT Patent Cooperation Treaty 
PCDA WIPO Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO-
Development Agenda 













PMAC Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada  
R&D research and development 
  
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
SNP single nucleotide polymorphism 
SPLT Substantive Patent Law Treaty 
  
TAC Treatment Action Committee 
TNC transnational corporation 
TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
TTO technology transfer office 
TWN Third World Network 
  
UCDTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNAIDS United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
US United States 
USC United States Code 
USPTO United States Patent and Trademark Office 
USTR United States Trade Representative 
  
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
  
WERO WIPO Evaluation and Research Office 
WHA World Health Assembly 
WHO World Health Organization 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization 
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„The terrible situations affecting many states and peoples around the 
world should be a key element that mobilizes the discussions in this forum … it 
is unfortunate we could not see a little more flexibility or humanity in these 
discussions and make IP a constructive tool.‟  
Delegate from Ecuador at the WIPO Development Agenda 
discussions June 29, 2006.
 1 
 
This dissertation examines aspects of the international patent regime and the 
negotiations through which it is created. It focuses particularly on the recent WIPO 
Development Agenda discussions.  
The United Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights has concluded that 
the global intellectual property regime is prejudicial to the interests of developing 
states.
2
 These states have had little influence over the shaping of the international 
intellectual property system or the ways in which it affects their citizens – they are 
frequently out-negotiated in the international forums where binding intellectual 
property standards are set.
3
 I argue that developing countries should base their 
negotiating positions on principles of international human rights law, particularly the 
rights set out in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
4
 
rather than solely on principles of intellectual property law. A human rights-based 
                                                 
1
 ‗Blogging WIPO: Development Agenda blocked‘ (June 29, 2006). Available from the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation web page at http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives (visited 17 
July 2006). 
2
 UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/7. 
3
 This is explored in detail in this dissertation. See also Maskus and Reichman ‗Globalization‘ 
at 6-7, who sum up the situation as follows: ‗Although the ratcheting up of global IPRs could 
adversely affect the growth prospects of developing countries, these nations have so far 
exerted little influence on standard-setting exercises.‘ 
4
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec 16, 1966, 
entered into force 3 Jan 1976 (6 ILM 360 (1967)) [ICESCR]. I am adopting a positivist 














approach would allow them to present more powerful arguments based on binding 
legal obligations shared by most of the negotiating states.
5
  
During the past 25 years, developed countries (net exporters of patented 
products) have established an international patent regime that offers as much 
protection as possible for patented processes and products. Developing and least-
developed countries
6
 (net importers) have tried to maintain as much domestic ‗policy 
space‘ as possible in order to devise patent regimes appropriate to local 
circumstances.  
The 1994 TRIPS Agreement
7
 substantially raised the minimum levels of 
patent protection that all WTO members must require in their domestic IP regimes. 
Many states, organizations, and scholarly commentators believe these minimum 
levels are too high and prejudice developing countries‘ interests.
8
 Government 
officials and industry in developed countries, however, argue that the minimum levels 
                                                 
5
 Almost all WIPO and WTO states other than the United States have ratified the ICESCR,. 
All but 26 of 152 current WTO member states have ratified the ICESCR, while all but 27 of 
184 WIPO members have done so. (WTO webpage at www.wto.org ; United Nations High 
Commissioner webpage at www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/ ; WIPO webpage at 
http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (visited July 2008). 
6
 International bodies (including the United Nations, the World Bank, and the WTO) classify 
some countries as ‗developing states‘ and others as ‗least developed states‘   The 
classification may have important legal consequences. Under TRIPS, for example, the 
classification determines how long states have to become compliant with various treaty 
provisions (TRIPS Articles 65 and 66).  In this dissertation, ‗developing states‘ will be used 
to denote collectively those states classified as either ‗developing‘ or ‗least developed.‘ 
‗Developing‘ and ‗least developed‘ states will be specifically distinguished only when 
necessary.  
7
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods, adopted Dec 15 1993 (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 81. 
[TRIPS]. 
8
  See for example, the 2001 World Bank study: Richard Newfarmer et al ‗Global economic 
prospects and developing countries‘ cited by Sell ‗Quest for global governance‘ at 372; 
Abbott ‗TRIPS and human rights‘ at 145; Drahos & Braithwaite Information Feudalism 
generally; Drommen ‗Safeguarding legitimacy‘ at 125; Reichman ‗Universal minimum 
standards‘ at 354; Walker ‗Human rights approach to TRIPS‘ at 173. The United Nations 
Development Program has concluded that ‗Countries at low levels of human technological 
capability cannot benefit significantly from TRIPS … . Developing countries are not likely to 
be even as … well off under TRIPS as they would be outside it,‘ and has advocated its 
abolition. Within the developed countries themselves, many commentators argue that current 
patent levels are not optimal. In this regard, see the discussion below, particularly with 













should be higher, and have attempted to raise protection levels through bilateral trade 
agreements, or through a new Substantive Patent Law Treaty.
9
 
This dissertation will focus particularly on the recent WIPO Development 
Agenda debates. These debates demonstrate the trend referred to above: the push by 
developed states for more IP protection, and the plea from developing states for less. 
Many of the arguments on both sides are similar to those raised during previous 
negotiations, particularly: the WTO talks that resulted in the ‗Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health‘ (the ‗Doha Declaration‘)
10
 in 2001; the talks 
resulting in the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
11
 in 2003; 
and the TRIPS negotiations themselves. I will also examine these negotiations. 
Policy space 
International intellectual property negotiations can be viewed as an on-going 
battle over ‗IP policy space.‘
12
 In this dissertation, I use a ‗policy space‘ concept 
based on a model developed initially to explain states‘ policy options regarding 
development and trade, particularly in the WTO Agreements.
13
 In this context, 
‗policy space‘ has been defined as ‗the scope for domestic policies, especially in the 
areas for trade, investment and industrial development.‘
14
  
                                                 
9
 Shadlen ‗Policy space‘ at 11. Agreements requiring minimum protection levels higher than 
those in TRIPS are often referred to as ‗TRIPS-plus‘ agreements. See Chapter 5. 
10
 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health. WTO Ministerial Conference, 4
th
 
Session, Doha, 9-14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 14 November 2001). (2002) 
41 ILM 755. [Doha Declaration]. 
11
 Council for TRIPS, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/405, 30 August 2003, 
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm  (visited October 2006).  
43 ILM 509. [Implementation Agreement]. 
12
 Cf May & Sell IPR History at 161 describing the history of IP protection as ‗long and 
contested.‘ 
13
 See Kunmar & Gallagher ‗Policy space‘; DiCaprio & Gallagher ‗How big is the bite?‘; 
Shadlen ‗Policy space‘; Corrales-Leal ‗Policy space‘; the various contributions to Gallagher 
Policy space; Hamwey ‗Expanding policy space‘; Abugattas and Paus ‗Policy space‘ and 
references contained therein. See also Orford ‗Economy of sacrifice‘ at 158, wording this 
somewhat differently: ‗ … critics have argued that the WTO agreements pose an illegitimate 
constraint on the political choices open to … governments.‘ 
14
 Sao Paulo Consensus para 8. For detailed expositions of the concept, see Hamwey 
‗Expanding policy space‘; Abugattas and Paus ‗Policy space‘ at 10ff; South Centre ‗Policy 
space.‘ The question of external policy space constraint was extremely controversial during 
the UNCTAD discussions in 2004, with developed countries (particularly the United States) 
concerned that recognizing the concept in a high-level intergovernmental consensus 













The policy space available to a government is limited by both internal and 




The ‗internal policy space‘ within which national governments are free to 
establish policy is circumscribed by such factors as the available financial, human, 
and other resources, as well as by ‗limits to policy acceptability by national 
stakeholders‘ including their electorates.
16
 The ‗external policy space‘ is limited by 
economic constraints imposed by the global economy, and constraints arising from 
the ratification of binding international treaties such as the WTO Agreements, or the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
17
 A government‘s 
‗available policy space‘ for domestic programmes lies in the intersection between the 
internal and external policy spaces.
18
  
My dissertation focuses on ways in which the ratification of treaties limits or 
expands states‘ available domestic policy space; it is primarily concerned with how 
the reduction or expansion of external policy space impacts on states‘ effective policy 
                                                                                                                                           
position in forums like the WTO (see TWN ‗Lengthy tussles‘ and South Centre ‗UNCTAD 
XI‘). Ultimately, the Sao Paulo Consensus document stated that ‗It is for each Government to 
evaluate the trade-off between the benefits of accepting international rules and commitments 
and the constraints posed by the loss of policy space. It is particularly important for 
developing countries, bearing in mind development goals and objectives, that all countries 
take into account the need for appropriate balance between national policy space and 
international disciplines and commitments‘ (Sao Paulo Consensus para 8). This has been 
viewed as a victory for developing-state negotiators (see South Centre ‗UNCTAD XI‘ at 4; 
TWN ‗Lengthy tussles‘ at 1). 
15
 Figure reproduced from Abugattas and Paus ‗Policy space‘ at 10.  
16
 Hamwey ‗Expanding policy space‘ at 3, using limits to acceptable taxation as one example. 
17
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted May 9, 1992, entered 
into force 21 March 1994 (1992) 31 ILM 849. [UNFCCC ]. Hamwey ‗Expanding policy 
space‘ at 4; Abugattas and Paus ‗Policy space‘ at 11; South Centre ‗Policy space‘ at 4. See 
also DiCaprio & Gallagher ‗How big is the bite?‘ at 785 for a detailed analysis of how WTO 
Agreements have reduced the policy space of particular developing states. 
18













space. Thus, I focus on international intellectual property treaties and the ways in 
which, by strengthening and tightening international IP rules, they have ‗enclosed‘
19
 
states‘ available domestic IP policy space.
20
 I also examine developing countries‘ 
attempts through international negotiation to resist enclosure, and maintain or even 
increase their available domestic IP policy space. Because the subject area is broad, I 
focus on patents, and do not examine other kinds of IP protection. 
I show that the patent system has many inherent ‗policy levers‘
21
 that states 
can use to fashion intellectual property regimes appropriate to their domestic needs,
22
 
and discuss how these levers might be affected by international instruments in ways 
that increase or decrease the available IP policy space.
23
  
As noted above, the genesis of the policy space model was in international 
trade and development theory. The model has been used primarily in attempts to 
ensure that international trade rules (including the intellectual property rules in 
TRIPS) do not constrain developing states‘ available policy space in ways that make 
it difficult or impossible for them to respond to local development objectives and 
needs.
24
 In international negotiations such as UNCTAD XI (and, subsequently, in the 
most recent WIPO Development Agenda talks), developing countries have argued in 




Although I support many of the developing countries‘ arguments for their 
retention of IP policy space, my dissertation argues for a reduction of policy space in 
a different way. The debates thus far have examined the international trade and IP 
rules set out in WTO treaties, including TRIPS; I focus on other treaties, particularly 
the ICESCR. Like all binding international agreements, the ICESCR limits the policy 
                                                 
19
 Yu has written about the ‗enclosure‘ of policy space in an international context (Yu 
‗Enclosure‘), building on James Boyles‘s use of an ‗enclosure‘ model (see Boyle ‗Second 
enclosure‘).  
20
 For a detailed examination of IP policy space in an intellectual property context, see Yu 
‗Enclosure.‘ Other scholars who have used the concept include Correa (see e.g. Correa 
‗Patent harmonization‘) and Abbott and Reichman (‗Public health legacy‘).  
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 Shadlen ‗Policy space‘. 
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 See for example DiCaprio & Gallagher ‗How big is the bite?‘; Kunmar & Gallagher 
‗Policy space‘; Shadlen ‗Policy space‘. See also Howse ‗Right to development‘ at para 3. 
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space available to member states by insisting that they abide by their treaty 
commitments.
26
 In effect, ICESCR obligations require states to adopt particular kinds 
of policies aimed at the realization of economic and social rights. I argue that 
ICESCR commitments constrain international trade and IP rules, because those rules 
should not violate binding international human rights commitments. This would be an 




In order to avoid confusion I will use the term ‗IP policy space‘ to refer 
specifically to rules of intellectual property and to the scope governments have to 
establish IP policies under international IP rules.  
Promoting innovation in the public interest 
In trying to resist higher patent protection levels and preserve IP policy space, 
developing states have typically relied on ‗welfare enhancing narratives‘
28
 with a 
utilitarian foundation.
29
  Welfare enhancing arguments emphasize that the primary 
purpose of (and justification for) intellectual property monopolies is to benefit society 
by encouraging innovation, thus furthering the public good and promoting 
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 According to human rights expert, Leckie: ‗policy freedom must have limits in view of the 
corresponding human rights obligations.‘ (Leckie ‗Violations‘ at 106). Writing on 
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implications of international human rights treaties, concluding  that while such treaties could 
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transformed‘; Bernstein ‗Human rights‘; Falk ‗Human rights at home‘; Sinclair & Byers 
‗What do they mean?‘  
27
 Another way of seeing this is that states require domestic policy space both to fulfil their 
development objectives and to ensure that they do not violate their human rights 
commitments (see Ovett ‗Access to medicines‘ at 170). 
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 Ruth Okediji has identified three closely interrelated core narratives employed by those 
resisting higher intellectual property standards. Okediji argues that they can be grouped as the 
‗human rights narratives‘, the ‗cultural narratives‘ and the ‗welfare enhancing doctrinal 
narratives‘. (Okediji ‗Narratives.‘) 
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development. Indeed, intellectual property was first recognized and protected because 
of the public benefits that would result. The American intellectual property system, 
for example, is based on a Constitutional provision permitting Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights in order ‗To promote the Progress of Science and the useful 
Arts.‘
30
 It remains  
a very well established principle that the conditional grant of proprietary 
rights over the fruits of creative endeavour and intellectual enterprise is 
directed principally at promoting the public interest. Virtually every 
country in the world recognizes this important goal as the core, 
foundational element of the intellectual property system.
31
 
Chapter 2 explores how the expected public benefits of innovation will be 
undermined if patent monopoly protection results in excessive pricing, making new 
products unaffordable to many people. Thus another foundational premise of the 
patent system is the necessity to ensure an appropriate balance between patent 
monopolies given as incentives to innovators, and the ability of the public to use and 
benefit from new inventions. ‗Welfare enhancing‘ arguments emphasize how this 




Developed-country negotiators cannot deny the importance of the public 
interest in the goods produced as a result of the patent system, because their own 
intellectual property systems are based on this foundation. However, the welfare 
enhancing argument is very easily countered (or even co-opted) in negotiation. Even 
if the developed states concede that the intellectual property system exists to 
encourage innovatio  that will benefit society, they can also claim that even higher 
levels of protection are necessary to encourage innovation, in effect, arguing that 
higher protection levels are themselves in the public interest. 
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 United States Constitution, art I, § 8, cl 8. This principle was recognized in one of very first 
IP cases, Donaldson v Becket (1774) 17 Hansard: The Parliamentary History of England  
(1771-4) Col. 953. For an examination of similar philosophical foundations in the United 
Kingdom, see Sherman and Bently Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law. 
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practice the invention for a period of years.‘ (Bonito Boats, Inc v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc, 
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unanimous agreement‘ that the purpose of the patent system is to encourage innovation for 
the benefit of society (Burk and Lemley ‗Policy levers‘ at 1580). 
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In this dissertation, I will show how a human rights-based argument might 
resolve this impasse by providing measurable benchmarks against which ‗the public 
interest‘ can be assessed. 
Promoting development 
Developed states often claim that developing states‘ implementation of 
intellectual property systems based on the American (or European) models will 
promote economic growth in those countries.   Macroeconomic growth will, in itself, 
benefit all sectors of society in those regions (as expressed in maxims like ‗a rising 
tide lifts all boats‘). During the TRIPS negotiations, developed countries further 
asserted that the implementation of stronger intellectual property models in 
developing countries would encourage domestic innovation and economic 
development in the same way as it had in developed states.
33
 They continue to claim 
that more protection will stimulate the development of industry and economic growth 
in developing countries. 
Negotiators from developed states also claim that implementing a ‗suitable‘
34
 
intellectual property system will encourage international trade, technology transfer, 
and foreign direct investment. They argue, for example, that if foreign companies are 
confident that their intellectual property rights are adequately protected in a particular 
state, they will be more likely to establish production companies there and stimulate 
local economic growth and development.
35
 
Developing countries, in turn, have begun to use a ‗development argument‘ to 
resist raised intellectual property standards. While the developed countries continue 
to argue that intellectual property protection leads to development, developing 
countries counter that, on the contrary, under certain conditions, intellectual property 
protection actively impedes development. 
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 Notoriously, however, almost all developed states underwent their industrial and 
technological revolutions without an international intellectual property regime, and routinely 
‗stole‘ from each other (see Maskus and Reichman ‗Globalization‘ at 14; and CIPR ‗IP and 
development‘ at 20). Indeed, the lack of intellectual property protection was an important and 
necessary element in the development of these sectors (Kunmar & Gallagher ‗Policy space‘ at 
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 Development-based discussions have been recurrent in recent intellectual 
property negotiations; indeed, they are the apparent focus of the ‗Development 
Agenda for WIPO‘ discussions. My examination of these talks shows that developed 
and developing state delegates have fundamentally different understandings of the 
nature and meaning of ‗development.‘ While developing countries ultimately 
succeeded in securing a recommendation that WIPO‘s future norm-setting activities 
should be supportive of the Millennium Development Goals, I argue that the 
‗development agenda‘ would be far more powerful if it were expressly linked to the 
binding human rights in the ICESCR.
36
 
In addition to their ‗intellectual-property-regimes-encourage-innovation-and-
promote-development‘ arguments, developed states occasionally refer to patents and 
other intellectual property monopolies as fair ‗rewards‘ for the innovators of new 
products. The ‗reward function‘ has not featured prominently in recent debates, in 
part because developing countries do not dispute the idea. Nevertheless, I will discuss 
this issue in Chapter 6, in the context of balancing inventors‘ and users‘ human rights.  
The weakness of internal arguments 
I argue that developing countries should move the debate beyond the confines 
of the intellectual property regime. Thus far, they have typically relied on ‗internal 
arguments,‘ basing their positions on principles of intellectual property law and 
theory:  
Developing countries endorse the concept of intellectual property, and regard 
IP law and policy as potentially positive tools for the development of science, 
technology and culture, and for the betterment of human existence – but they also 
hold the intellectual property regime to its utilitarian justifications and assert that it 
must actually deliver its promised benefits in promoting innovation, producing useful 
goods that ordinary people can afford, and encouraging economic and social 
development. They argue that recent trends in international intellectual property law 
make it increasingly unlikely that the system will achieve these ends, and therefore 
advocate a shift within intellectual property law and policy so that the system can 
become more useful to society and better able to fulfil its foundational goals. 
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At the Doha Ministerial Meetings of the WTO in 2001 and 2003, developing 
countries presented an internal welfare enhancing argument based on public health 
needs. At the WIPO Development Agenda discussions, they broadened this argument 
to include wider development concerns, while relying primarily on established 
principles of intellectual property theory. 
This reliance on internal arguments has not been successful. Developing and 
developed countries agree that the purpose of patent protection is to encourage 
creation of new and useful products for the benefit of society, thus promoting public 
health and development. Developed states, however, claim that a more stringent 
patent system with higher protection levels and fewer flexibilities will promote more 
innovation and more technological development. Developing countries dispute this, 
and point out that, even if this were empirically true, it would not be enough – the 
intellectual property system should both produce and disseminate innovative 
products. Both sides appear to agree that this implies some sort of ‗balance‘ between 
patent monopolies and the public good, but disagree about the patent protection levels 
required to achieve the optimal balance. Various economic studies have tried to 
determine optimal protection levels for the promotion of innovation and the 
dissemination of the resulting technology, but they are never produced, critiqued or 
discussed in the negotiations, and the debate goes round in circles.
37
  
Developing countries argue that, even if higher and more stringent patent 
policies are appropriate in developed countries, they are not appropriate for 
developing states, that the social costs associated with the patent system are 
disproportionate to any potential gains, and that the stringent standards in 
international patent law agreements impede developing states‘ abilities to respond to 
development needs, including the current public health crisis. Developed states 
counter that short-term social costs are an inherent feature of the patent system, and 
that a strong patent system is necessary, particularly for pharmaceutical products, 
given the time and expense required for R&D and regulatory approval, and the 
uncertain and financially risky nature of the research. Without this kind of 
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encouragement, they argue, essential medicines would not be produced in the first 
place. 
The arguments on both sides lack clear standards, benchmarks, or indicators 
demarcating a bottom line below which the social costs of the international patent 
system become non-negotiable. I argue that developing countries‘ arguments for 
increased IP policy space would be more effective if they were able to insist on a 
bottom line using clear guidelines and standards – and that this strategy would be 
particularly effective if the non-negotiable bottom line and standards were binding, 
and had the backing of the international community. I believe that an argument based 
on internationally agreed human rights norms could offer these advantages. 
The potential power of the human rights argument 
In this dissertation, I suggest that developing countries shift their arguments 
into a new ‗regime‘
38
 basing their claims on binding human rights obligations instead 
of relying solely on internal intellectual property-based arguments. I thus argue for 
the use of an ‗external‘ argument. ‗External arguments‘ are those which emphasize 
that intellectual property must comply with other kinds of law outside the intellectual 
property regime.  
The intellectual property system is intended to benefit both the producers of 
intellectual property goods (through incentives and rewards like patents and other 
monopolies) and the users of the products produced through the intellectual property 
system. However, intellectual property law recognizes and protects only the rights of 
producers. It is hardly surprising that the system has become unbalanced. A human 
rights approach that recognizes and protects the rights of both users and producers is 
more likely to achieve balanced outcomes.
39
 
The human rights system also offers standards and benchmarks against which 
the social costs of the intellectual property system can be assessed. Unlike the IP 
system, the human rights system provides an objective bottom line below which 
social costs are unacceptable; indeed, a failure to alleviate or avoid certain social 
costs may violate binding international commitments. 
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Several scholars and activists have argued that the rights set out in the 
ICESCR should be used to develop ‗user rights‘ that can be applied in the context of 
the intellectual property system.
40
 The Covenant is a high-status treaty which most 
countries have ratified.
41
 The vast majority of WTO and WIPO member states are 
also states parties to the ICESCR.
42
  This has important implications for negotiations 
at WIPO and the WTO.
43
 
As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, ICESCR member states have a binding 
legal obligation to abide by the provisions of that treaty. When establishing domestic 
intellectual property systems, negotiating international IP treaties, or interpreting 
TRIPS, they must ensure that the resulting provisions do not violate the rights set out 
in the Covenant. ICESCR states parties also have binding obligations to interpret 
TRIPS (and other treaties) in ways consistent with the ICESCR, and to use limitations 
and exceptions clauses
44
 where necessary to meet their ICESCR human rights 
obligations. The practical effect is that the vague, ambiguous, and unenforceable 
exceptions provisions of intellectual property treaties become specific and binding.
45
 
This gives users legally binding rights to the benefits of the intellectual property 
system – rights which the IP system itself does not recognize or protect. 
Other external arguments 
This dissertation examines only one external argument – the human rights 
argument outlined above. While I will not explore other external arguments, some 
successful challenges have been based on principles of international environmental 
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 See for example Drommen ‗Safeguarding legitimacy‘ at 121. 
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 159 states have ratified the ICESCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
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law, particularly the Convention on Biodiversity.
46
 These approaches have been used, 
for example, in the context of food security and the protection indigenous knowledge. 
I will discuss some aspects of these campaigns as part of the human rights approach. 
Cultural narratives 
Okediji has grouped critiques of the intellectual property regime into three 
‗narratives.‘ I have outlined two of the narrative groups: the ‗welfare enhancing‘ and 
‗human rights‘ narratives. Okediji‘s third category consists of ‗cultural narratives,‘
47
 
which are typically employed with reference to indigenous knowledge systems.
48
 
Potentially, cultural narratives present the most radical critique of Western
49
 
intellectual property systems, which are based on individualism and the 
commodification of ideas, creations and inventions.  Traditionally, indigenous 
knowledge is not commodified, not usually attributed (or even attributable) to any 
individual, and is shared and used communally for the benefit of the community.
50
 
Some cultural narratives reject Western IP systems outright, arguing that their terms 
are alien to indigenous knowledge systems, and that indigenous communities will not 
benefit from the adoption of such systems.
51
 However, because of the widespread 
uncompensated appropriation of indigenous knowledge by outsider commercial 
enterprises,
52
 indigenous communities are now focusing on how to protect indigenous 
knowledge within ‗Western-style‘ international IP property regimes.
53
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 Convention on Biological Diversity, concluded June 5, 1992, entered into force December 
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While questions related to indigenous knowledge have been raised during 
recent WIPO discussions on the Substantive Patent Law Treaty and the WIPO 
Development Agenda, developing countries have not used cultural narratives to resist 
the raising of minimum levels of patent protection. I do not believe that cultural 
narratives arguments would be strategic or effective in these particular IP policy 
space negotiations.  Developing states want to be part of the international trade 
regime and want access to patented products; they just want to change the terms on 
which they do so. For this reason, I do not have a separate chapter on the cultural 
narratives. I do, however, examine some of the issues raised by these narratives in the 
context of the human rights discussion, because the cultural narratives raise 
important, and potentially troubling, questions for those adopting a human rights-
based approach. 
Rejection arguments 
As noted above, the cultural narratives sometimes suggest outright rejection of 
the current global intellectual property system. The IP system has also been rejected 
for other reasons. Some scholars point out that human creativity and invention 
flourished for thousands of years before the first intellectual property system; they 
argue that an intellectual property system is not necessary.
54
 Some argue that, in 
practice, the system serves to enrich large multinational companies; stifles creativity; 
and makes it more difficult for society to benefit from the collective creativity and 
inventiveness of humankind – our common heritage.
55
 Others specifically object to 
the terms of the international trade regime of which TRIPS and other international 
intellectual property treaties are part. 
These authors raise valid concerns. There is merit in exploring alternatives to 
patent protection as means to encourage innovation in certain sectors (for example, 
                                                 
54
 Drahos and Braithwaite point to the great works of literature, art and music, and the many 
scientific discoveries and inventions emanating from Western Europe without intellectual 
property incentives (see Drahos & Braithwaite Information Feudalism at 210-211.) The 
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the development of drugs for the treatment of diseases which primarily affect the 
poor). However, outright rejection of the global intellectual property and trade 
systems does not appear to be a very practical strategy at this time – especially when 
so many people need the products of the current system. This does not necessarily 
imply an acceptance or endorsement of the patent system as such. As put by Jonathan 
Berger: ‗This ―acceptance‖ is utilitarian in nature, in that it is guided by an 
understanding that the strategic choice of engagement should in no way be seen as 
lending legitimacy or support for the status quo.‘
56
 On the whole, this dissertation 
takes the patent system as given (although it suggests reform of the system). This, 
however, ‗this should not be mistaken for implicit endorsement‘ of the system, ‗nor 
as undermining the basis for more foundational critiques‘
57
 that question whether the 
world would be better off without it.  
Focus on public health and essential medicines 
Because the subject matter of the patent system is so broad, I focus 
particularly on public health and the provision of essential medicines – both 
medicines that already exist, and those that have yet to be developed. In this regard, I 
will focus on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, diseases which annually kill 
millions of people in developing countries.
58
  
Health policy in developing countries needs to respond to this crisis in a range 
of ways. Intellectual property policy is an important part of this response, particularly 
through the ‗policy levers‘ within patent law which developing countries could use to 
create enough flexibility to respond to the health crisis in the optimum manner. I will 
examine the ways in which the enclosure of the available domestic IP space through 
international agreements has made it more difficult for developing states to use patent 
policy levers, and will argue that human rights offer strategically powerful tools in 
their efforts to retain or regain patent policy flexibility. 
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Development Agenda discussions 
This dissertation looks in detail at the recent WIPO Development Agenda 
discussions.
59
 The WIPO Development Agenda initiative can be understood as part of 
the on-going IP policy space battle between developed and developing countries. As 
will be explored in detail in the following chapters, the developed states have 
continually attempted to narrow the available IP policy space through more stringent 
international IP rules to which all states must adhere, regardless of local needs and 
circumstances. Having largely failed to resist these pressures during the TRIPS 
negotiations in the early 1990s, developing states united around the Access to 
Medicines Campaign, and, using an internal public health argument, succeeded in 
securing some rather modest gains during the WTO Doha discussions in 2001 and 
2003. Developed states have continued trying to reduce the available policy space 
through numerous bilateral treaties and, more recently, through attempts to set 
uniform substantive patenting standards in a new Substantive Patent Law Treaty. The 
WIPO Development Agenda must be understood in this context, as an attempt by a 
unified group of developing countries to bring a new case against developed states‘ 
pressures on their policy space, and also an attempt to influence the approach of 
WIPO itself. 
The Development Agenda was initiated by Argentina and Brazil which 
submitted a Proposal for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO at 
the 31
st
 Session of the WIPO General Assembly in September 2004.
60
 Brazil tabled a 
new document on 5 April 2005: Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for 
WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document WO/GA/31/11. This elaboration 
of the initial Argentina-Brazil proposal was authored by the Group of Friends of 
Development (GFD), a coalition of 14 developing states.
61
 It was not intended to 
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replace the initial proposal, but to endorse the initial document and further elaborate 
some of its central themes.
62
 
The two documents highlight development as the ‗most important challenge 
facing the international community,‘
63
 and argue that ‗the development dimension‘ 
should be integrated into all WIPO‘s activities, because as a United Nations agency, 
WIPO is bound to promote UN pro-development policies and programmes, including 
the Millennium Development Goals.
64
 While recognizing that, in certain 
circumstances, intellectual property protection can play a role in stimulating 
innovation and development, the documents express concern about the uncritical 
approach to IP protection endorsed by some developed states as well as by WIPO 
itself. This uncritical perspective tends to approach the ‗highly controversial issue‘ of 
intellectual property protection ‗as if it were governed by absolute truths, solely under 
the one dimensional perspective of the private rights holders, ignoring the broader 
public interest,‘
65
 ‗and appears to assume that higher protection levels are always and 
inherently beneficial in promoting development and innovation.‘
66
 The documents 
point out, however, that the impact of IP protection varies in different economic and 
social contexts, and that it is very unlikely that IP standards deemed appropriate to 
developed economies will have the same effect in developing and least-developed 
states. Indeed, it is possible that they will impede development.
67
 The documents 
suggest that WIPO examine the impact of its proposed IP protection levels on ‗the 
public interest, innovation and access to science, technology and the promotion of 
diverse national creative industries – in order to ensure material progress and welfare 
in the long run‘;
68
 request empirical impact studies to obtain more information and 
understanding about the effects of IP protection in different contexts;
69
 and suggest 
the creation of a WIPO Evaluation and Research Office (WERO) as an independent 
body to  monitor and assess WIPO projects.
70
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The documents stress that ‗intellectual property protection is not an end in 
itself, but rather a means to support public policy objectives such as economic, social, 
and cultural well-being.‘
71
 Although the ultimate goal of IP protection is to promote 
technological innovation for the benefit of society,
 72
 the documents recognize the 
inherent social costs of the monopoly-based nature of patent protection. They stress, 
however, that these costs must always be balanced against the likely benefits of IP 
protection.
73
 The documents stress the need for operable public interest flexibilities in 
international IP agreements
74
 to preserve the necessary IP policy space for states to 
structure their domestic intellectual property systems in ways appropriate to local 
economic and social conditions and that promote rather than impede domestic policy 
goals.
75
 IP policy and norm-setting activities, therefore, should be informed by a 
‗development dimension.‘
76
 The documents advocate ‗Pro-Development Norm-
Setting‘ which takes into account the development and public interest concerns of 
countries at different levels of development.
77
 The documents also stress the need for 
meaningful participation in norm-setting by all states (including developing and least-
developed countries rather than only wealthy developed states), as well as by non-
profit NGOs (rather than representatives of the ‗knowledge industries‘ only).
78
 
The Development Agenda documents stress that WIPO‘s development 
assistance should not be limited to mere ‗technical assistance,‘ and point out that 
WIPO‘s technical assistance programmes have tended to promote maximalist 
interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement.
79
 As a UN agency, WIPO should ensure that 
its advice is informed by UN development priorities, and should help states make use 
of TRIPS flexibilities to fashion TRIPS-compliant IP policies which take into account 
their specific development objectives and public interest priorities.
80
 
                                                 
71
 para 44. 
72
 Argentina-Brazil Proposal WIPO WO/GA/31/11 Annex section II. 
73
 GDF Proposal IIM/1/4 para 9. 
74
 Argentina-Brazil Development Agenda for WIPO (WO/GA/31/11) Annex section IV; GDF 
Proposal IIM/1/4 para 9. 
75
 GDF Proposal IIM/1/4 para 21 (a). 
76
 Argentina-Brazil Development Agenda for WIPO (WO/GA/31/11) Annex section II. 
77
 GDF Proposal IIM/1/4 paras 36- 57. 
78
 Argentina-Brazil Development Agenda for WIPO (WO/GA/31/11) Annex section VIII. 
79
 GDF Proposal IIM/1/4 paras 58- 82. 
80













A notable feature of the Development Agenda initiative is the lack of any 
‗human rights‘ discussion. Neither of the Development Agenda proposal documents 
refers to human rights; developing states seldom mentioned human rights concerns 
during the discussions; and there are no references to human rights norms in the 
Recommendations finally agreed upon.
81
 This seems a surprising omission. The 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and human 
rights activists and scholars have paid increasing attention to the potential 
implications of human rights within the intellectual property regime, and to the 
important ways in which a human rights focus can ensure that the intellectual 
property regime works for people. Similarly, a growing number of development 
workers, including major development agencies such as the World Bank, have 
increasingly begun to understand the human rights implications of development and 
how human rights standards can inform and improve the development process. 
The Development Agenda proposals will be examined in more detail 
throughout this dissertation, but the Development Agenda initiative must be 
understood in the context of previous international intellectual property negotiations: 
Chapters 3 and 5 examine previous negotiations in some detail.  It is also important to 
understand the nature of the patent system as a policy instrument and the policy levers 
it offers: this will be the focus of Chapter 2. In Chapter 4, I look more closely at why 
developing states need more available IP policy space by examining some of the 
challenges they face and how patent policy levers could be used to meet them. In 
Chapter 5, I critique the weaknesses of internal arguments in trying to claw back 
domestic policy space, and suggest that a human rights-based approach offers a 
stronger argument.  
In Chapter 6, I look at the ICESCR and show that it is possible to construct a 
legal argument in favour of increased IP policy space based on ICESCR rights, 
particularly Article 12 (the right to health) and Article 15 (the right to enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress). This is a theoretical discussion to show that it is 
possible to make such an argument using legal principles.  The more practical 
discussion in Chapter 7 examines the strategic advantages of the human rights 
argument, arguing that it is both possible and desirable to use the approach in 
practice. This chapter also examines some of the potential pitfalls of the approach. 

















Because the issue is so wide ranging, I have restricted the discussion to focus 
only on the patent system, particularly with regard to public health and the 
availability of medicines. I will examine the conditions necessary for creating 
sufficient incentive for the research and development of new medications, the positive 
and negative impacts that the patent system may have on R&D, and impacts of the 
system on the availability of these medicines once they have been developed. 
Throughout, I will use the positions taken in the Development Agenda 
documents to lay the groundwork for more in-depth discussion of the Development 
Agenda as a negotiating strategy. I will discuss the ways in which a focus on 
development provides strategic advantages over the narrower focus on public health 
employed during the Doha Ministerial discussions, but will also suggest some 
weaknesses in the new approach. 
 I will suggest that the Development Agenda initiative and the resulting 
Recommendations would have been stronger if the GFD had adopted an explicitly 













CHAPTER TWO  
THE PATENT SYSTEM: A BRIEF THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
 
This dissertation uses the concept ‗IP policy space‘ – the space available to 
governments to set IP policy appropriate to local circumstances and needs. In this 
chapter I examine the patent system as a policy instrument and show that the system 
has many important ‗policy levers‘ – flexibilities that governments can use when 
establishing local patent regimes, provided that they have sufficient policy space in 
which to do so.  
Developed states often base their arguments on ‗the economics of the patent 
system,‘ and argue that higher protection levels promote innovation; indeed, they used 
this argument repeatedly during the WIPO Development Agenda talks. I respond to 
this argument by examining several economic studies and conclude that it is 
impossible to determine optimal protection standards.  
The role of the patent system 
The most important purpose of the patent system is to encourage the 
development of new products for the benefit of society, thus furthering the public 
good and promoting development. As the Development Agenda proposal documents 
note, intellectual property protection is not ‗an end in itself,‘ but ‗a means for 
promoting the public interest, innovation, and access to science, technology and the 
promotion of diverse national creative industries – in order to ensure material progress 
and welfare in the long run.‘
1
 It is ‗a means to support public policy objectives such as 
economic, social, and cultural well-being.‘
2
  
Much current IP discourse suggests that patents are a natural, obvious, and 
non-negotiable reward for inventing new products or investing in the R&D that leads 
to their development. Yet, in the history of human inventiveness, patents are a 
relatively recent tool.
3
 In Britain, for example, there was considerable doubt about the 
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worth, legitimacy, and usefulness of the patent system until the early 1870s.
4
 Until the 
late nineteenth century, patents were regarded as grants of privilege, monopolies 




The historical debate over the worth and usefulness of the patent system 
reminds us that the patent system was developed as a policy tool to be used by 
governments to encourage development of ‗important inventions‘ to benefit society.
 6
  
Indeed, this remains the core justification for patent monopolies, and ‗There is 
virtually unanimous agreement that the purpose of the patent system is to promote 
innovation by granting exclusive rights to encourage invention.‘
7
  
The historical debates remind us that a patent system is not the only way to 
encourage development of useful inventions. Economists and other scholars agree that 
while the patent system can be a useful and powerful policy instrument under certain 
conditions,
8
 it is not necessary for encouraging innovation,
9
 nor is it necessarily the 
optimal way to promote development of new and useful products.
10
 Patents‘ impacts 
differ by field of technology and in different economic contexts,
11
 and are influenced 
                                                 
4
 Sherman & Bently Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law at 130-131; May & Sell 
IPR History at 115-117. 
5
 Sherman & Bently Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law at 131. See also Sell 
‗TRIPS‘ at 489-490; Dreyfuss ‗TRIPS Round II‘ at 26-27. 
6
 Sherman & Bently Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law at 101. See also Drahos 
Death of Patents at 1-2 discussing this and other historic policy objectives. 
7
 Burk and Lemley ‗Policy levers‘ at 1580. See also Okediji Limitations at ix; Drahos 
Philosophy; Primo Braga and Fink ‗Foreign direct investment‘ at 164-165; Cornish 
Intellectual Property at 129; Barton argues that: ‗A patent monopoly is justified only if the 
monopoly is likely to lead to genuine incentives for research and for bringing new products to 
market..‘ (Barton ‗World patent system‘ at 623. 
8
 Gifford, for example, asserts that ‗the patent system is without peer in routing resources to 
the creation of the technological needs of modern societies,‘ although he questions whether 
the benefits to society are optimally realized.  (Gifford ‗Social benefits and costs‘ at 77; 
Primo Braga and Fink ‗Foreign direct investment‘ at 166. 
9
 Some inventors are primarily motivated by other kinds of benefits: for example prestigious 
academic appointments, state grants, or the possibility of fame and prizes (Landes and Posner 
Economic Structure at 307).  Others may be motivated primarily by curiosity or altruism (for 
example, Marie Curie).  See further Gallini and Scotchmer ‗Best incentive system‘ at 53-56; 
Jaffe ‗Policy innovation‘ at 554; Kahin ‗Innovation diversity‘ at 389. 
10
 Taylor and Silberston Economic Impact of the Patent System; Mansfield ‗Patents and 
innovation‘; Gallini ‗Economics of patents.‘ The Development Agenda documents request 
that WIPO investigate alternatives to patents, pointing out that the IP protection is ‗neither the 
only way nor necessarily the most efficient or appropriate means‘ for promoting creativity 
and innovation (GDF Proposal IIM/1/4 para 16). 
11













by a wide range of factors.
12
 After his extensive state-sponsored
13
 investigation of the 
patent system in 1958, Fritz Machlup concluded that:  ‗If we did not have a patent 
system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its 
economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a 
patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible on the basis of our present 
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.‘
14
 
It would be impossible and undesirable, given the enormous investments in the 
current patent system, to dismantle the entire edifice at this stage. Nevertheless, the 
system is ineffective in generating research into certain products that are important 
and necessary for the good of society. Drugs for the prevention and treatment of 
widespread pandemics like malaria and tuberculosis are prime examples of this 
failure. Furthermore, even when it does encourage the invention of new products, the 
patent system has significant inherent social costs. 
How does the patent system encourage innovation? 
This section discusses how the patent system encourages innovation by 
examining its workings in some detail. A patent is an exclusive monopoly giving the 
patent-holder ‗a monopoly to work the patented invention to the exclusion of others 
for a period of time.‘
15
 This monopoly is made up of several exclusive rights. Article 
28 of the TRIPS agreement is a typical patent clause, setting out the exclusive rights 
of patentees.  For product patents, the patentee has an exclusive right ‗to prevent third 
parties not having the owner‘s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for 
sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product.‘
16
 For process patents, the 
patentee has the exclusive right ‗to prevent third parties not having the owner‘s 
consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for 
sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by 
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 The monopolies are granted for a specific period, after which, the 
patented invention enters the ‗public domain‘ and may be copied without restriction.
18
 
The system relies on the premise that the possibility of an exclusive monopoly 
to make and sell a useful new invention provides an incentive for people to invent 
things and to invest in the research, development and manufacture of innovative 
technologies. Much of the modern understanding of the patent system is based on the 
early economic studies of Kenneth Arrow and others.
19
Arrow argues that 
technological innovation is driven by the economic investment choices of profit-
making institutions, which invest in research and development if they think the 
potential new products will be profitable, and perhaps more profitable than alternative 
(and possibly less risky) investments.
20
 In part, the patent system exists to compensate 
for market failure. Producers of tangible goods that people want are rewarded when 
consumers buy these goods at profit prices.
21
 This is not always true for producers of 
economically valuable knowledge and information created through expensive 
research and development: once information is available, others can use it without 
incurring their own R&D costs.
22
 Unless an inventor can capture some of this newly 
created economic good, there might be insufficient incentive to innovate.
23
 The patent 
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system thus protects investments in the generation of knowledge that would otherwise 




In addition to encouraging innovation, the patent system serves a disclosure 
function. The grant of a patent requires that the patentee make a disclosure in the 
patent claim that is ‗sufficient to enable others to use it‘
25
 in a public document.
26
 
Non-licensees are not permitted to manufacture patented products, but they may learn 
other useful things, including how to invent around the patented product,
27
 thus 
offering benefits that would be unavailable under alternative policies like trade 
secrecy.
28
 The patent process may thus play an important role in the dissemination 
and diffusion of information, which could lead to social welfare gains.
29
  
Importantly, patent protection lasts only for a limited period. Once it elapses, 
the invention falls into the public domain and everyone is free to manufacture, use, 
improve upon, or sell it free of monopoly prices. 
Patents can play a very important role in encouraging innovation.
30
 Under 
certain circumstances, patents encourage investment, research, and the development 
of new processes and products which would otherwise not be available. Patents are 
generally regarded as especially important in the pharmaceutical sector, because new 
drugs are notoriously expensive and risky to develop, and require large investments of 
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capital, time, and labour for uncertain returns.
31
 To the extent that the patent system 
drives investment in potentially risky and expensive pharmaceutical innovation, it 
should be viewed positively: society places an extremely high value on 
pharmaceutical innovation, and this is a sector of ‗high social utility.‘
32
 The 
pharmaceutical industry reaps extremely high profits from their ability to secure 
patent monopolies – which explains the lengths to which the industry is willing to go 
to ensure that the system remains in place.
33
  
Patent basics: Core concepts and potential policy levers 
The GFD Development Agenda document refers to the ‗policy space‘ 
available to states to establish locally-appropriate norms and rules for domestic patent 
systems.
34
 This section discusses some of the ‗policy levers‘
35
 inherent in the patent 
system. Policy levers originate in the fact that patent monopolies are government 
grants, which the state may award at its discretion, and on the terms and conditions it 
sees fit.
36
 A state can use its authority to fashion a patent system appropriate for its 
circumstances and needs, if it has enough IP policy space within which to do so. 
Patentable subject matter  
The first potential policy lever is deciding what kinds of products and 
processes can be patented. In principle, states should have the discretion to decide 
which kinds of inventions will be awarded patent protection and which will be 
excluded from the patent system. They can also decide to offer patent protection to 
products only, or to processes only. The Indian Patent Act of 1970, for example, 
excluded pharmaceuticals from product patentability, on the grounds that, because 
pharmaceuticals are vital to the health of the community, they should not be subject to 
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 Until fairly recently, many states excluded certain products and 
processes from patentability on similar policy grounds.
38
  
Naturally occurring substances (which are ‗discovered‘ rather than ‗invented‘) 
have also traditionally been excluded from patent protection, as have ideas and ‗pure 
scientific research‘ that have not yet been developed into more concrete products or 
processes. Article 52(a) of the European Patent Convention,
39
 for example, 
specifically excludes discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods. 
Such exclusions have come under increasing pressure.  The United States 
Supreme Court, for example, has interpreted the term ‗patentable subject matter‘ to 
‗cover everything under the sun made by man.‘
40
 This trend has been particularly 
controversial in the biotechnology industry where, as discussed in Chapter 4, grants of 
patents over isolated gene sequences and other discoveries in microbiology have had 
negative impacts on upstream research. 
Utility and the inventive step 
In principle, governments can determine which requirements an invention 
must meet in order to qualify for a monopoly grant, providing another potential policy 
lever within the patent system.  Typically, to qualify for a patent, an invention must be 
novel, must involve an ‗inventive step,‘ (that is, it must be ‗non-obvious‘ to someone 
skilled in the art), and must be capable of industrial application.
41
  
The requirements are not as straightforward as they seem. What, for example, 
is an ‗inventive step?‘ When would the patented product or process not have been 
                                                 
37
 Ragavan ‗Uruguay Round‘ at 289-290. See also Cullet ‗Patents and medicines‘ at 143. 
38
 Musungu and Dutfield ‗WIPO‘ at 14, noting that many developed states excluded 
pharmaceuticals from patenting until the 1960s or 1970s. 
39
 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct 5, 1973, (1973) 13 ILM 270. 
40
 Diamond v Chakrabarty 447 US 303 (1980) at 309-310. The court recognized a patent on a 
genetically engineered bacterium. See Jaffe ‗Policy innovation‘ at 535, discussing the 
‗expansion of the realm of patentability‘; see also leading cases illustrative of this trend such 
as Diamond v Diehr 450 US 175 (1981). 
41
 The South African Patents Act 57 of 1978, for example, provides that ‗A patent may, 
subject to the provisions of this section, be granted for any new invention which involves an 
inventive step and which is capable of being used or applied in trade or industry or 
agriculture.‘ (section 25(1)). There are similar provisions in the Canadian Patent Act (RSC 
1985, c P-4) at s 28 (2-3); the British Patent  Act 1977 c 37 (as amended by 2004 c 16) at s 1; 













obvious to someone skilled in the art?
42
 Patents may be granted more or less readily, 
depending on whether the non-obviousness and other requirements are strictly or 
liberally applied. Economists have investigated the effects of using patentability 
requirements as a policy tool in designing a patent system.
43
 I examine this in more 
detail below.  
Scope of the patent 
Patent scope or breadth defines the boundaries of what the patent protects and 
does not protect.
44
 This is determined by the patent claim and how it is interpreted in 
court.
45
 Patent scope determines the subject matter for which the patentee has an 
exclusive right and which actions by others will be regarded as infringing those rights. 
The broader the scope of the patent, the larger the patent-holder‘s monopoly.  
Courts may extend patent breadth by using the ‗doctrine of equivalents‘ which 
extends protection to products or processes not explicitly mentioned in the patent 
claim, but regarded as more or less equivalent to those that are expressly claimed.
46
 
They may also narrow the scope of the patent using the ‗doctrine of enablement,‘ 




In principle, states‘ capacity to manipulate the scope of patent monopolies 
creates a potential policy lever to establish an optimal patent system. Manipulation of 
patent scope is discussed in more detail below. 
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Length of the patent 
Another potential policy lever is the period for which patent protection is 
awarded. In principle, states can decide how long a grant will last, whether this period 
will be dated from the date of invention or the date on which the patent application is 
filed,
48
 and whether the period should be extended to compensate for the time it takes 
to obtain regulatory approval for new products (such as pharmaceuticals).
49
 
Limitations and exceptions to patent rights 
Patent rights are never absolute, and patent law typically provides for 
limitations and exceptions to the broad monopoly rights awarded to patentees. These 
exceptions and limitations are potentially very powerful policy levers for states 
attempting to balance the social costs and benefits of their patent systems or to ensure 
their optimal efficiency. For example, some domestic patent systems allow 
researchers to use patented products or processes for ‗research purposes‘ without 
payment of licence fees, and most patent systems permit the state to award 
compulsory licences for patented products under specified conditions. These policy 
levers are discussed extensively throughout this thesis. 
The next section discusses how to ensure a balance between the costs and 
benefits of the patent regime. 
Inherent social costs of the patent system 
As noted in the Development Agenda documents, the patent system is 
intended to encourage innovation for the good of society. Because it grants exclusive 
monopolies, however, these social benefits come at high social costs inherent in the 
very design of the system.
50
 With an exclusive monopoly, the patent-holder is free to 
manufacture and use the patented product without competition from others, and to sell 
the patented goods at higher prices than would be possible under competitive 
conditions. Very often, this monopoly profit price is too expensive for all consumers, 
and some consumers who would have been willing to buy the patented invention at a 
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lower cost – at an ordinary profit price – will decide not to purchase.
51
 In economic 
terms, this lost profit is described as a ‗deadweight loss,‘ and is an inherent flaw in the 
system from an economic perspective.
52
  
In social terms, deadweight loss represents actual people who cannot buy new 
goods at monopoly prices. It is most prevalent for ‗pioneer inventions‘ for which there 
are no ready alternatives.
53
 Here the inventor is able to set very high supracompetitive 
prices, and social loss is most extreme, because there are no substitutes.
54
 
Pharmaceutical products often fall into this category.
55
 
It is important to remember that the patent system is a policy instrument 
intended to promote innovation for the public good.
56
 While short-term social costs 
are an inherent feature of the system, governments should in principle be able to 
manipulate the policy levers and adjust the system to reduce short-term social costs 
while promoting innovation. Policy-makers must weigh up the costs and benefits in 
ways that are most beneficial to society at large.
57
 Naturally, the public at large will 
be unable to enjoy the fruits of innovation if there is insufficient incentive for 
investment in technological development.
58
 It would not be in the public interest to 
reduce incentives to levels unattractive to investors and researchers, but much of the 
general public might be unable to benefit from innovation if patent monopolies make 
products unaffordable.
59
   
The Development Agenda documents point out that governments need enough 
policy space to ensure a balance between the benefits and inherent social costs of the 
patent system, and to ensure that the impact of the patent system is not prejudicial to 
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economic and social welfare in the short term.
60
 They stress the importance of ‗public 
interest flexibilities‘ in the international intellectual property system
61
 – those policy 
levers available to states when establishing domestic patent policy. 
Economist Louis Kaplow argues that  
a rational society will determine the level of innovation that it desire[s], 
and will then generate … that innovation at the least cost. Ideally, society 
should limit the patent term to the point when the marginal social costs 




Unfortunately, economists have been unable to identify this ‗ideal point.‘ 
Kaplow himself examines the effects of altering the length of patent terms.  Longer 
patent terms might encourage more innovation (a benefit to society), but at an 
additional social cost – a longer period during which the patented invention is 
available only on patented terms; shorter periods might have the opposite result.
63
 He 
acknowledges, however, that it is ‗virtually impossible to determine either the value 
of new innovation or the monopoly loss from a hypothetical extension of the patent 
term.‘
64
 Some recent studies conclude that in the case of ‗pioneering products‘ such as 
new pharmaceuticals, the overall welfare benefit to society is best met by using 
shorter patent terms;
65
 other studies reach the conclusion that ‗the socially cost-
effective way to achieve a given reward to innovators is to have infinitely-lived 




Using policy levers to balance social costs and benefits is particularly 
important for the pharmaceuticals industry and the biotechnology sector that supports 
it. These sectors are integral to public health, a major social and public welfare 
concern; yet are probably the most heavily integrated into and governed by the 
international patent regime. It is especially important to ensure that the benefits 
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flowing from patent monopolies in the long term do not adversely affect social 
welfare in the shorter term. Balance has a very visible human dimension. 
Unfortunately, economists can offer almost no guidance on the optimal levels 
of patent protection. Priest tells us that ‗economists know almost nothing about the 
effect on social welfare of the current patents system‘ and are unable to resolve 
‗whether activity stimulated by the patent system … enhances or diminishes social 
welfare ….‘
67
  Studies that have attempted to set an optimal balance between 
encouraging innovation and ensuring that monopoly protection does not prejudice 
public welfare have been contingent, tentative and inconclusive. They examine only 
particular products, industries, and contexts. Most studies have been based on 
theoretical models, not on empirical investigation, and have assumed a developed-
country economic context. Even very specific studies such as those examining a 
particular form of protection and its effects on product-availability are inconclusive, 
because, as with all economic studies, ‗results differ according to the assumptions 
made and models used.‘
68
 
Economists have demonstrated, however, that the impact of intellectual 
property protection is ‗directly related to prevailing socio-economic circumstances.‘
69
 
Thus, it is highly improbable that tentative conclusions drawn from modelling in a 
developed market can be applied in developing markets. Developed-state negotiators 
have insisted on raising global minimum protection levels to the levels deemed 
appropriate
70
 for developed economies, but there is virtually no empirical evidence on 
how minimum protection levels affect developing counties.
71
 The GFD argue that 
international IP norm-setting has led to unprecedented raising of minimum protection 
standards ‗with little consideration for their actual costs and benefits to developing 
countries,‘
72
 and criticize the assumptions made by WIPO and some developed 
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countries that strengthening of patents and other IP protection is necessarily beneficial 
despite ‗current worldwide debate questioning the appropriateness of such an 
approach.‘
73
 They point out that states at different levels of development ‗face 
different challenges and different needs,‘
74
 and that intellectual property standards 
should be flexible enough to respond to the public interest and ‗specific development 
needs of each country.‘
75
 Because social and economic contexts differ so widely, 
international patent rules must be flexible enough to allow states to strike a balance 
between the interests of patent-holders and the wider public interest appropriate to 
local economic and social circumstances.
76
 Although there is little empirical data on 
the social and economic impact of IP protection in developing countries, the GFD 
point out that IP protection standards and WIPO‘s norm-setting activities should be 
based on the available empirical evidence.
77
  
Another social cost associated with the patent system is its inability to 
encourage R&D into products for which there is no attractive market. Because the 
patent system relies on the market, it is not effective in generating R&D for products 
that are required predominantly by poor people. A prime example is its failure to 
encourage research into new technologies to prevent and control major diseases such 
as tuberculosis and malaria.
78
 Because there is no attractive market for such products, 
commercial companies are reluctant to risk the necessary financial investment 
required to develop them.
79
  
As discussed in Chapter 4, a number of state-sponsored programmes have 
been initiated to make up for this failure of the patent system. These programmes rely 
on other kinds of funding, or on incentives like prizes. Because they necessarily 
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require the use of upstream research tools such as patented gene sequences, enzymes, 
and other products of biotech research, these programmes are not really ‗outside of 
the patent system,‘ but are affected by the patents over research tools and other 
upstream products. Governments still need to use such patent policy levers as 
compulsory licences, recognition of research exemptions, or refusal to grant broad 
patents over essential research tools like gene sequences, proteins, enzymes, SNPs, 
and ESTs to make this ‗non-patent-system-research‘ possible.
80
 
Using policy levers to optimize the efficiency of the patent 
system 
Policy levers are important not only for achieving a balance between the social 
costs and benefits of the patent system, but also for ensuring that the system promotes 
innovation in the first place. 
In the previous section, I cited a few economic studies which explored the 
optimal balance between promoting innovation and the consequent social cost. 
Economists have paid considerably more attention to the question of optimal levels of 
intellectual property protection for encouraging innovation itself.  For the system to 
work efficiently there should be enough protection to encourage innovation, yet not so 
much that innovation is deterred. Thus, the patent system is built on an inherent 
tension between two forces pulling in opposite directions.
81
  
Gervais points out that, if insufficient patent protection is offered to 
innovators, they ‗will either turn to other forms of protection or simply invest less 
time and money to pursue innovation,‘ the effect of which is that fewer innovative 
products will be researched and developed.
82
 On the other hand, overprotection of 
intellectual property rights may also stifle innovation. As explained by Maskin, 
strengthening intellectual property protection has two important impacts. As a ‗direct 
effect‘ it will encourage more innovation: ‗If I am going to be rewarded with a longer 
or broader patent whenever I discover something, I will have correspondingly more 
incentive to try to make such a discovery.‘
83
 However, there is also an ‗indirect 
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 Gervais TRIPS at 65. 
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effect‘: ‗to deter innovation‘ by others.
84
 ‗If the property right you have to your 
invention is strengthened, you will then have more monopoly power over me if I try 
to use your invention to make one of my own. In other words, it will now be more 
expensive for me to innovate, and so I have less incentive to do it.‘
85
 
Early studies on the economics of the patent system
86
 tended to focus on 
stimulating ‗pioneer inventions,‘ and assumed that inventors do not need to use or 
build on patented products or techniques in the course of their own product 
development.
 87
 They concluded that broader, more powerful patents would provide 
greater incentives, and thus stimulate more innovation.
88
 However, pioneer inventions 
are unusual – almost all innovation is cumulative, and often builds on or uses 
technology which is itself still under patent restriction.
89
 This raises some extremely 
complex questions about the ‗internal balance‘ of the system.    
There are hundreds of economic papers exploring optimal levels of patent 
protection for encouraging ‗innovation.‘
90
 Most of these are based on economic 
models, and rely on specified assumptions and simplification of very complex 
realities.
91
 Different conclusions could be drawn, depending on the assumptions 
made, and on which variables are included in the model. The studies are also 
restricted to particular industries, particular kinds of inventions, and particular 
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There have been many studies exploring optimal patent ‗strength,‘ defined in 
terms of various combinations of patent breadth and length, the available exceptions 
and limitations to the patent protection, and the ease and price of obtaining licences 
under the patent.
93
 Almost all studies exploring optimal patent scope and length are 
based on theoretical modelling. In his seminal article, Edward Kitch argued that the 
patent system worked most efficiently when broad patents were awarded to initial 
inventors. He argued that the initial inventors were best positioned to conduct follow-
on research themselves, or to direct it efficiently through licensing.
94
 A number of 
recent researchers have reached similar conclusions, under particular conditions.
95
 
There is some evidence to conclude that stronger patent rights provide greater 
encouragement to ‗initial inventors‘ who want to ensure that they see a return on their 




But, others argue that innovation is most efficient when a larger number of 
people are able to work on a problem under competitive conditions.
97
 If this is true, 
narrower patents for initial inventions are optimal.
98
 Some studies conclude that 
overly strong patent rights deter follow-on innovation.
99
 Other studies, however, 
suggest that in certain industries, stronger patents may have the benefit of obliging 
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other innovators to invent around existing patents, a scenario which may stimulate 
rather than impede innovation.
100
 Some studies have concluded that short, broad 
patents are the optimal spur to innovation in certain industries.
101
 Others conclude that 
long, but very narrow patents are optimal, since they oblige innovators to invent 
around a patent, rather than wait it out, but provide sufficient space in which to do 
so.
102
 Some analyses use an inverted U curve ( ∩ ) and conclude that until a certain 
point on the curve is reached, strengthening patents may encourage innovation, but 
strengthening them beyond this point will tend to deter innovation and also have 
significantly detrimental effects on social welfare.
103
  
Jaffe, among many others, points out that broader patents are more valuable 
and might therefore provide greater incentive to innovate, but that ‗an inventor also 
has to worry about producing an invention that will be judged to infringe someone 
else‘s patent; broader patent scope makes this more likely and hence makes research 
riskier and less valuable.‘
104
 Cohen et al distinguish between ‗complex‘ and ‗discrete‘ 
products depending on whether ‗a new commercializable product or process is 
comprised of numerous separately patentable elements [typical of the electronics 
industry] versus relatively few [more typical of new drugs or chemicals].‘
105
 Gallini 
examines whether stronger patents encourage more technology transfer through 
licensing of patented technologies, and concludes that there is evidence to show that 
patentees who feel secure about their bargaining position because of strong patent 
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protection are more likely to negotiate licences. On the other hand, weaker patents 
mean that competitors can devise their own non-infringing imitations; licences may 
be awarded to discourage this, which makes the overall effect inconclusive.
106
 In a 
separate study, Gallini and Scotchmer conclude that ‗the ideal design of an 
intellectual property system depends on the ease with which rightsholders can enter 
into licensing agreements.‘
107
 In their survey of these studies on optimal patent 
models for initial inventions Encaoua, Guellec and Martínez conclude that while none 
of the economists have provided ‗definite results‘ for the ‗optimal mix between length 
and breadth … there is a strong presumption that a combination of narrow and long 
protection is preferable when other features such as patent-races, licensing and 
characteristics of the product market competition are introduced.‘
108
  
Some studies have concluded that, in certain cases, a period of patent 
exclusivity will be important in creating a profit, but it might not be necessary for it to 
run for an entire patent term because sufficient profit to encourage innovation might 
be foreseeable through a shorter period. In other cases, however, even a full patent 
period of 20 years might not generate an attractive profit.
109
 Some inventors do not 
invent for financial profit, and in these cases the length of the patent term is probably 
irrelevant – indeed, some of them might not seek a patent at all.
110
  
It is important to bear in mind that patents sometimes can completely block 
whole new lines of research,
111
 and that firms sometimes deliberately file strategic 
‗blocking‘ patents to prevent the development of new products by their rivals, even if 
they have no intention of developing the patented technology themselves.
112
  Firms 
may also engage in other kinds of patent suppression, including refusal to license their 
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Almost all studies exploring optimal patent scope and length have been based 
on theoretical modelling. There are few empirical studies, because it is much harder to 
control variables in the real world or find ‗natural experiments from which different 
degrees of patent scope can be observed.‘
114
 The available empirical studies have 
sometimes produced evidence tending to conflict with the conclusions reached by 
theoretical modelling, particularly the models that tend to favour broad patents for 
initial inventions.
115
 Many studies point out that there is little empirical evidence that 
increasing patent strength leads to an increase in innovation – and, indeed, there might 
be indications to the contrary.
116
 Many empirical studies conclude that there are ‗deep 
structural differences in how [different] industries innovate.‘
117
  
Is it possible to set optimal standards? 
The studies sketched above demonstrate that economists appear to reach 
different (although tentative) conclusions when examining different industries in 
different contexts. It would appear that ‗definite conclusions … are generally not yet 
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 Economists are broadly agreed, however, that the economic functioning 
of the patent system differs substantially between ‗initial inventions‘ and ‗follow-on‘ 
inventions; for various industries and types of products;
119
 and depends on the 
economic context within which it is examined (for example, the size of the local 
market, whether technology goods are imported or exported, and whether there is a 
high rate of innovation in a particular economy). Given this wide range of contexts, 
economists agree that ‗one size‘ will not ‗fit all‘. It is difficult for economists to agree 
on optimal patent strength for one product in one industry in one economic context – 
but they do agree that it is certainly not possible to identify an optimal patent strength 
for all contexts, with regard to patent length and breadth, the types of products and 
processes that should be patented, the exemptions and exceptions that should be 
permitted, the level of inventiveness (non-obviousness and novelty) that should be 
required for patenting, or whether the patent system is the optimal method of 
stimulating research, development and innovation. In short, economists agree that 




Yet, developed-country negotiators continue to base their arguments largely 
on ‗the economics of the patent system‘ in an uncritical and unreflective manner, 
continue to insist that stronger patent protection is desirable, and continue to push for 
a uniform patent policy for all industries in all contexts.
121
 Even WIPO, ‗the one 
agency entrusted with managing intellectual property rights at the international level‘ 
has ‗tended to interpret its legislative mandate as one of progressively elevating 
intellectual property rights throughout the world. Whether this strategy actually 
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During the WIPO Development Agenda talks, developed countries continued 
to argue that higher and more stringent levels of patent protection are required to 
stimulate innovation into useful products, and to assume that because patents 
encourage innovation, higher levels of patent protection will encourage even more 
innovation. Developing states countered that economic studies are unable to offer any 
clear and unambiguous advice about optimal protection levels, particularly in 
developing economies. They further noted that the current IP standards had adverse 
social costs (particularly for the implementation of public health programmes) and 
impeded innovation in developing states by making necessary research tools 
unaffordable. They argued that they need enough policy space to devise domestic 
patent regimes most appropriate to their circumstances.
123
  
Using patents to stimulate innovation, technology transfer and 
economic growth in developing countries 
Developed states have argued that if developing countries institute IP regimes 
with protection levels equivalent to their own, they will stimulate local innovation, 
foreign direct investment, technology transfer, and consequent overall economic 
growth.
 124
  These claims are impossible to prove theoretically, and do not seem to be 
supported by the available empirical evidence.  
During recent international IP policy negotiations (including the WIPO 
Development Agenda talks), developing countries argued that none of these claims 
has been tested and proved, pointing out that higher levels of patent protection have 
had directly observable negative impacts on social welfare in many developing 
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208). 
124
 For discussion on how such promises featured in the TRIPS negotiations see Drahos & 
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countries, particularly by reducing access to patented antiretroviral medicines. While 
these costs can be clearly observed, the supposed benefits of the system are less 
obvious. It remains uncertain whether the implementation of patent systems in 
developing countries will encourage local innovation, foreign direct investment, 
technology transfer, and economic development; or that raising patent levels will 
encourage more local innovation. The Development Agenda proposal documents thus 
request, at the very least, thorough social and economic impact analyses to 
demonstrate the possible or probable outcomes of higher patenting levels, and what 
mechanisms should be employed.
125
 
The developed countries have asserted that the short-term social welfare costs 
caused by raised IP standards are reasonable given the considerable long-term 
benefits of raised IP standards in encouraging foreign investment, local innovation, 
and therefore, overall economic growth. In Chapter 4, I will show that the 
demonstrable ‗short-term‘ social welfare costs are too great to be regarded as 
reasonable, even if the apparent longer-term benefits were guaranteed. I argue further 
that these ‗short-term‘ social welfare costs should be regarded as human rights 
violations, illegal in terms of binding international instruments. 
In the following section, I try to rebut some of the developed states‘ arguments 
by reviewing studies which have raised serious doubts about whether even the long-
term gains promised by the developed states are probable outcomes of raised IP 
standards. 
IP, local innovation, and technology transfer 
Much of the optimism underlying the developed countries‘ position is based 
on a hugely influential paper
126
 drafted by Edwin Mansfield for the World Bank‘s 
International Finance Corporation in 1994, the year that TRIPS was implemented. 
Mansfield reported that American companies were more willing to transfer 
technology and invest in countries where they felt comfortable with the levels of 
intellectual property protection provided.
127
 Since then, the Mansfield paper has been 
‗ubiquitously cited for that proposition that if developing countries raise their levels of 
                                                 
125
 GDF Proposal IIM/1/4 para 44. 
126
 Heald, for example, writes that ‗it would be hard to overestimate the influence of 
Mansfield‘s … study ….‘ (Heald ‗A sceptical look‘ at 57). 
127













intellectual property protection (especially patents), they will attract foreign 
investment and technology transfer.‘
128
 
More in-depth theoretical economic analyses, as well as consideration of 
empirical data since 1994, tend to suggest that, while raising intellectual property 
standards has had demonstrably negative effects on public welfare in developing 
countries,
129
 it has not attracted the promised investment and technology transfer,
130
 
and seldom seems to increase levels of local innovation.  
Certainly, there are studies showing a correlation between raised IP standards 
and foreign investment, and some authors suggest a causal relationship between the 
two.
131
 There are also studies suggesting that raised IP standards may increase local 
innovation.
132
 Linear causal relationships are very difficult to show in any economic 
model, and it appears that in these case-studies (as in others) factors other than IP 
protection are more important in attracting investment or stimulating innovation. 
Indeed, most economic studies (whether theoretical or empirical), agree that many 
factors contribute to the likelihood of technology transfer, FDI, or local innovation. 
The most important of these include the size of the local markets and states‘ 
productive and innovative capacities.
133
 
                                                 
128
 Heald ‗A sceptical look‘ at 3. Heald looks closely at Mansfield‘s paper and, apart from 
questioning the conclusions that Mansfield himself reached, points out that Mansfield‘s 
arguments and conclusions have been exaggerated, crudified, and used out of context in 
subsequent arguments. There have been many other papers critiquing Mansfield. See for 
example, Christopher Kalanji, a WIPO author, ‗Direct foreign investment‘. 
129
 These include the public health concerns discussed in Chapter 4, as well as the provision of 
other public goods such as environmental protection, education, and scientific advancement . 
(Maskus and Reichman ‗Globalization‘ at 4). 
130
 International technology transfer can be defined as the ‗shifting of information across 
borders‘ and ‗its effective diffusion into recipient economies,‘ including, for example, the sale 
of foreign-made goods, local manufacture of foreign products under licence, foreign direct 
investment in the form of production plants, and technical assistance. (Maskus and Reichman 
‗Globalization‘ at 11). See also Primo Braga and Fink ‗Foreign direct investment‘ at 167; 
Correa ‗Technology transfer‘ at 229. 
131
 See for example discussion of the enormous increase of Chinese patent applications during 
the last ten years (Straus ‗Impact‘ at 6) and several studies on R&D investment in China: Gao 
& Tisdell ‗China‘s reformed system‘;  Fischer & von Zedtwitz ‗Chinese R&D‘; Straus 
‗Impact‘; and in India: Bowonder and Richardson ‗Business led R&D‘. 
132
 Eg Chen and Puttitanun ‗Innovation in developing countries‘ at 489-90. 
133
 See Primo Braga and Fink ‗Foreign direct investment‘ at 167. See also Roffe ‗Technology 
transfer‘ at 261. The United Kingdom CIPR has concluded that ‗in most low income 
countries, with a weak scientific and technological infrastructure, IP protection at the levels 
mandated by TRIPS is not a significant determinant of growth. On the contrary, rapid growth 














To increase local innovation and develop local knowledge industries, the key 
factor is local ‗innovative capacity.‘ Innovative capacity depends on existing levels of 
economic development; the infrastructure (not only physical infrastructure, but the 
information, education, research, legal, financial, and business infrastructure); the 
education levels of the workforce (both skilled labour and highly skilled labour such 
as scientists); and the existing levels of ‗scientific and technological capacity.‘
134
  
States which do not have sufficient innovative capacity are unlikely to 
stimulate local innovation whether or not they raise IP protection levels.
135
 For states 
that do have some local innovative capacity, the effect of raising IP standards is 
uncertain, but is closely related to local economic conditions.
136
 In most cases, raised 
IP protection levels appear to have a negative effect on local innovation. To some 
extent, this could be anticipated, because of the cumulative nature of research and 
innovation. As discussed in Chapter 4, many of the research ‗inputs‘ upon which 
follow-on research is based, are subject to IP restrictions that make them unaffordable 
to developing states.
137
 Indeed, if companies in developed countries fear competition 




Using an empirical and theoretical analysis of 19 developed and 28 developing 
countries, Schneider concludes that raising IP protection levels tends to have either a 
negligible or even a negative effect on innovation in developing states.
139
 She notes 
that innovation levels depend on a range of factors including ‗market size, high-
technology imports … the stock of human capital, the level of R&D expenditures, 
infrastructure, and the level of IPR protection,‘ as well as in ‗a country's stock of 
                                                                                                                                            
countries, there is some evidence that IP protection becomes important at a stage of 
development, but that stage is not until a country is well into the category of middle income 
developing countries.‘ (CIPR ‗IP and development‘ at 26). 
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 In developing countries, the dominant factors are ‗market size and 
infrastructure.‘
141
 Park and Ginarte conclude that IPRs explain investment in 
innovation only for the top 30 world economies, and are relatively insignificant at 
attracting R&D investment in developing countries.
142
 Kortum‘s longitudinal 
comparison of patents granted to innovators in developing countries for the period 
1991-2001 concluded that the number of patents granted ‗remains miniscule,‘ and that 




IP protection also affects the ability of developing states to imitate existing 
foreign technologies. Chen and Puttitanun conducted a theoretical and empirical study 
of the effects of intellectual property rights on innovation in 64 developing countries 
over a 25 year period (1975-2000).
144
 They found that raising IP levels made it more 
difficult for local firms to reverse-engineer and imitate foreign products, and that this 
tended to have a negative impact on the industries which would otherwise have been 
able to employ such strategies, as well as on domestic consumers.
145
  
Maskus and Reichman point out that in global terms knowledge industries in 
developing countries already have the disadvantage of their ‗follower‘ status, and that 
very often this is aggravated by the strengthening of IPRs as this makes it more 
difficult or expensive for them to ‗acquire new, and even mature, technologies at 
manageable costs.‘
146
 Adoption of new and higher IP standards excludes imitation by 
reverse engineering (a successful ‗catch up‘ mechanism in the pre-TRIPS era
147
), and 
makes licences more expensive (and in some cases impossible) to acquire.
148
 In short, 
the adoption of the new global standards has ‗in effect removed the rungs on which 
they could advance.‘
149
 Many other studies have reached similar conclusions.
150
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The Chen and Puttitanun study found that in some developing countries, local 
innovation did tend to increase when intellectual property levels were raised.
151
 Other 
studies have reached similar conclusions.
152
  Primo Braga and Fink concluded that 
developing counties with large economies, large production capacity, as well as some 
innovative capacity may attract significant R&D investment from developed country 
investors, which is likely to have the effect of stimulating the development of local 
innovation.
153
 They warn, however, that this might nevertheless imply significant 
initial rent transfer back to the developed countries (where the investors are based), 
and result in short-term losses for the developing country concerned, in higher prices 
and the displacement of other local producers
154
 – a warning echoed by others such as 
Correa, and Maskus and Reichman.
155
 
Attracting foreign investment: R&D, FDI and technology 
transfer 
The question of whether increased intellectual property protection will lead to 
greater foreign investment and technology transfer is also complex and nuanced. To 
some extent it would appear that developed-state companies are more reluctant to 
                                                                                                                                            
southern states because they make it more difficult to reverse engineer and imitate foreign 
technologies. 
150
 An early study by Helpman concluded that the adoption of higher level IPRs would 
exclude the possibility of imitation and reverse engineering, thereby reducing innovativeness 
both in the south and globally. He concluded that adoption of higher level IPRs was not in the 
interests of developing countries. This paper has stimulated an extensive literature. In an 
empirical study of 28 developing countries, Schneider notes that raised IP protection 
standards might have a negative effect on innovation because imitation is thereby excluded. 
She notes that stronger IP protection benefits developed countries, but not developing 
countries (Schneider ‗International trade at 543). Lall lists potential disadvantages of higher 
IP standards, including ‗the higher costs of imported technology and capital goods and … the 
restriction of imitation and reverse engineering as a source of technological learning.‘ (Lall 
‗IPRs in developing countries‘ at 1679). Glass and Saggi conclude that increased IP standards 
will impede imitation in the South, and raise the overall costs of innovation. They also 
conclude that FDI is reduced under these conditions. (Glass and Saggi ‗Foreign direct 
investment‘ at 408). 
151
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152
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invest in countries with inadequate IPR protection – but offering such protection does 
not necessarily guarantee investment, and levels of technology transfer and 
investment have been disappointing. Again, the most important factors driving foreign 




Empirical evidence suggests that smaller developing countries which lack 
attractive markets and have little productive or innovative infrastructure (and poor 
capacity to absorb new technology),
157
 have not attracted trade, foreign direct 
investment, or indeed any kind of international technology transfer, by raising IP 
protection standards.
158
  Higher patenting standards may indeed have a positive 
impact on trade and market-based licensing in larger developing country economies, 
particularly those with more attractive markets and technological capacities,
159
 
although patenting standards are only one of many variables that will impact in this 
regard.
 160
 The UK CIPR notes that historically, most investment has gone into larger 
developing countries with weak IPR protection systems, and that IP protection levels 
not generally taken into account when assessing whether a developing state is 
attractive to potential foreign investors.
161
 Empirical studies have found conflicting 
evidence. Smarzynska, for example, discovered that in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, some industries were more likely to participate in foreign direct 
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This brief overview of the patent system provides a theoretical foundation 
against which to evaluate the ‗IP policy space battles.‘  I have pointed out that the 
patent system is intended to provide social benefits by stimulating innovation. 
However, it is based on market monopolies, which necessarily introduces some 
important social costs. In addition to potentially prejudicing the consumer, patent 
monopolies may also impede innovation if later researchers cannot use patented 
upstream research in the course of their own investigations. The system has many 
inherent policy levers that states should be able to use to achieve optimal balance 
between innovation and social welfare, and to stimulate innovation. Optimal 
protection levels are impossible to quantify and differ among industries, particularly 
in different social and economic contexts. Economists agree that optimal protection 
levels differ: one size does not fit all. It is thus inappropriate to mandate global 
protection levels, and insist that developing states institute the same IP protection 
levels used in developed countries. Not only might this lead to unacceptably severe 
short-term welfare losses, but the promised benefits (local innovation, FDI and 
technology transfer) are uncertain. 
In the past, every state was free to create a domestic patent system to suit local 
needs and to try to achieve the optimal balance between incentive and diffusion. Now, 
developed states have attempted to close the available IP policy space by setting 
global standards. Developing countries argue that these standards might be 
inappropriate to their local circumstances. Chapter 3 will examine the first major 
‗enclosure‘ of the available IP policy space: the TRIPS Agreement.  
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In the previous chapter I outlined some of the potential costs and benefits of 
the patent system and identified some of the policy levers available to states when 
establishing patent policy. Because the patent system is based on government grants, 
and because its primary purpose and justification is to benefit society, states should be 
able to use these policy levers to ensure that the potential costs of patent monopolies 
do not outweigh their potential benefit in furthering the public good and stimulating 
innovation. 
Increasingly, however, developed states use the intellectual property system to 
improve their competitive advantage in the global economy.
1
 To this end, both 
domestic and international patent policy is increasingly shaped in the interests of the 
powerful ‗knowledge industries‘
2





 In this chapter, I demonstrate how knowledge industries in 
the United States convinced the US government to push for protectionist global IP 
policies that narrow the available IP policy space, and discuss why the United States 
continues to favour higher standards. I begin with a detailed examination of TRIPS 
negotiations, the first of the ‗policy space battles‘ discussed in this dissertation. I then 
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 See Shulman Owning the Future at 18-19; Scotchmer ‗Intellectual property treaties‘; 
Reichman ‗IPR protection‘ at 24-25. 
2
 In this context, this refers to those industries that produce information, inventions and 
cultural goods (or which hold the IP rights to such goods). 
3
 See Abbott ‗TRIPS and human rights‘ at 150, pointing out that American policy-makers did 
not consult domestic public health authorities before raising minimum patent levels in TRIPS. 
See also Maskus and Reichman ‗Globalization‘ at 7: ‗Indeed, the progressive re-regulation of 
world markets for knowledge goods is not driven by a broad consensus of economic agents in 
the developed world. Rather, pressures to elevate IP norms are exerted by powerful private 
interests whose lobbying activities hold sway in legislative and regulatory initiatives in rich 
countries and international forums.‘ 
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look at the TRIPS Agreement itself and at the ways in which it reduces IP policy 
space. 
Negotiating TRIPS: closing the IP policy space 
To understand how TRIPS came into existence, it is necessary to understand 
the role of intellectual property in the international economy. TRIPS is an 
international trade treaty.  Although it goes much further than international trade and 
‗reaches deep into the domestic regulatory environment of states,‘
5
 scholarly 
commentators – as well as the United States negotiators themselves – agree that its 
ultimate objective was to ensure that the United States is able to maintain and increase 
its competitive trade advantage in the global economy.
6
  
 When TRIPS began to take shape in the mid-1980s, it was clear that the 
United States had lost its comparative global advantage in the manufacture of 
traditional industrial goods.
7
 The trade figures spoke for themselves: the US trade 
deficit had grown from US$ 31 billion in 1980 to US$ 170 billion in 1987; during the 
same period, the manufacturing trade balance dropped from a US$ 2 billion surplus in 
1980 to a US$ 138 billion deficit in 1987;
8
  all this had resulted in the loss of between 
two and four million American jobs.
9
  
Knowledge-based industries, however, continued to contribute considerably to 
the United States economy, and their representatives claimed that that they would 
restore the trade-balance and employment figures in a more favourable international 
trade and IP policy environment.
10
 Knowledge industry economists persuaded the 
American government that the US remained dominant globally in their industry, and 
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 Sell Private Power at 1. 
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Policy Options; Harrison Human rights Impact of WTO at 156. 
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 In 1993, the copyright industries claimed to reduce the balance of payment deficit by US$ 
45.8 billion. (‗Intellectual property and the national information infrastructure: Report of the 
Working Group on Intellectual Property, US Dept of Commerce, 1995, reprinted in 
Dinwoodie et al (eds) International Intellectual Property at 15.). See also Sell Private Power 
at 72 and 99; Gathii ‗Rights, patents, markets‘ at 313. For comparable figures for the late 

















This would be possible, however, only if international trade and IP rules were 
strengthened, to give intellectual property goods the maximum possible protection. In 
addition, better enforcement measures were required to prevent counterfeiting and 
piracy. By 1986, the knowledge industry was quoting losses of between US$ 43 




The importance of the knowledge industries to the US economy explains why 
their representatives have been so influential in shaping American IP policy,
13
 arguing 
has been that what is good for their companies is good for America.  Given the 
underlying economic realities, this has been ‗a persuasive story.‘
14
 
TRIPS was the brainchild of a small group of American corporations, highly 
motivated to devise a solution to their problems and to implement it internationally. 
Drahos and Braithwaite quote ‗a senior US trade negotiator‘ who told them that 
‗probably less than 50 people were responsible for TRIPS.‘
15
  The American 
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 Between 1987 and 1999 US receipts from foreign sales of intellectual property goods rose 
from US$ 10 billion to US$ 36.5 billion, while the US still paid only US$ 13 billion to 
foreign owners in 1999 –a significant growth and net surplus (Landes and Posner Economic 
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national information infrastructure: Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property, 
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Reichman ‗Universal minimum standards‘ at 346; McCarthy ‗America‘s overlooked export‘ 
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TRIPS negotiations (Weissman ‗Long strange TRIPS‘ at 1093). Sell suggests that TRIPS was 
the direct result of an ‗even smaller group [of American corporations], the ad hoc US-based 













knowledge industries, organized as the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), an ‗ad 
hoc group‘ of 13 major IP companies, co-founded by Pfizer and IBM in 1986,
16
 had a range 
of concerns. One was the threat to profits in brand-name pharmaceuticals, which were 
increasingly threatened by competition from generic equivalents. Technological 
developments had made reverse engineering of generics far easier,
17
 and the Indian 




The American knowledge-based industries sought to reduce the policy space 
available to states by raising the minimum protection standards required for all patent 
regimes regardless of local context, or local consequences.
19
 Their template for the 
TRIPS Agreement aimed at reducing the possibilities for patent exclusions, 
compulsory licensing, and public interest exemptions.
20
 TRIPS, based largely on the 
IPC blueprint, was not aimed at benefiting the public interest, but to secure the 
interests of the large American intellectual property companies.
21
 Because this sector 
continues to drive America‘s export advantage, the knowledge industries continue to 
exert very strong influence on American economic policy.  This must be borne in 
mind when considering the negotiating position of the United States. Their 
negotiating position is very strongly influenced by the need to protect the knowledge 
industries, thus securing and maintaining their global trade advantage.
22
 
TRIPS devotes an entire chapter to enforcement of intellectual property rights,
 
23
 fulfilling an important aim of the IPC.  Prior to TRIPS, intellectual property rules 
were poorly enforced in many jurisdictions
24
 and there was no effective international 
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Human rights Impact of WTO at 156; Scherer ‗Pharmaceutical industry‘ at 2248; Gathii 
‗Rights, patents, markets‘ at 316-17; Fink ‗Balances‘ at 1; Basso and Beas ‗New 
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 Wojahn ‗Conflict of rights‘ at 476. 
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 Drahos & Braithwaite Information Feudalism at 12, 67.  
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 Shadlen ‗Policy space‘ at 7. 
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 For a detailed account, see Drahos & Braithwaite Information Feudalism and Sell Private 
Power. 
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 Harrison Human rights Impact of WTO at 138. 
22
 See Shulman Owning the Future at 18-19; Scotchmer ‗Intellectual property treaties.‘ 
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24
 Sometimes, the sheer lack of adequate enforcement machinery at national level called into 
question the commitment of the state concerned to intellectual property protection. (Sell 















 Historically, developing countries have produced very little 
intellectual property (as understood in formal terms),
26
 and have had little motivation 
to enter into international agreements to protect IP rights.
27
 Thus, the IPC‘s key 
insight was to link the intellectual property regime (in which developing countries had 
no stake) to trade in other goods.
28
 The IPC favoured a ‗treaty with teeth‘: one that 
could punish non-compliance with intellectual property rules with serious punitive 
measures – trade sanctions on unrelated goods such as textiles and agricultural 
products, thus enabling ‗cross-sectoral retaliation.‘
29
 The TRIPS Agreement provides 
compulsory dispute settlement through the WTO‘s dispute settlement machinery.
30
 
The ultimate sanction is the imposition of trade sanctions, which can target any 
industry of the offending state,
31
 and which ‗are to be of an amount equivalent to the 
value of market access lost by the prevailing party‘ as a result of the illegal conduct.
32
 
The IPC‘s ‗persuasive story‘ and considerable economic and legal expertise
33
 
convinced US policy-makers to push the IPC blueprint for TRIPS at the Uruguay 
Round of WTO negotiations. Working through the knowledge industries in other IP-
producing states like Japan and European countries, the IPC secured some important 
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The allied developed states encountered some resistance from developing 
countries.
35
 India had a large generic pharmaceutical industry that it was keen to 
protect,
36
 and Brazil relied greatly on generic drugs in the implementation of its 
highly successful HIV/AIDS Programme, offering free antiretrovirals to everyone 
infected with HIV.
37
 Developing-country resistance was overcome, however, using a 
range of carrot-and-stick techniques, ranging from blatant coercion in the form of 
actual sanctions (such as those instituted against Brazil in 1988)
38
 or their threat,
39
 to 
promises of the benefits that the Agreement would deliver, such as increased foreign 
direct investment and technology transfer,
40
 new bilateral trade benefits,
41
 or the 
opening of developed-country markets to developing-state exports such as agricultural 
goods and textiles, which, as Drahos and Braithwaite point out, ‗does not confer 




The developing countries were out-negotiated, in part because they lacked the 
expertise of the developed-country negotiators.
43
 In theory, all states have equal 
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362 and McCarthy ‗America‘s overlooked export‘ at 11. See also Sell Private Power at 110; 
Drahos & Braithwaite Information Feudalism at 87-89; Weissman ‗Long strange TRIPS‘ at 
1088; Mercurio ‗TRIPS‘ at 217. On the effectiveness of such threats in the TRIPS 
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and Developing Countries at 25 and 31. 
40
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materialized. See Maskus and Reichman ‗Globalization‘ 11-15; Correa ‗Technology transfer‘ 
at 254-256; Maskus et al ‗International technology transfer‘ 280-281; Helfer ‗Regime 
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41
 Yu ‗Currents‘ at 363; Drahos & Braithwaite Information Feudalism at 134; Watal WTO 
and Developing Countries at 44. 
42
 Drahos & Braithwaite Information Feudalism at 11. See also Yu ‗Currents‘ at 363; 
Harrison Human rights Impact of WTO at 167. 
43
 Jayashree Watal of the Indian delegation has noted the lack of ‗Geneva-based expertise‘ 
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representation within the WTO; in practice, TRIPS was finalized in small discussion 
groups, built around circles of influence.
44
 Developing states seldom participated in 
the important discussions.
45
 While IPC representatives and lawyers were present 
throughout the negotiations (even in the negotiating room itself),
46
 developing-
country negotiators were very often excluded from the key discussions in which the 
details of the Agreement were finalized. Their trade ministers were often ‗forced to 
wait for hours on end in the coffee bar, begging the emerging journalists to tell them 
the latest developments in the negotiations.‘
47
 This dynamic – the exclusion of 
developing states from crucial talks, the influence of knowledge industry 
representatives throughout the negotiations, and the lack of participation by public 
interest groups and other representatives of civil society
48
 – is a theme in the 
Development Agenda proposal documents, which demand that all states participate 




The UK CIPR has concluded that ‗developing countries accepted TRIPS not 
because the adoption of intellectual property protection was high on their list of 
priorities, but because they believed that the overall package offered, including the 
reduction of trade protectionism in developed countries, would be beneficial.‘
50
 
Intellectual property policy is, after all, only part of the range of social and economic 
policies that states adopt, and some states may have concluded that the losses incurred 
by raised intellectual property standards would be off-set by other gains, for example 
by more foreign direct in estment.
51
 Many commentators have concluded, however, 
that developing-country negotiators did not fully appreciate the impact that raised IP 
standards and the curtailment of IP policy space would have on their local economies 
or their ability to institute important public interest projects. The developing states 
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lacked economic and legal expertise in an increasingly complex area,
52
 and had an 




How TRIPS curtails policy space 
TRIPS was the most far-reaching intellectual property treaty ever negotiated. 
Unlike its predecessors, the Paris and Berne Conventions,
54
 TRIPS spells out 
minimum global protection levels in great detail. These are considerably more 
stringent than the standards previously required. I will highlight the ways in which 
TRIPS enclosed the previously-available IP policy space and, where appropriate, will 
compare its provisions to those in the Paris Convention.  
TRIPS requires protection for more kinds of products and processes, for 
longer periods.  While it includes some limitations and flexibilities (many of which 
were the result of negotiation victories by developing states), they are often 
circumscribed by conditions and cumbersome procedural requirements. TRIPS also 
provides for extensive enforcement machinery, another novelty in international 
intellectual property protection.
55
 In short, TRIPS ‗…ushered in a full-blown 
enforceable global intellectual property (IP) regime that reaches deep into the 
domestic regulatory environment of states.‘
56
 Particularly in developing countries, 
these new protection levels affect agriculture, education, and public health, and thus 
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I argued in Chapter 2 that every state should fashion a domestic intellectual 
property regime suitable to local circumstances. States need enough IP policy space to 
set an appropriate balance between providing monopoly incentives, and ensuring that 
monopolies do not result in overly prejudicial social and public welfare. TRIPS 
significantly reduces this policy space by setting universal minimum standards.
58
 One 
important implication is that this may prevent or curtail states‘ use of cheaper generic 
drugs when facing widespread epidemics such as HIV/AIDS.
59
 I have also argued that 
states must be able to set patent standards that encourage local innovation. Again, 
TRIPS reduces available policy space by establishing global protection standards that 
do not take local circumstances into account. 
The standards established by TRIPS were largely set at levels suiting the 
knowledge industries in developed countries. The effects of these standards on 
developing countries have been described as ‗staggeringly prejudicial.‘
60
 The United 
Nations Development Program has concluded that ‗Countries at low levels of human 
technological capability cannot benefit significantly from TRIPS …. Developing 




Many scholars and IGO commentators agree that TRIPS overwhelmingly 
favours the knowledge industries in developed states,
62
 while offering very little to 
developing countries.
63
 Even those who claim that developing states will benefit from 
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61
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62
 Abbott notes that the American negotiators ‗did not consult adequately with other parts of 
their own government, such as those responsible for public health.‘ (Abbott ‗TRIPS and 
human rights‘ at 150).  
63
 The World Bank, for example, has concluded that TRIPS would provide an annual income 
to the United States of US$ 19 billion. Everyone else would lose out. South Korea, for 
example, was expected to lose US$ 15 billion annually. (World Bank study: Richard 
Newfarmer et al ‗Global economic prospects and developing countries‘ (2001) at 137, cited 
by Sell ‗Quest for global governance‘ at 372). See also Drahos & Braithwaite Information 
Feudalism at 11; Drommen ‗Safeguarding legitimacy‘ at 125; Abbott ‗TRIPS and human 
rights‘ at 145; Wojahn ‗Conflict of rights‘ at 478; Walker ‗Human rights approach to TRIPS‘ 
at 173. Jerome Reichman‘s tentative comment on TRIPS in 1995 was that, although 
developing countries might benefit from stronger patent systems through potential direct 
investment or licensing from foreign patent-holders, or perhaps even through greater 
investment in local research and development, ‗the value of a patent system to developing 













TRIPS in the long term agree that ‗the short term consequences will be massive 
resource transfers from developing countries to owners of intellectual property.‘
64
 
It is important, however, not to lose sight of small victories achieved by 
developing countries during the negotiations.
65
 As discussed below, the flexibilities 
that developing-country negotiators pushed for successfully have been used to 
strengthen their positions in subsequent negotiations.  I will argue, however, that the 
status of these provisions within the overall Agreement significantly reduces their 
power and that they need to be bolstered by human rights claims. 
Increased patent protection levels (scope and period) 
The TRIPS Agreement raises minimum levels of patent protection, thus 
reducing policy space, in the following ways: 
Firstly, TRIPS increases both the minimum period and the scope of patent 
protection, particularly through Articles 33, 27(1), 28, and 39(3). 
Article 33 provides that ‗the term of protection shall not end before the 
expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.‘ Prior to TRIPS, 
most (but not all) developed states had patent laws protecting new inventions for 20 
years, but many states offered far shorter protection periods deemed appropriate to 
local circumstances.
66
 TRIPS created a universal minimum term of patent protection, 
removing a potential policy lever. 
Article 28 is a typical patent clause, specifying that owners of product or 
process patents have the following exclusive rights: In product patents, the patentee 
has the exclusive right ‗to prevent third parties not having the owner‘s consent from 
the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes 
                                                                                                                                            
because of a growing dependence on foreign patents with few countervailing benefits 
(Reichman ‗Universal minimum standards‘ at 354). 
64
 Sell ‗Quest for global governance‘ at 372. 
65
 Jayashree Watal, a member of the Indian TRIPS negotiation team also highlights these 
victories and concludes that TRIPS ‗essentially balances, albeit delicately, the legitimate 
interests of intellectual property owners with those of third parties, including that of users of 
IP.‘(Watal WTO and Developing Countries at 10). See also Reichman ‗Universal minimum 
standards‘ at 354; Correa TRIPS and Policy Options at 6, arguing that: ‗Despite the origins of 
and main forces behind the TRIPS Agreement … this Agreement still contains elements that, 
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66
 Ovett ‗Access to medicines‘ at 173, noting that Costa Rica awarded patent protection for 















; in process patents, the patentee has the exclusive right ‗to prevent 
third parties not having the owner‘s consent from the act of using the process, and 
from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at 
least the product obtained directly by that process.‘
68
 These exclusive rights are 
limited by exceptions discussed below. 
Article 27(1) provides that ‗Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, 
patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes in all 
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application …‘ 
TRIPS thus significantly increases both the period and the scope of patent 
protection.
69
 Not only does it mandate a minimum period of 20 years, but Article 
27(1) extends compulsory coverage to ‗virtually all subject matter … including 
pharmaceutical products, chemicals, pesticides, and plant varieties.‘
70
  
The Paris Convention does not require states to protect particular kinds of 
inventions, allowing them to exclude certain inventions in light of local 
circumstances.
71
 Before TRIPS, many countries excluded large numbers of products 
and processes from patent protection. A WIPO study of the 98 Paris Convention 
members in 1988, found that half ( 49 members) excluded pharmaceuticals,  almost 
half excluded animal varieties (45), methods of treatment (44), plant varieties (44) and 
biological processes for producing them (42), while a significant number excluded 
food products (35), computer programmes (32), and chemical products (22).
72
 Some 
states refused to provide patent protection for certain kinds of inventions (particularly 
pharmaceuticals and food products) on the grounds that this was not in the public 
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 Sell Private Power at 8; Wojahn ‗Conflict of rights‘ at 479. 
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72
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Importantly, unlike the Paris Convention, TRIPS mandates patent protection 
for products as well as processes.
75
 Before TRIPS, many states protected only 
processes, making it legal to produce generic equivalents of pharmaceutical products 
by reverse engineering.
76
   
 India‘s extensive generic manufacturing industry was based on this kind of 
patent system. During the 1960s, 90 percent of drugs used in India were imported and 
the local cost of pharmaceuticals was almost the highest in the world.
77
 India‘s 
Ayyangar Committee, appointed in 1959 to consider a national patent regime, stressed 
that the system should be shaped to suit local circumstances.
78
 The Committee 
asserted that ‗such important articles of daily use as medicine or food which are vital 
to the health of the community should be made available to everyone at reasonable 
prices,‘ and concluded that product patents were inappropriate for pharmaceutical or 
food products.
79
 The Indian Patent Act of 1970, which was based on the Ayyangar 
Report, permitted the manufacture of generic drugs. The Indian system actively 
encouraged the development of a sophisticated reverse-engineering capability and 
contributed significantly to the growth and success of India‘s generic pharmaceutical 
industry.
80
 TRIPS removed this important policy lever, with potentially devastating 
results for the production of generic drugs.
81
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‗Lifeline‘ at 2). MSF estimates that Indian drugs will increase in cost by a mean of 200 













TRIPS Article 39(3) also has an adverse effect on the production of generic 
medicines, providing that ‗Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the 
marketing of pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products which utilize new 
chemical entities, the submission of test or other data, the origination of which 
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use 
….‘  
Article 39(3) thus extends protection to test data. Companies that originate 
pharmaceutical products must submit test data to the authorities showing the drugs‘ 
safety and efficacy before the drugs can be registered.
82
 Before TRIPS, generic 
manufacturers could rely on the test data of the original drugs and needed to 
demonstrate only the chemical equivalence of their products to the registered 
originator drugs in order to obtain regulatory approval.
83
 This allowed generics to 
enter the market fairly quickly.
84
 Article 39(3) protects undisclosed test data against 
‗unfair commercial use.‘
85
 In practice, this ‗data exclusivity approach‘ means that 
once an originator company has submitted its test data, no generic competitor will 
permitted ‗to rely on these data for a period of time.‘
86
  The WHO notes that data 
exclusivity could be an obstacle to the use of compulsory licences, because the ‗entry 
of the generic product would be delayed for the duration of the [data] exclusivity 
                                                                                                                                            
India as a source of affordable quality medicines. (Médecins sans Frontières ‗Lifeline‘ at 3). 
The UK CIPR raised similar concerns (CIPR ‗Health‘ at 38). 
82
 Rai ‗Information revolution‘ at 181; Musungu ‗Public health‘ at 440; Skillington & Solovy 
‗Protection of test data‘ at 7. 
83
 Skillington & Solovy ‗Protection of test data‘ at 8-9. See Carvalho Undisclosed information 
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84
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pharmaceutical industry (Sell ‗TRIPS‘ at 506). See further Carvalho Undisclosed information 
at 240-259 for a detailed history of the negotiations and proposals. 
86













period or for the time it takes to undertake a new compilation of test data.‘
87
 It would 
also increase the price of the generics.
88
 
Under Article 39(3), states no longer have the policy space to allow generic 
products to enter the market using simple bio-equivalence tests relying on undisclosed 
test data until the expiration of a ‗reasonable period.‘
89
 Without access to the data, 
generic companies are forced to repeat expensive and time-consuming clinical trials 
or postpone releasing their products.
90
 This seems not to be in the public interest, 
particularly for those states faced with the HIV/AIDS crisis. 
Flexibilities and other gains made by developing states 
During the TRIPS negotiations, developing countries insisted that the text 
incorporate alternative visions of intellectual property protection that better reflected 
their interests. They were also able to negotiate some important exceptions and 
limitations to the substantive TRIPS standards.
91
 This section examines some of these 
clauses. 
The Preamble, and Articles 7 and 8 
The TRIPS Preamble specifically recognizes the ‗special needs of the least-
developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic 
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This is expanded upon in Articles 7 and 8, which are possibly the most 
significant articles included at the developing countries‘ insistence:
 93
 
Article 7 sets out the ‗objectives‘ of the treaty as follows: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
94
  
Article 7 clearly establishes that intellectual property rights are not ends in 
themselves, but should contribute to social welfare and development.
95
 It explicitly 
sets out the foundational premises of intellectual property law: the ultimate objective 
is to further the public interest and there should be a balance between the monopoly 
rights of owners on the one hand and users on the other.
96
 As explored in Chapter 2, 
this accords with the widely-accepted underlying justifications for the patent system.  
Article 7 is the product of intense negotiation, and its list of objectives is very 
different from those in the draft texts submitted by the Americans and the European 
Community. In the American proposal, for example, the treaty‘s objective was ‗to 
reduce distortions of and impediments to legitimate trade in goods and services 
caused by deficient levels of protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.‘
97
 In response, the Indian delegation, with several other developing states, 
pointed out that protection of intellectual property rights has social and economic 
implications and that ‗any principle or standard relating to IPRs should be carefully 
tested against the needs of developing countries.‘ It would thus ‗not be appropriate for 
the discussion to focus merely on the protection of the monopoly rights of the owners 
of intellectual property.‘ It was also important to recognize ‗the freedom of Member 
                                                 
92
 TRIPS at page 84.  
93
 Watal WTO and Developing Countries at 293; Yusuf ‗TRIPS‘ at 10; May & Sell IPR 
History at 165. 
94
 TRIPS Article 7. 
95
 UNCTAD-ICTSD TRIPS Resource Book at 125. 
96
 Yusuf ‗TRIPS‘ at 12; Gervais TRIPS at 65. 
97
 ‗Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotiating Objective‘ 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14, 20 Oct 1987, as quoted in UNCTAD-ICTSD TRIPS Resource Book 

















The different approaches to intellectual property protection persist in the 
Development Agenda talks and other contemporary negotiations. The Americans and 
their developed-country allies continue to stress the importance of higher levels of 
intellectual property protection; developing countries stress that intellectual property 
levels should be individual states should suit local conditions and needs, maintaining 
a balance between benefits and social costs. Economists agree that it is unlikely that a 
global balance will suit all states given the vast range of economic development and 
social needs, and usually conclude that individual states will have to establish levels 
of protection appropriate to local circumstances. 
Article 8(1)
99
 appears to recognize that states should have enough policy space 
to minimize the social costs of intellectual property protection. It provides that 
member states ‗may adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition 
and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided such measures are consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement.‘
100
  
Early TRIPS commentators, such as Gervais and Watal, noted the potential 
value of Articles 7 and 8 as tools of interpretation in future disputes,
101
 arguing that 
they could be regarded either as interpretative principles or as policy statements, 
explaining the rationale for particular exceptions, such as those in Articles 30 and 
31.
102
 Watal noted that the articles might provide a ‗framework for the TRIPS 
Agreement in terms that are consistent with developing-country interests.‘
103
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It should be noted, however, that Article 7 uses the permissive verb ‗should‘ 
rather than the peremptory ‗shall‘ used in most other TRIPS articles.
104
 While Article 
8(1) recognizes the right of governments to protect the public interest in technological 
and social development and promote local health and nutritional needs, it insists that 
the measures taken be ‗consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.‘ However, 
the very ‗provisions of this Agreement‘ often make it difficult or impossible for 
individual states to promote these public interests, and it is not clear that Article 8(1) 
will assist in this regard. IPC negotiator, Jacques Gorlin (the IPC member who drafted 
the documents on which TRIPS was based) has ‗quoted US and EC negotiators as 
stating that these provisions are hortatory and do not have operational significance.‘
105
 
 Indeed, as discussed in the following chapters, developing-state negotiators 
have found it exceedingly difficult to rely on Articles 7 and 8(1) as interpretative 
principles giving more muscle to the very restricted exceptions set out in Articles 30 
and 31. It has also proven difficult to rely on the articles directly to retain sufficient IP 
policy space to respond to local public health and nutritional needs, or ‗promote the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development.‘
106
 I will argue in hapters 6 and 7 that a human rights-
based approach could give these articles more muscle. 
Specific exception provisions 
In addition to the gene al provisions in Articles 7 and 8(1), there are several 
specific TRIPS provisions allowing for exceptions and limitations to the overall 
protection standards. As noted earlier, Article 27(1) requires patent protection for ‗any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology …,‘
107
 but there 
are several exceptions to this broad rule. I will focus on Articles 31 and 30, since 
these articles have been the focus of subsequent negotiation and disputes.
108
 The 
attempts to rely on these articles illustrate the fundamental weakness of relying on 
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‗exceptions‘ to ‗rights‘ clearly spelled out elsewhere in the Agreement. The 
restrictively and ambiguously worded exceptions to clear and broadly worded IP 
rights clauses also demonstrate the fundamental imbalance in the TRIPS Agreements 
between the clear rights of patent-holders and the more ambiguous ‗public interest‘.  
Article 31: Compulsory licences 
Article 31 provides for compulsory licensing.
109
 Compulsory licences permit 
government agencies (or private companies authorized by the government) to 
manufacture generic equivalents of patented products without the consent of the 
patent-holder.
110
 Traditionally, compulsory licences were awarded when inventions 
were not worked at all, or to promote competition.
111
 Article 31 does not specify or 
limit the grounds on which compulsory licences may be issued,
112
 and seems to 
envisage a rather wide range of circumstances under which they may be used, 
including ‗national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.‘
113
  
Reichman argues that Article 31 must be read in the context of Article 8. As 
noted above, Article 8(1) provides limitations on a patent-holder‘s exclusive rights 
when ‗necessary to protect public health and nutrition‘ or to ‗promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development,‘ while 8(2) permits measures that ‗prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights.‘
114
 In the United States, ‗abuse‘ of intellectual property rights has 




most other cou tries  – and a leading commentator – considered the 
doctrine of abuse applicable if a patentee fails to work the patent locally in 
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due course or ―refuses to grant licenses on reasonable terms and thereby 
hampers industrial development, or does not supply the national market 
with sufficient quantities of the patented product, or demands excessive 
prices for such products.‖‘
116
 
Matthews argues that the existence within TRIPS of compulsory licensing 
provisions implies recognition that in some contexts ‗the public interest goal of 
achieving broader access to the patented invention is considered more important than 
the private interest of the right holder in fully exploiting his exclusive rights,‘
117
 and 
that ‗what this means in the context of public health imperatives is that compulsory 
licensing is intended to permit countries to produce generic drugs that are more 
affordable than patented proprietary medicines.‘
118
 As discussed in the next chapter, 
however, arguments of this nature have been difficult to assert in international 
negotiating forums such as the Doha Discussions. 
Because compulsory licences restrict patentees‘ exclusive rights, their 
issuance is highly circumscribed and subject to a large number of procedural 
conditions.  Their scope and duration are also regulated.
119
 Thus, while compulsory 
licensing provisions are, technically, limitations of the broad protection required by 
Article 27(1), they are so bureaucratic, complicated, and circumscribed that they may 
also be considered part of the reduction of policy space that TRIPS introduces.
120
 
Article 31(a) provides that ‗authorization of such use shall be considered on its 
individual merits,‘ thereby suggesting that governments may not grant blanket 
compulsory licences for an entire patent class, but that the individual merits of each 
case should be considered.
121
 Given that the United States itself had a history of 
issuing blanket compulsory licences at the time of the TRIPS negotiations, however, 
this might be somewhat flexible.
122
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Compulsory licences may only be issued if ‗prior to such use, the proposed 
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions and … such efforts have not been successful within 
a reasonable period of time.‘
123
 This requirement may be waived ‗in the case of a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public 
non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of 




Article 31(c) provides that ‗the scope and duration of such use shall be limited 
to the purpose for which it was authorized,‘
125
 while 31(g) provides that such 
authorization ‗shall be liable, subject to the adequate protection of the legitimate 
interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the circumstances 
which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.‘
126
 These provisions may deter 
manufacturers from investing in production under compulsory licence because the 
duration of the licence is insecure and uncertain.
127
 
Article 31(d) requires that use in compulsory licences ‗shall be non-
exclusive,‘
128
 while 31(e) specifies that such use be ‗non-assignable.‘
129
 These 
restrictions might impede a country from designing a compulsory licence scheme best 
suited to its needs, but this could be mitigated because more than one compulsory 
licence may be issued for the same patent.
130
 
Article 31(h) states that ‗the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration 
in the circumstance of each case, taking into account the economic value of the 
authorization.‘
131
 The meaning of ‗adequate remuneration‘ is somewhat unclear,
132
 
but it could be argued that it would defeat the purpose of compulsory licensing of 
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generics if the licensee were required to pay what the patent-holder would have 
charged for the on-patent products.
133
 
Crucially, the original wording of Article 31(f)
134
 provided that a compulsory 
licence should be ‗authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of 
the Member authorizing such use,‘
135
 which greatly limited the export of products 
manufactured under compulsory licences.
136
 Prior to this rule, generic drug 
manufacturers were able to lower their costs through economies of scale by expanding 
their markets to foreign countries.
137
 Article 31(f) also placed severe limitations on 
the ability of poor countries to parallel import generic drugs, since they would be able 
to import only from countries that manufacture such drugs primarily for their 
domestic markets.
138
 Most developing countries do not have the infrastructure to 
manufacture generic drugs for themselves.
139
 
Some commentators view Article 31 as a flexibility within TRIPS that limits 
exclusive rights in the public interest,
140
 but the Article has also been criticized as 
vague, overly restrictive, and procedurally cumbersome. Article 31(f), in particular, 
greatly limited the utility of compulsory licensing as a response to the public health 
crisis. These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 in the context of the 
Doha talks.  
Article 30 
Article 30 provides that ‗Members may provide limited exceptions to the 
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent-owner, taking account of 
                                                 
133
 Wojahn ‗Conflict of rights‘ at 489. 
134
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This makes significant changes to Article 31(f) which, in terms of the Protocol of December 
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membership. (see Abbott ‗Introductory note‘ at 1127). 
135
 TRIPS Article 31(f). 
136
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Discussion in Chapter 5. 
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 Ibid at 137. 
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the legitimate interests of third parties.‘
141
 Possible criteria for authorizing Article 30 
exceptions might include situations where (a) an importing country has a public health 
care need that cannot be addressed by importing on-patent drugs and (b) an exporting 




Reichman reads this provision together with Article 8, and suggests that 
exceptions to exclusive patent rights would be acceptable if ‗necessary to protect 
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to … socio-economic and technological development,‘
143
 or ‗to prevent 
the abuse of intellectual property rights.‘
144
  He also argues that Article 7, ‗envisions 
the effective transfer and dissemination of technology among member countries and 
the maintenance of social and economic welfare as further grounds for regulatory 
action limiting grants of exclusive rights in appropriate circumstances.‘
145
  He 
concludes that ‗These and other articles thus preserve, and may even expand, 
preexisting grounds for limiting a patentee's exclusive rights under article 5A of the 




Other commentators have been similarly optimistic about Article 30:
147
 
Weissman argues that Article 30 should be understood to create a balance between 
patent-holders and the users of patented products, particularly those in developing 
countries, and that it indeed permits the ‗prejudicing‘ of owners‘ interests, provided 
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 TRIPS Article 30. 
142
 Gupta ‗Patents on pharmaceuticals‘ at 141. 
143
 Article 8(1). 
144
 Article 8(2). Reichman ‗Universal minimum standards‘ at 354. See also Gupta ‗Patents on 
pharmaceuticals‘ at 142, making a similar argument. 
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 Before the Doha talks, many commentators argued that developing states should try to 
secure access to affordable medicines using Article 30‘s compulsory licensing procedures 
rather than Article 31. Article 30 avoids the problems presented by Article 31(f) (restricting 
the export of drugs manufactured under compulsory licence). Moreover, under Article 30, the 
decision to award a compulsory licence rests with the country of consumption, rather than 
with the country of production, and the patent-holder is paid by the consuming state, rather 













that the prejudicing is not unreasonable.
148
 Wojahn points out that the ‗legitimate 
interests‘ of pharmaceutical patent-holders are in fact somewhat limited since 
developing countries represent only a small portion of their market.
149
 Because the 
R&D costs of some drugs are heavily subsidized by the state, drug companies cannot 
argue that they need the sales to recoup their research and development costs. Indeed, 
some antiretroviral patents are owned by the United States government or the 
National Institute of Health and are merely licensed to pharmaceutical companies for 




Article 30 cannot be read as a general ‗opt-out‘ clause, however. It imposes 
three conditions: exceptions must be ‗limited‘; they must not ‗unreasonably conflict 
with the normal exploitation of the patent;‘ and they must not ‗unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the patent owner.‘ In the Canada –  Pharmaceuticals 
case
151
 a WTO panel interpreted Article 30 very restrictively, holding that the three 
requirements should be interpreted individually so that none was made effectively 
redundant;
152
 that ‗limited exception‘ means a ‗narrow exception – one which makes 
only a small diminution of the rights in question‘;
153
 and that when considering 
‗legitimate interests‘ the legitimate interests of the patent-holder are more important 
than those of third parties.
154
 Commentators have criticized this restrictive 
interpretation, arguing that, by ignoring TRIPS Articles 7 and 8, the panel did not 
abide by the rules of Vienna Convention.
155
  
Other flexibilities  
TRIPS provides several other flexibilities and exceptions: despite resistance 
from the Americans it permits parallel importation following the ‗international 
                                                 
148
 Weissman ‗Long strange TRIPS‘ at 1119. Clearly Article 30 permits some ‗prejudice‘ to 
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Pharmaceuticals § 4.37). 
149
 Cann ‗Global constitutionalism‘ at 814. 
150
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exhaustion‘ model, rather than a ‗national exhaustion‘ model,
 
making it easier to 
import products originally produced under patent.
 156
 In addition, while Article 39(3) 
places some limitations on the use of test data, it does not seem to prohibit generic 
companies from using publicly available data in bio-equivalency testing.
157
 
Developed countries were required to become TRIPS-compliant by January 
1996, but developing countries were given longer adjustment periods to comply with 
the TRIPS regime. Less developed countries (for example, those in Eastern Europe) 
had to comply by January 2000, while the deadline for least-developed countries was 
January 2006.
158
 In many cases, however, these adjustment periods were too short,
159
 
and the deadline for least-developed countries was extended to 2016 in the Doha 
Declaration.
160
   
Achieving a balance? 
TRIPS significantly curtailed the policy space available to states, but did not 
completely eradicate it.
161
  Still, many commentators doubt that TRIPS achieves an 
equitable balance between the private interests of patent-holders and the public 
interest. In a 2001 Report, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
concluded that TRIPS is deeply imbalanced, stating that ‗the overall thrust of the 
TRIPS Agreement is the promotion of innovation through the provision of 
commercial incentives‘
162
 and that references to the public interest are ‗generally 
expressed in terms of exceptions to the rule rather than the guiding principles 
themselves.‘
163
 Furthermore, while TRIPS covers intellectual property rights in great 
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detail, its references to the corollary duties of intellectual property rights holders are 
vague and broadly worded.
164
  
Abbott, too, regards the ‗balance‘ struck in the TRIPS Agreement as 
‗flawed‘:
165
 ‗Generally speaking, the TRIPS Agreement frames protection of private 
rights in the form of positive obligations, and addresses public interest issues by way 
of negative or exceptional rights.‘
166
 If the public interest side of the balance were 
taken more seriously, ‗An alternative way would be to formulate protected public 
interests as positive rights or obligations of states, and to establish IPRs as reflecting 
exclusivity in information based on specific policy objectives.‘
167
  
As outlined above, the TRIPS negotiations were dominated by powerful and 
wealthy states, highly motivated to draft a treaty that favoured their knowledge 
industries. Drahos and Braithwaite point out that the ‗basic rule for negotiators was to 
find very clear language to describe the deals favourable to them, while striving to set 
in ambiguous language those deals in which they had made concessions. The 
negotiations were a search for clarity and ―constructive ambiguity‖ at the same 
time.‘
168
 There are many examples of vaguely-worded exception clauses that will 
require interpretation: what terms would be regarded as ‗reasonable‘ as part of the 
prior negotiations envisaged by Article 31(b)?
169
 What is meant by a ‗reasonable 
period of time‘ in this context?
170
 What might be understood as ‗reasonable 
remuneration‘ based on the ‗economic value of the authorization?‘ as set out in 
Article 31(h)?
171




Watal also discusses this ‗constructive ambiguity,‘ but suggests that 
‗Interpretation of ambiguous clauses in certain ways may be one means of ―clawing‖ 
                                                 
164
UNHCHR ‗Impact of TRIPS‘ para 23; Weissbrodt & Schoff ‗Human rights approach‘ at 
10. 
165
 Abbott ‗TRIPS and human rights‘ at 145. See also May & Sell IPR History at 177 using 
the word ‗skewed‘. 
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 Drahos & Braithwaite Information Feudalism at 139. See also Harrison Human rights 
Impact of WTO at 168-169. 
169
 UNCTAD-ICTSD TRIPS Resource Book at 469. 
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 Gervais TRIPS at 165. 
171
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back much of what was lost in the negotiating battles in TRIPS …‘.
173
 Indeed, 
although developed-state negotiators brushed off the significance of some of 
limitation clauses at the time of the negotiations, these clauses might yet prove 
extremely valuable in trying to achieve a better balance. Their potential significance 
within a human rights context will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
In Chapter 4, I will look more closely at the practical effects of the TRIPS 
policy space enclosure and some of social and economic challenges it presents to 
developing states. In the course of these discussions, I will also examine the broader 
context – why do developing states need policy space? Chapter 5 will examine the 
attempts by developing states to ‗claw back‘
174
 some of the policy space relinquished 
as a result of the TRIPS Agreement. I will look at the Doha talks, where developing 
countries based their arguments on public health concerns, as well as the more recent 
WIPO Development Agenda talks. I will also look at recent attempts by developed 
countries to further enclose the policy space, particularly via the Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty initiatives. These chapters will lead to Chapters 6 and 7, which argue for 
human rights-based approaches to negotiation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
CHALLENGES FACING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
The patent system is based on market monopolies and has inherent social 
costs. States need enough IP policy space to design a patent system appropriate to 
local circumstances and needs, and should use the system‘s policy levers to strive for 
a reasonable balance between promoting innovation and safeguarding public welfare 
needs. Economic studies broadly agree that patent policy should be set locally rather 
than globally, and that it is exceedingly unlikely that uniform international standards 
will suit all environments. It is particularly unlikely that standards appropriate for 
developed-state economies will be suitable in developing countries. 
The TRIPS Agreement raised protection levels substantially, reducing the 
policy space available to developing states. Most commentators regard the treaty as 
prejudicial to developing countries‘ interests and needs, and it has indeed presented 
significant challenges to those countries. These are the kinds of social costs that the 
Development Agenda proposals suggest be critically examined.  
In this chapter I focus on two of these costs. First, I look at the HIV/AIDS 
crisis and the ways in which TRIPS has made it more difficult for developing states to 
acquire the essential medicines needed to respond to the crisis, focusing particularly 
on compulsory licensing and the availability of generic drugs. Next, I look at the 
possibilities for developing a local pharmaceutical sector in developing countries, and 
examine the problem of patents over research tools 
Public health crisis: HIV/AIDS and essential medicines 
The human dimensions of the ‗social cost‘ of the patent system are nowhere 
more obvious and pressing than in the context of the HIV/AIDS crisis, a pandemic 
that primarily affects developing states.
1
  The horrifying proportions of this human 
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 Sixty-seven percent of those infected live in sub-Saharan Africa, the region which accounted 














tragedy cannot be stressed enough. An estimated 33 million people are infected with 
HIV/AIDS 
2
 and more than 25 million have died during the past 20 years.
3
  
It would be difficult to overstate the social and economic problems that the 
HIV/AIDS crisis presents for developing states.
4
 In Africa, HIV/AIDS has been cited 
as both a result and a cause of endemic poverty.
5
 AIDS deaths are concentrated in 
adults of working age, potentially crippling the productive capacity of the economy, 
and affecting states‘ capacity for economic development and technological 
innovation.
6
 Illness affects the productivity of businesses and manufacturing plants; 
among farm workers, it lowers agricultural output and threatens food security.
7
 
Because children are often obliged to care for sick parents or orphaned siblings, 
school enrolments drop significantly, affecting the future productive capabilities of 
the children and the productive capacity of the economy generally.
8
 The scale of the 




The WHO‘s Commission on Macroeconomics and Health has concluded that: 
‗The AIDS pandemic represents a unique challenge of unprecedented urgency and 
intensity. This single epidemic can undermine Africa‘s development over the next 
generation … unless addressed by greatly increased efforts.‘
10
 Similarly, the UN High 
Commissioner has noted that the pandemic is ‗a significant obstacle to the realization 
of the right to development‘;
11




Coping with this crisis requires in part that states are able to provide access to 
antiretroviral medication. Since 1996, HIV infection has been successfully managed 
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5
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using combination therapies to dramatically improve the efficacy of treatment and 
make it less likely that the patient will develop resistance
 13
 The standard first-line 
therapy
14
 currently recommended by the World Health Organization  is ‗the classic 
combination of two nucleoside
15
 and one non-nucleoside
16
 drugs (eg 
D4T+3TC+NVP).‘  For patients with special circumstances such as pregnancy, 
tuberculosis, or HIV-2 infection, ‗triple non-nucleoside regimens (eg 
AZT+3TC+ABC) are recommended as the alternative strategy.‘
17
  




● Nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs)  (which prevent healthy 
T-cells in the body from becoming infected with HIV) 
 abacavir (ABC) 
 didanosine (ddI) 
 lamivudine (3TC) [emtictabine (FTC) added as an alternative in 2007] 
 stavudine (d4T) 
 tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (TDF) [added 2007] 
 zidovudine (ZDV or AZT) 
● Non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs)  (also prevent healthy 
T-cells in the body from becoming infected with HIV) 
 efavirenz (EFV or EFZ) 
 nevirapine (NVP) 
● Protease inhibitors (PIs) (which prevent T-cells infected with HIV from 
producing new copies of the virus) 
 indinavir (IDV) 
 ritonavir 
 lopinavir + ritonavir (LPV/r) 
 nelfinavir (NFV) [added 2007] 
 Saquinavir (SQV) [added 2007] 
  
In addition, the WHO added certain fixed-dose combinations of the above to its 
essential medicines list in 2007. 
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It is clear that the HIV/AIDS crisis must be tackled in a variety of ways. Mere 
provision of antiretroviral therapy cannot solve the problem.
19
 However, the use of 
antiretroviral medicines is an essential component of a successful programme to 
manage the effects of HIV/AIDS and bring the epidemic under control.
20
 
Unfortunately, in developing countries, only one-third of those needing antiretroviral 
therapy is able to obtain it.
21
 In many sub-Saharan African countries less than 25 
percent of infected people receive treatment.
22
 As a result, most will become sick and 
die. 
It is important to note that antiretroviral therapy is also crucial for preventing 
new infections. Numerous studies show that greater availability of antiretroviral 
treatment leads to dramatic increases in HIV-testing and counselling.
23
 Preventing 
infection is the single most important strategy to control the epidemic; in the absence 
of an effective prevention strategy, HIV infections could increase to almost 40 million 
in sub-Saharan Africa during the next 15 years.
24
 More than half of these infections 
could be avoided with a comprehensive prevention and treatment package.
25
 
Prevention of mother-to-child transmission during pregnancy and birth is crucial. 
This, too, is positively related to HIV-testing and counselling.
26
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Widespread availability of HIV/AIDS therapy is essential, not only to prolong 
the lives and increase the economic and social capacity of the millions already 
infected, but as an indispensable component of a prevention strategy, the only realistic 
way to bring the HIV/AIDS epidemic under control. 
The need for generic drugs and compulsory licences 
In 2000, the year before the problem was first raised at Doha, the on-patent 
price of antiretroviral therapy ranged from US$ 10 000 to US$ 15 000 per patient per 
year.
27
 At that time, the annual per capita income in Malawi was less than US$ 200,
28
 
while most developing states had medications budgets below US$ 30 per person per 
annum, and 38 countries had budgets of less than US$ 2 per person per year.
29
 In 
2000, the Panos Institute (London) found that Zambia would need to spend 57 percent 
of its GDP in order to procure antiretrovirals.
30
 Clearly, the full on-patent prices were 
(and still are) unaffordable to patients or public health services in developing 
countries, and have ‗seriously compromised‘ the ability of developing states to 
respond to the HIV/AIDS crisis.
31
 As a result, these states have explored ways of 
obtaining these essential medicines at a lower cost.  
One of the most efficient and effective ways of doing this is to make or buy 
generic versions of the drugs. Generic drugs are typically far cheaper than their on-
patent equivalents, particularly when then is competition between generic producers.
32
  
In Brazil, the average price of antiretroviral drugs fell by 70 percent when generics 
were produced by Brazilian companies: the price of one drug fell by 95 percent.
33
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Since 2000, the price of standard first-line triple therapy has dropped significantly 
every year, in part because of more generic competitors in the marketplace.
34
 By July 
2008, it was possible to obtain first-line triple therapy for US$ 87 per patient per year, 
a 99 percent saving on 2000 prices.
35
 Newer and more effective drugs, however, are 
often not available in generic form, in part because of TRIPS. India and other 
developing states with the capacity to produce generic drugs have had to extend 
patent protection to pharmaceutical products, and are thus not permitted to reverse 
engineer new drugs without licences.
36
 While first-line triple therapy is still effective 
for most infected people in developing countries, patients develop resistance to the 
first-line drugs over time, and the non-availability of generic second-generation 
medicines will become ‗increasingly acute.‘
37
 
In addition to lower prices, generic drugs manufactured free of patent 
monopolies offer other advantages. For example, distribution, d sage accuracy and 
adherence are greatly enhanced by combining triple therapy in a single pill. Important 
three-drugs-in-one-pill versions of d4T+3TC+Neverapine and AZT+3TC+Nevirapine 
are produced only by generic pharmaceutical companies.
38
 The ingredients in these 
pills are produced by rival originator companies, and are not available at all in 
combination in on-patent form.
39
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 See the fixed-dose combinations listed in the Drugs Tables in Appendix I and II. The table 
illustrates that they are available only from generic manufacturers. Note, however, the 
cooperation between Merck and BMS in offering a combination of TDF/FTC/EFV in 2008. 
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Because of the enormous price differences between on-patent drugs and 
generic competitors, developing states need access to generic products as part of their 
HIV/AIDS programmes.  
As I discussed in Chapter 2, patent regimes are policy decisions: states 
compare the social costs of monopoly prices to the benefits of monopoly incentives. 
The TRIPS Agreement restricts many possible policy levers in the patent system. The 
lever that many developing countries seek to implement to ensure availability of 
affordable essential medicines is compulsory licensing. Ideally, developing states 
should be able to choose the terms of compulsory licences, the drugs to which they 
apply, and the countries and enterprises from which they source the drugs. A 
predictable market would also favour generics-producers, since they would be better 
able to predict probable sales and feel reasonably confident that their investments 
would not be wasted.
40
 Countries such as India with pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacity need compulsory licences to manufacture new second-generation medicines 
as increasing numbers of patients become resistant to first-line therapy.
41
 
The effect of generics on the price of brand-name drugs 
Since 2000, highly visible publicity campaigns
42
 have resulted in a dramatic 
drop in the price of ‗originator brand‘
43
 antiretrovirals sold under differential pricing 
schemes
44
 to developing countries.
45
 In some cases, the prices offered by originator 
patent-holding companies are now lower than the prices of generic equivalents.
46
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There have also been several highly-publicized donation schemes,
47
 as well as the 
issuing of voluntary licences to generic producers based in developing states.
48
  
Differential pricing schemes can be a profitable business option for companies 
selling products under patent,
49
 but they are not under the control of developing states, 
depend largely on the business decisions of the originator companies, and are far from 
guaranteed.
50
 Without a long-term legal agreement, developing states cannot rely on 
sources or prices, and have very little control over which medicines are discounted, 
for how long, or in what volume.
51
 Not all on-patent drugs are included in the 
schemes, which reduces developing states‘ public health options for providing the 
most appropriate medicines.
52
 Furthermore, the schemes do not include newer and 
more effective drugs, a problem of growing importance as developing-country 
patients become resistant to first-line therapy.
53
 As noted earlier, some of the most 
effective and most easily dispensed fixed-dose combinations are manufactured only 
by generic producers.
54
  The current differential pricing arrangements have been 
criticized for their lack of transparency.
55
 Companies typically announce different 
prices for ‗Category 1‘ and ‗Category 2‘ countries but it is sometimes unclear which 
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 CIPR ‗Health‘ at 35; Watal ‗Differential pricing‘ at 12; ‗DFID ‗Framework for good 
practice‘ at 32; Gifford ‗Social benefits and costs‘ at 115-116; Danzon and Towse 
‗Differential pricing‘ at 455. See also Rai ‗Information revolution‘ at 188, discussing price 
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50
 Some speculate that lowered prices were a response by originator companies fearing 
negative publicity in light of widespread media attention to the HIV/AIDS crisis, the price of 
brand-name ARVs, and the comparable price of generics. (DFID ‗Framework for good 
practice‘ at 1-2, noting that pharmaceutical companies face serious reputational damage if 
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developing countries‘; See also Drahos & Braithwaite Information Feudalism at 8-9). Some 
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51
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52
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53
 Médecins sans Frontières Untangling the Web 2008 at 6-7. 
54
 See for example those in the Drugs Tables in Appendix I and II. 
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These factors impede the planning and development of HIV/AIDS 
programmes. Developing states desire and need their own policy space to issue 
generic licences, manufacture generic drugs, or import generics from sources of their 
choice.  
One of the most important arguments favouring compulsory licensing is the 
effect that this can have on the prices of brand-name drugs. Differential pricing 
schemes instituted by the originator companies are a response to competition in the 
marketplace, and it is unlikely that prices would have dropped as significantly without 
generic competition.
57
 Although the originator companies cannot sell their products in 
developing countries at the full on-patent price (because the market will not bear it), 
they can still sell the drugs for profit with prices close to (and sometimes even lower 
than) those offered by generic companies.
58
 Without generic competition, however, 
there would be a tendency for prices to rise.
59
 The Drugs Table in Appendix I shows 
that in 2005, originator companies tended not to offer discounts for drugs for which 
there were no generic competitors. By 2008, TRIPS had curtailed generic competition 
for newer second-generation medicines and, in the absence of such competitors, the 
originator companies offered no discounts for the newest drugs.
60
 
The power to issue compulsory licences can also be a very powerful tool when 
negotiating with originator companies.
61
 Brazil, for example, has found its credible 
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The UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights has concluded that 
compulsory licensing plays a crucial role in maintaining price competition in the 
pharmaceutical sector: ‗We do not regard compulsory licensing as a panacea, but 
rather as an essential insurance policy to prevent abuses of the IP system.‘
63
 




TRIPS‟s effect on production of generics and compulsory licensing 
TRIPS has made it more difficult to manufacture generic drugs. Prior to 
TRIPS, many countries did not recognize product patents on pharmaceuticals.
65
 This 
permitted development of large generic pharmaceutical sectors in countries such as 
India and Brazil. TRIPS requirements that patent protection be provided for all 
products and processes threaten these industries and the supply of cheaper generic 
drugs worldwide,
66
 an issue of growing concern as more patients become resistant to 
first-line therapy.
67
 TRIPS also makes it more difficult to export or import goods 
manufactured in a foreign state under compulsory licence,
68
 thereby significantly 
reducing the available policy space. However, it also contains several flexibilities, 
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 which should, in theory, allow developing 
countries to cope with public health crises by providing access to essential medicines.  
Despite these provisions, however, countries such as South Africa and Brazil, 
which have attempted to use the flexibilities to implement TRIPS-compliant strategies 
to improve access to medicines through the compulsory licensing and generic drugs, 
have found themselves under intense pressure to abandon their strategies. Brazil 
launched a highly successful HIV/AIDS Programme in November 1996,
72
 providing 
free antiretroviral treatment to everyone infected with HIV.  As a result, the number 
of AIDS death fell dramatically (by more than 50 percent during the period 1996 to 
1999).
73
 The Programme relied on Articles 68 and 71 of the Brazilian Intellectual 
Property Law, which provided for compulsory licensing of patented drugs on a 
number of grounds, including ‗national emergency‘ and ‗public interest‘, without the 
consent of the patent-holder.
74
 This provision is very similar to provisions in Article 




In large part, the Programme was made possible because of local production 
of generic equivalents to patented antiretroviral drugs, which were up to 95 percent 
cheaper than the brand-name equivalents.
76
 While almost all the drugs used in the 
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 it also relied on two drugs (Efavirenz and Nelfinavir) 
that were under patent to foreign companies,
78
 with costs that made up 36 percent of 
the Programme‘s total cost in 2001.
79
 The Brazilian Government has had some 
success in negotiating a price reduction for these drugs,
80
 largely by threatening to 
produce local generics under compulsory licence.
81
 Through these strategies, the 
Brazilian Government significantly reduced the costs of treatment.
82
   
In 2001, however, the United States brought a complaint against Brazil to the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The complaint was directed at Brazil‘s threats to 
issue compulsory licences if it was unable to negotiate a reasonable discount,
83
 and at 
Article 68 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law,
84
 which permitted the granting of 
compulsory licences where there is no local manufacturing of the patented product.
85
 
In 1997, the South African government passed the Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act,
86
 which introduced ‗measures to ensure supply 
of more affordable medicines‘
87
 and provided for parallel importation of medicines, 
compulsory licensing, and substitution of generic equivalents of on-patent drugs 
without consent of the patent-holders. In response, the United States passed Public 
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Law 105-277 (1999), which threatened to suspend American aid to South Africa 
pending negotiations leading to the repeal of s 15(c) of the South African Act,
88
and 
threatened to lodge a WTO complaint.
89
 Senior EU officials, leaders of European 
countries including France, Germany and Switzerland, and US Vice-President Gore 
appealed to President Mbeki to drop the legislation on the grounds that it was not 
TRIPS-compliant.
90
 In February 1998, 41 pharmaceutical companies filed suit in 
South African courts arguing that the Amendment violated both TRIPS and the South 
African Constitution.
91
 The South Africans countered that the Act did not violate 
TRIPS because TRIPS provides for parallel importation and for manufacture of 




In the context of the HIV/AIDS crisis, the actions against South Africa and 
Brazil created a domestic outcry in the United States, and (in an election year) were 
dropped for fear of political consequences.
93
 The pharmaceutical companies which, in 
addition to filing lawsuits, had persuaded the American government to bring the WTO 
complaints,
94
 suspended the actions, fearing reputational losses.
95
 In addition, they 
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These incidents illustrate the difficulties experienced by developing states 
attempting to use TRIPS flexibilities to fashion TRIPS-compliant patent regimes 
appropriate to local circumstances. They provide excellent examples of the squeeze 
on policy space, and provide a backdrop to the Doha Ministerial Discussions in 2001 
examined in Chapter 5. They also contextualize the demands for increased policy 
space made in the Development Agenda proposal documents. 
Development of a local pharmaceutical sector? 
The Development Agenda documents propose that WIPO examine whether 
the standardization of IP protection at higher levels promotes the ‗diffusion of 
science,‘ particularly in LDCs and developing countries.
97
 During the TRIPS 
negotiations (and subsequently), developed countries argued that if developing 
countries adopted Western-style patent laws, one of the benefits would be the 
development of an indigenous intellectual property sector. They argued that patent 
incentives would encourage innovation, just as in the developed world, and that 
developing countries would be able to develop their own originator pharmaceutical 
sector, create their own drugs, patent them, and reap returns. 
In the next part of this chapter I will examine this further. Is it possible for 
developing countries to grow their own pharmaceutical sectors under TRIPS 
conditions? To answer this question, it is necessary to look more broadly at the 
question of patents over research tools, since research-tool patents may impede 
follow-on research. I thus begin with a general discussion of research-tool patenting. 
In addition to examining the effects of research-tool patents on the ‗diffusion of 
science‘ in developing countries, I will examine their effects on research into ‗non-
profitable‘ diseases like malaria and tuberculosis. 
Patents on research tools may come at a very large social cost – not only may 
they impede the development of pharmaceutical sectors in developing states, but they 
may also obstruct research into the prevention and treatment of diseases that primarily 
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affect people living in these countries. Developing countries desire and need the 
policy space to confront these social costs. 
Research tools 
Research tools can be broadly defined as ‗the full range of resources that 
scientists use in the laboratory:‘
98
 the resources that scientists need to conduct their 
research. They include: ‗reagents that facilitate cloning and manipulating genetic and 
proteomic materials across different environments; screening equipment, such as 
microchips embedded with an array of genome or proteomic material; animal models; 






Modern biomedical and pharmaceutical research relies on the use of genes, 
proteins and gene fragments (such as oligonucleotides),
101
 expressed sequence tags 
(ESTs),
102
 and single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).
103
 An oligonucleotide 
sequence, for example, can be used to detect particular sequences of molecules in 
DNA and to provoke particular chemical reactions at a particular point in the DNA 
molecule. Microarrays (‗DNA chips‘) can hold thousands of these sequences and can 
be used as probes, which will hybridize with complementary DNA strands from DNA 




 Berman & Dreyfuss ‗Structural biology‘ at 887. 
100
 Malakoff ‗Rise of the mouse‘; Pennisi ‗Mouse chronology‘. 
101
 DNA molecules have two long ‗chains‘ (strands) of smaller molecules. These smaller 
molecules are called ‗nucleotides.‘ The bases on one strand of DNA are paired with the bases 
the complementary strand in a predictable manner. The order of the bases in a strand of DNA 
is known as the DNA molecule‘s ‗structural formula,‘ or ‗nucleotide sequence‘. An 
oligonucleotide is a short single strand of the DNA molecule, usually between 2 and 50 bases 
long. (Chin ‗Research in the shadow‘ at 851). The bases in a particular oligonucleotide strand 
can hybridize (join up) with their complementary bases in another oligonucleotide strand if 
there is a reverse-complementary sequence in the second DNA strand (because this will 
permit such hybridization). (Chin ‗Research in the shadow‘ at 849 and 851). Oligonucleotides 
are thus very useful for detecting DNA molecules that contain such complementary 
sequences. They can also be used to cause a particular chemical reaction at a particular point 
in the DNA molecule (at the point where the sequence of complementary bases occurs). (Chin 
‗Research in the shadow‘ at 851). 
102
 ESTs are short strands of DNA. They can be used to identify, locate, and map specific 
genes. (Garde ‗Targeted treatments at 275). 
103
 SNPs are ‗single base-pair variations‘ in the human genome. Most humans have identical 
DNA sequences, with our genetic differences located in these SNPs. These occur, on average, 
about once in 1000 base pairs. Identifying and locating these SNPs is useful for understanding 
disease – and possibly, for predicting which people might be prone to developing particular 















 this is a tool that can be used to test for the presence of thousands of 
particular DNA sequences at the same time.
105
 
Genetically-engineered animals like Harvard University‘s cancer-prone 
OncoMouse
106
 can be crucially important for scientists working in biomedical and 
related fields.
 107
 Many such transgenic animals have now been engineered, with a 
range of ailments, mimicking not only cancer, but also AIDS and Alzheimer‘s.
108
  
Some research tools can be classified as ‗broad spectrum tools‘ because they 
are useful for ‗pursuing a wide range of research problems, and could potentially aid 
in the discovery of a wide range of future products.‘
109
 A good example of a broad 
spectrum tool is recombinant DNA technology. Recombinant DNA is DNA 
manufactured using nucleotide sequences from two different sources (which are 
usually from different species) combined into the same DNA molecule.
110
 




Another broad spectrum tool is the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), first 
developed in 1985, which is used to replicate segments of DNA. Using this automated 
technique, billions of copies of a sequence can be copied within a few hours. This 
technology and the DNA products created with it have a very wide range of 
applications. They are used for further genetic research, for the development of 
pharmaceutical products, and as components in the pharmaceuticals themselves (for 
example in various vaccines and antiretroviral medications). They are also used in 
diagnostics, gene therapy, forensics, genetic engineering of agricultural plants and 
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 Chin ‗Research in the shadow‘ at 852. 
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 NIH Report on Research Tools at ‗Private Firms‘. 
110
 This technique was made possible by the discovery of ‗restriction enzymes‘ in 1971. 
Restriction enzymes cut DNA molecules at a small number of specific sites, depending on the 
enzyme used (thus far, hundreds of specific restriction enzymes have been discovered and 
isolated). Campbell & Reece Biology at 384-386; Klug, Cummings & Spencer Concepts of 
Genetics 458. 
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animals, environmental clean-up products, and palaeontology. PCR technology has 
revolutionized genetic research and molecular biology research.
112
 
Broad spectrum tools also include information sources such as archival 
databanks with information about gene and protein sequences and structures,
113
 and 
biobanks with collections of DNA samples and medical histories of particular 
populations.
114
 There are also many value-added databases derived from these 
archival databases. Some, for example, ‗classify the elements of protein structure 
based on common features, such as folds.‘
115
 Databases like this are crucial research 
tools in the biotech and pharmaceutical industries.
116
 
Research tools are now indispensable for pharmaceutical research. Tools 
based on genomics can assist, for example, in identifying the most promising ‗targets‘ 
at a cellular level,
117
 identifying compounds for use in new pharmaceutical remedies, 




The rise of patents over research tools 
Historically, research tools were developed by ‗pure scientists‘ working at 
universities or other publicly funded research institutions. ‗Pure science‘ was regarded 
as having very little direct commercial potential, but as indispensable for follow-on 
research in applied science and technology.
119
 United States policy following World 
War II was heavily influenced by a policy document drawn up by Vannevar Bush, 
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 Campbell & Reece Biology at 391-392, 403-407; Klug, Cummings & Spencer Concepts of 
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 For example, the BCRA 1 gene, linked to breast cancer. (Kane ‗Molecules and conflict‘ at 
329). 
118
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which argued that because technological advancement was based on foundational 
pure science research, pure science should be given generous state funding,
120
 and that 
scientific findings should be disseminated as widely as possible so that other 
scientists, and indeed potential technological innovators, could draw upon them 
freely.
121
 This approach recognizes that, since scientific knowledge and technological 
progress are always cumulative and evolutionary, the process of scientific discovery is 
optimized when many scientists work in a field, evaluating, testing and critiquing one 
another‘s work and results, building on one another‘s research, and furthering the 
boundaries of reliable knowledge.
122
 Scientific process is thus most efficient and 
effective when scientists have unfettered access to one another‘s work.
123
 
As ‗publicly-supported institutions of higher learning,‘ universities have 
traditionally been core to fostering ‗pure‘ research and disseminating new knowledge 
to the broader scientific and technological community.
124
 In 1980, however, the 
United States Congress passed the Bayh-Doyle Act,
125
 which encouraged universities 
to take out patents on their research results.
126
 The rationale behind the Act was that 
commercial companies are more likely than universities to develop pure research into 
practical and commercially viable products, but, given the risks and expense involved, 
that they are likely to do this only if they have an exclusive licence.
127
  Universities 
would be able to award such licences if they could control access to their research 
through patents.
128
 In France, the Innovation and Research Law of 1999
129
 has a 
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similar purpose: the ‗transfer of technology from public research to the economy and 
innovative firms.‘
130
 Similar legislation has now been passed in many countries.
131
 
The number of patents filed by universities and other publicly funded research 
institutions has increased dramatically following passage of legislation of this kind;
132
 
previously, most of the inventions, methodologies, tools, and materials produced at 




This restriction on freely available information and research tools has been 
exacerbated by the fact that the courts now recognize patents over important research 
tools like gene fragments. Traditionally, it was not possible to patent natural 
phenomena.
134
 However, it is not always easy to distinguish between a naturally 
occurring substance and one which has been invented by humans (and is thus 
potentially patentable).
135
 In a landmark 1911 case, the New York Supreme Court 
recognized a patent for purified human adrenalin as a ‗man-made substance‘, holding 
that even though adrenalin occurs in the human body, it is never pure or distilled in its 
natural state; therefore, the distilled purified substance should be regarded as the 
result of human intervention, and patentable.
136
 In Diamond v Chakrabarty,
137
 the US 
Supreme Court held that although it was not possible to patent ‗laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas,‘ genetically-engineered bacteria could be 
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patented because they were the product of human ingenuity, and indeed the Court 




This line of thinking has persisted in modern patent practice where patents are 
granted on an increasingly wide range of biological materials including isolated 
genes, receptors, and purified proteins on the grounds that since genes, receptors and 
proteins do not occur naturally in pure or isolated forms, the modified gene, receptor 
or protein is thus human-made and patentable.
139
 As a result, essential research tools 
like genes, proteins, or gene fragments (such as ESTs, SNPs and oligonucleotides) 
have been patented on the grounds that they have been isolated or purified by human 
agency.
140
 These post-Chakrabarty decisions show a general trend by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the special US patent court), toward 




While the United States has probably the most protectionist attitude toward the 
patenting of naturally occurring substances, other countries have also begun patenting 
more widely.
142
 This type of patenting has been widely criticized as arbitrary, and too 
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 It is problematic for scientists attempting follow-on research because genes, 
proteins and various fragments thereof are fundamental research tools.
144
  
The effect research-tools patenting 
‗Proprietary science‘ may impede research by restricting access to the 
necessary research tools and published information. Research tools are widely used in 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnical sectors particularly, where sophisticated research 
tools have enabled scientists to make important breakthroughs.
145
 
But, problems arise when access to tools is restricted by patents. Sometimes, 
the holders of the patent may refuse to license at all – typically if they want to prevent 
competitors from using the technology to develop a rival commercial product.
 146
 
When patent-holders do issue licences, they often place significant restrictions on how 
the tools may be used.
 147
 Such restrictions include that research tools not be: shared 
with other institutions (and sometimes even with colleagues at the same 
institution);
148
 used for commercial purposes; or used for research sponsored by 
another commercial company.
149
 Some licences provide that the tool may be used 
only for the particular research project described in the user agreement.
150
  
Some licence agreements have confidentially clauses which limit the ability to 
publish research results or to have the findings validated through the peer review 
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 Some require delayed publication of research findings, or pre-publication 
approval by the research-tool owner,
152
 restricting the flow of information about new 
discoveries and their potential applications.
153
 There may also be restrictions on 
collaboration, particularly with competitor private companies, or with university-
based scientists funded by competitors.
154
 Some scientific researchers have 
significantly reduced normal academic collaboration, due in part to fears that such 
collaboration would infringe research-tool licences.
155
 
Thus, licence agreements can significantly curtail the freedom of scientists to 
conduct research and share it with peers in the ways envisaged by Vannevar Bush in 
his Endless Frontier of science. This curtailment of the ‗public domain of science‘ 
presents significant obstacles to scientific progress, since ‗open science‘ has 
traditionally has been perceived as the most efficient and powerful model to generate 
progress in both the pure and applied sciences.
156
 
Licences can also be very expensive.
157
 Sometimes patent-holders insist on 
exorbitant up-front fees.
158
 Very often, however, instead of charging fees up-front, the 
patent-holder insists on ‗reach-through‘ or ‗grant-back‘ licences. These govern the 
rights to potential future inventions made using a research tool owned by someone 
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 Some agreements require that the owner of the research tool be given outright 
ownership of discoveries made using the tool.
160
 Short of outright ownership, 




The most notorious example of this is Cetus, which held the patent to the 
indispensable broad spectrum PCR technology. The company originally hoped to 
insist on reach-through licences ‗which would have required users to pay Cetus 
royalties on any invention or marketable product created using PCR ....‘
162
 Because 
PCR is an essential tool for genomic research, there was outrage in the scientific 
community and beyond.
163
 Business Week remarked that this arrangement would be 
comparable to ‗a software company demanding royalties from a best-selling author 
who used its word-processing program.‘
164
 
The sheer number of patents needing to be negotiated prior to research (‗patent 
thickets‘
165
) can itself impede research, regardless of the terms on which the various 
tools are subsequently offered.
166
 Heller and Eisenberg discuss the ‗tragedy of the 
anti-commons,‘ which arises when a large number of patent-owners hold patents to 
the research tools and materials required for a particular research project.
167
 Under 
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these conditions, the transaction costs of performing the research may become 
prohibitive; this results in under-research in heavily patented areas.
168
 The need to 
negotiate multiple reach-through licences might also result in ‗royalty stacking‘ 
against any potential inventions arising from the research
169
 – research may appear 




The end result is that patent protection may end up stifling innovation, rather 
than encouraging it.
171
 The consequences of research-tool patenting are most severe 
where the patents affect tools that are needed for a wide range of research projects,
172
 
for example, patents over potential ‗druggable targets‘ (usually genes) in the human 
body. In 2000, existing drugs targeted about 10 percent of the 5000 potential drug 
targets, but patents over promising targets (such as the BCR1 breast cancer gene) 
often impeded promising lines of research.
173
 Ultimately, patents granted over 
research tools often hinder ‗the ability of the scientific community, both that part 
interested in advancing the science farther, and that part interested in trying to use 




 Ibid; Thumm ‗Patents for genetic inventions‘ at 1411. 
170
 Heller & Eisenberg ‗Can patents deter innovation?‘ at 699; Thumm ‗Patents for genetic 
inventions‘ at 1411; Jaffe & Lerner Innovation Discontents at 64-65. Further problems are 
created by the administrative difficulties and delays often experienced in university 
environments where TTOs ar  very often understaffed, under-funded, with employees 
insufficiently trained in administering the system. (NIH Report on Research Tools at 
‗University Technology Transfer Professionals‘.) See also Eisenberg ‗Proprietary research 
tools‘ at 225, reporting that this administrative burden may be overwhelming both for 
universities and for private companies, particularly smaller ones; and Thumm ‗Patents for 
genetic inventions‘ at 1411. See also Nottenburg, Pardey & Wright ‗Non-profit research‘ at 
399, reporting on the difficulties of tracking down licence holders and negotiating with them. 
171
 Many scholars have made this point. See Rai, discussing the possible benefits of genomics 
research for the development of pharmaceuticals but warning that over-patenting of early-
level research might ‗create a web of property rights that is very difficult for developers of 
pharmaceuticals … to negotiate.‘ (Rai ‗Information revolution‘ at 193). See also Berman & 
Dreyfuss ‗Structural biology‘ at 887-888, noting that ‗the … proliferation … of patents … has 
given rise to significant licensing difficulties. In many cases, negotiations are slow relative to 
the rate at which scientific research proceeds.‘ 
172
 for example, the patenting of ‗key pathways‘ for research such as the use of a particular 
receptor (Barton ‗Research-tool patents‘ at 822; Nelson ‗Scientific commons‘ at 463). See 
Miller ‗Bayh-Dole‘ at fn 66-68 discussing the BCRA 1 gene linked to breast cancer. Because 
the licence fees are so expensive, however, many researchers have abandoned BCR1 research. 
On this issue see also Dreyfuss ‗Public domain‘ at 460; Dutfield & Suthersanen ‗Innovation 
dilemma‘ at  405; Kane ‗Molecules and conflict‘ at 329. 
173

















Some empirical studies have suggested that, in practice, scientists have been 
less impeded by research-tool patenting than might have been anticipated in theory. 
Walsh et al, for example, interviewed American biomedical scientists, and discovered 
that those working on important projects were usually able to work around the patent 
problem by licensing, inventing around the patent,
175
 moving their research offshore, 
developing their own research tools, or using patented technology in secret without 
paying licence fees.
176
 Commercial enterprises have tended to pay licence fees, even 
where excessive (which diverts funds from actual research projects), passing the costs 
on to the consumer.
177
 
Other studies, however, have documented specific projects that were 
abandoned because access to the necessary research tools or information was either 
impossible, or too difficult or expensive.
178
 In a study conducted in 2000, for 
example, Campbell et al reported that over 20 percent of university-based geneticists 
had been unable to continue with promising lines of research because of contractual 
prohibitions in research-tool agreements preventing collegial data-sharing and 
collaboration with peers, while almost 50 percent were unable to acquire data required 
for their research from their colleagues during the previous three years.
179
 A 2006 
study by Zheng, Juneja and Wright reported that one third of scientists interviewed 
had struggled to obtain necessary research materials, and that one quarter of their 
projects had to be abandoned.
180
 A 2005 survey conducted by the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science found that 58 percent of bio-scientists 
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had experienced delays in their research because of patent issues; 50 percent of bio-




These and other recent studies
182
 confirm the results of the very detailed study 
conducted by the American NIH in 1997. At that time, scientists complained about 
restrictions on the kinds of research they could conduct, licence fees, reach-through 
licences, restrictions on collaboration with peers, and restrictions on publication of 
research.
183
 They reported that these restrictions sometimes made it impossible for 
them to proceed with research, either because of an absolute refusal to licence the 
necessary research tool, or because the royalties demanded were too expensive or 
offered on unreasonable terms.
184




Research-tool patents may hamper research into profitable areas, but they 
seldom prevent it altogether.
186
 Where profits are more doubtful, however, patent 
thickets may make research almost impossible.
 187
 The non-profit Malaria Vaccine 
Institute, for example, has cited upstream research patents as an important barrier to 
its research;
188
 researchers looking at HIV-1 subtypes C and A (the types prevalent in 
developing countries) have experienced similar problems. Most research has been 
conducted into subtype B, which is prevalent in North America and Europe.
 189
 
Effect on developing countries 
Scientific research and technological innovation in developing countries has 
been affected by the increasing costs of research tools and by the complexity of 




 See for example Stern & Murray ‗Free flow of scientific knowledge‘ for an empirical 
survey concluding that patent protection has had a negative impact in the sciences. 
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 Ibid at 295. 
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 Ibid at 303. Most research has been conducted into subtype B, which is prevalent in North 















 Indeed, ‗scientific communities in developing countries are 
particularly vulnerable to limitations of access to information and to increasing costs 
of laboratory equipment and materials. In developing countries, the replication of 
common experiments [regarded as routine in developed economies] demands 
important investments in new equipment, research tools, information, training and 
scientific networking.‘
191
 The set-up costs resemble those for ‗exploratory research‘ in 
developed states. The cost of research tools and materials in developing countries 




Sometimes universities and small biotech firms in developing countries cannot 
afford the licence fees for the necessary research tools and materials.
193
 Some PCR-
based products cost up to US$ 500 000 per annum in 1997 – a huge impediment to 
developing-country universities.
194
 Even where licence fees are regarded as 
reasonable by developed-country standards (for example, the US$ 10 000 annual fee 
for the (now expired) Cohen-Boyer patent on the restriction enzymes used in DNA 
recombinant technologies) they may nevertheless be prohibitive for research 
laboratories in developing states.
195
  
In practice, research tools
196
 are not patented in most developed countries, 
since the benefits of the patent monopolies do not justify the patent costs.
197
 In such 
cases, developing-country researchers could copy important research tools if they had 
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 Usually, however, research tools are patented in those developing 
countries with the research and innovative capacities to use them to produce 
competing products,
199
 such as South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Thailand, and India – 
that is, in all those developing countries which have the research capacity to actually 
use patented research tools and produce competing products.
200
 In an Indian study, 94 
percent of scientists working in the biotechnology sector reported that the 
‗multiplicity of patents and patent-owners‘ had had a negative impact on their ability 
to conduct research.
201
 It is also important to bear in mind that the problems created 
by research-tool patenting affect not only research but also teaching programmes at 
universities, thus prejudicing the next generation of geneticists, physicians and 
scientists.
202
 Confidentially restrictions also affect potential collaborative projects 
between universities in developing states and those in developed countries.
203
  
For developing states with the research and innovate technology to use 
research tools, research-tool patents have similar effects to those in developed 
countries. Indeed, the effects are exacerbated as a result of much smaller overall 
research budgets and a comparative paucity of research infrastructure. 
Research tools and ‘neglected diseases’ 
As noted in Chapter 2, the patent system relies on the market to provide the 
incentives and rewards that encourage research and investment; where there is no 
attractive potential market, commercial companies are often unwilling to make 
significant financial investments in R&D.
204
 In the pharmaceutical and biotech 
sectors, commercial companies tend to concentrate their investment and research 
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efforts on developing products aimed primarily at wealthy developed-country 




 In contrast to the rapid development of drugs for wealthy patients, there has 
been very little research into tropical diseases such as sleeping sickness, leishmaniasis 





diseases that primarily affect people in poor countries.
208
 The WHO has noted that of 
1325 new medicines developed 1975-1997 only 11 were for tropical diseases,
209
 and 
only four of those resulted from R&D in the commercial pharmaceutical sector.
210
 
Less than 5 percent of pharmaceutical R&D money funds research into diseases 
(including malaria and tuberculosis) that affect mostly developing countries.
211
 There 
has also been insufficient attention paid to developing dosage formats for existing 
drugs best suited for use in developing countries. There is no heat-stable formulation 
of insulin, for example – essential where it is almost impossible to refrigerate 
medication.
212
 Similarly, little work has been done on fixed-dose combination pills to 




Recently, however, there have been some very important initiatives to develop 
malaria and tuberculosis drugs, spearheaded by the World Health Organization, 
various states, the Gates Foundation, and even some of the major pharmaceutical 
companies. They have agreed to fund and coordinate research into vaccines and 
treatments for malaria and tuberculosis using government funding and new kinds of 
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incentives like prizes rather than relying on traditional patent incentives as a way of 
encouraging investment and R&D.
214
  
However, even though the incentives and funding for this research are ‗outside 
the patent system‘ the research itself cannot take place outside the patent system. This 
is because it is not possible to conduct this kind of scientific, medical and 
pharmaceutical research without using research tools that are under patent. Many of 
the important recent advances in biotechnology are tied up in patents, which can make 
it extremely difficult for researchers to conduct their research. One of the best 
candidates for the development of a malaria vaccine, MSP-1 (merozoite surface 
protein 1), for example, is protected by 39 patents, which belong to different patent-
holders. This may impede researchers who want to explore its potential.
215
 Thus the 
patent system can have a negative impact on research projects which themselves are 
not based on patent incentives. 
Potential patent policy levers to ameliorate research tool 
problems 
The potential patent policy levers that states could use to ameliorate the 
research-tool problems outlined above, fall into two main groups: the first lies in 
decisions on what to patent, and standards of patentability; states could apply stricter 
patenting criteria so as to curtail the patenting of important potential research tools 
such as genes and gene fragments. The second group recognizes patents on research 
tools, but offers various exceptions such as general research and experimentation 
exemptions or various kinds of compulsory licences. 
Grant fewer patents 
As noted in Chapter 3, TRIPS Article 27(1) significantly reduces states‘ IP 
policy space by providing that, in principle, patents shall be awarded for all 
inventions,  subject to the exceptions listed in Article 27(2), which provides that states 
may exclude ‗diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
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 Most research tools, however, do not fall into this category. 
States may also exclude ‗plants and animals‘
217
 but this provision specifically 
excludes micro-organisms and ‗non-biological processes‘ for the production of plants 
or animals, and it would appear that genetically modified animals such as Harvard‘s 
OncoMouse do not qualify under this provision.
218
 
In the United States, scientists argue that the patenting of genes and gene 
fragments has had a hugely detrimental effect on follow-on research
219
 and have 
proposed that as ‗naturally occurring substances‘ they should not qualify for patent 
protection.
220
 Traditionally, the distinction between ‗discoveries‘ and ‗inventions‘ had 
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218
 Correa ‗Patent rights‘ at 233. Note, however, Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner 
of Patents) 219 DLR (4th) 577 (2002), where the Canadian Supreme Court refused the 
OncoMouse patent on the grounds that higher life forms (such as mammals) could not be 
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(per Bastarache J). 
219
 See, for example, Kiley ‗Patents on random complementary DNA fragments‘, noting that 
‗These patents cluster around the earliest imaginable observations on the long road to 
practical benefit, while seeking to control what lies at the end of it.‘ See also Heller & 
Eisenberg ‗Can patents deter innovation?‘ at 699; and Bobrow & Thomas ‗Patents in a 
genetic age‘. 
220
 ACMG Position Statement Gene Patents and Accessibility of Gene Testing. Available at 
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González ‗Open science‘ at 10; Chin ‗Research in the shadow‘ at 863; Rai ‗Information 
revolution‘ at 194; Preston ‗Genome warrior‘). Similarly, the private-sector-led SNP 
Consortium has placed a number of SNPs in the public domain so as to make them freely 
available for scientific research (Barton ‗Research-tool patents‘ at 823; Cook-Deegan and 
Dedeurwaerdere ‗Science commons‘ at 306). For more examples of similar projects, see 
Cook-Deegan and Dedeurwaerdere ‗Science commons‘ at 302, 306; Runge & Defrancesco 
‗Exclusion‘ at 1721. In 1995, more than 100 American universities voluntarily entered into 
Uniform Biological Materials Transfer Agreement, aimed at ensuring that upstream patented 
biological materials were freely shared among the universities for research purposes (Rai 
‗Proprietary rights‘ at 299). Compliance with this agreement does not seem to have been 
uniform. (Rai ‗Proprietary rights‘ at 299, noting that the NIH has reported onerous restrictions 
in ‗sharing‘ agreements between participating institutions). Both public and private research 
institutions have also tried to collaborate in making more upstream research tools freely 
available in the public domain, particularly for research purposes, or particularly to non-profit 
research institutions, or available on easy terms for reasonably fees. Merck, for example, 
recently invested millions in an open access genomics database because it ‗sees gene 













been a useful way to restrict what could be patented, and prevented the patenting of 
natural substances.
221
 American case law
222
 has eroded this distinction by providing 
that natural substances that have been isolated or purified – or somehow changed by 
human intervention – are indeed patentable in their changed forms.
223
  
TRIPS, however, does allow states considerable discretion in determining 
criteria for granting patents. States are obliged to grant patents only for products or 
processes that are ‗new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application,‘
224
 that is, which meet the requirements of novelty and utility. The grant 
of patents could be limited by a more stringent application of these standards.
225
 For 
example, states could refuse to patent an ‗invention‘ which is a reasonably obvious 
next step to a person of ordinary skill in the art, on the grounds that it fails to meet the 
novelty/non-obviousness requirement, and thus ensure that patent rights ‗are only 
awarded in situations in which significant inventive effort has taken place.‘
226
  
In the early days of biotechnology, gene and protein sequencing was difficult 
and ground-breaking; today, it is ‗routine and automated.‘
227
 While gene sequencing 
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221
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nature has no claim to a monopoly of which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention 
from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and 
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222
 As cited above. 
223
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Directive of 2000 tries to solve this, and provides for the patenting of certain biotech 
products, arguing that such protection will encourage research and development in this field. 
(González ‗Patented past‘ at 4-5). 
224
 TRIPS art 27 (1). 
225
 Barton ‗Research-tool patents‘ at 822; Correa ‗Patent rights‘ at 235, 237. 
226
 Berman & Dreyfuss ‗Structural biology‘ at 895. 
227
 Ibid. See also Dreyfuss ‗Pathological patenting‘ at 1565, noting that Fred Sanger won the 
Nobel Prize in 1980 for discovering how to sequence DNA, but that this ‗Nobel-winning 













was once quite rightly regarded as ‗non-obvious,‘ scientists are now able to use the 
molecular ‗structure of a protein in one organism to accurately predict the structure of 
the same protein in another species.‘
228
 Berman and Dreyfuss thus argue that 
sequencing and structures determined by such comparisons or by high throughput 
processes ‗should no longer be considered inventive enough to qualify for patent 
protection.‘
229
    
States could also be more stringent about the utility requirement, and require 
clear and immediate utility; or award patents only once a ‗useful product‘ has actually 
been developed, 
230
 and then restrict the patent to this particular use.
231
 Current 
patenting practice allows a patentee who discovers a single use for a particular 
invention to obtain rights to other uses that are subsequently discovered (even those 
which could not have been anticipated at the time the patent was granted),
232
 or to 
patent not only a specific sequence, but ‗based on the complementarity of nucleic 
sequences and the predictability of the genetic code,‘ to patent complementary 
sequences in similar molecules which have not yet been discovered or explored.
233
 
The Harvard developers of OncoMouse have patented not only their technique and 
their mouse, but also ‗all non-human transgenic mammals‘ made using their 
                                                                                                                                            
tool patents‘ at 822; Llewelyn ‗Schrodinger‘s cat‘ at 27; Bobrow & Thomas ‗Patents in a 
genetic age‘ at 764. 
228
 Berman & Dreyfuss ‗Structural biology‘ at 895.  
229
 Ibid. The authors point out, however, that the ‗Federal Circuit has used the alleged 
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393 F 3d 1253 (Fed Cir 2004) at 1254-55, where the Federal Circuit upheld the USPTO 
decision that ‗a nucleotide sequence having promoter activity for the human involucrine gene 
(hINV) was anticipated by disclosure of a plasmid with the same hINV,‘ and suggest that this 
‗may signal a change in what the ordinary artisan is considered to understand.‘ González 
suggests that one way to halt the deluge of patents would be by refusing patent partial DNA 
sequences, which are easier to identify than full sequences (González ‗Patented past‘ at 8). 
230
 Nelson ‗Scientific commons‘ at 462. See also Dutfield & Suthersanen ‗Innovation 
dilemma‘ at 409; Dreyfuss ‗Pathological patenting‘ at 1560; Llewelyn ‗Schrodinger‘s cat‘ at 
31. 
231
 Williamson ‗Gene patents‘ at 672. On the success of utility based models generally see 
Dutfield & Suthersanen ‗Innovation dilemma‘ at 409-410. 
232
 Berman & Dreyfuss ‗Structural biology‘ at 893, citing the example of a leather-tanning 
agent, which was subsequently found to be useful as an anti-AIDS drug. 
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 The development of higher-order transgenic mammals might, however, 
require significant additional work and research. Thus, the European Union Patent 
Office has rejected the patent for mammals other than rodents.
235
  
Recently, the NHGRI guidelines on the patenting of gene fragments and 
proteins have influenced patenting policy at the US Patent and Trademark Office, 
which now refuses patents on ‗gene fragments, SNP, genes and proteins structures‘ of 
unknown function on grounds that they lack ‗utility.‘
236
 New USPTO guidelines 
require that patents on gene fragments be narrow in scope so that they do not block 
access to the full gene.
237
 In 2007, a bill introduced in the US Congress aimed at 
halting the patenting of any ‗nucleotide sequence, or its functions or correlations, or 
the naturally occurring products it specifies.‘
238
 
Although TRIPS has considerably narrowed the available IP policy space, it 
does permit states to set stringent novelty and utility requirements, which are 
potentially powerful policy levers in stemming the ‗deluge‘ of patents.
239
 However, 
this policy space is now threatened by the proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 
which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
But even though these strategies might be useful for halting the overall ‗patent 
deluge,‘ many important research tools will be unaffected, because they will easily 
meet these more stringent novelty and utility requirements. With this in mind, many 
scientists call for research exemptions and compulsory licences, as discussed in the 
following section. 
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 Ibid at 194-195. See also Dreyfuss ‗Public domain‘ at 469. 
238
 Genomic Research and Accessibility Act H. R. 977, 110
th
 Cong. (2007), as quoted by 
Holman ‗Gene patents‘ at 296. See also Haugen Right to Food at 228 arguing that while it 
would contravene TRIPS to ban patenting on a whole category of inventions (eg micro-
organisms) it would probably not contravene TRIPS to ban from patentability the mere 
isolation or identification of genes which occur naturally in living organisms. Dutfield & 
Suthersanen point out that there are scientific grounds for refusing to patent genes: it is 
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simplistic to assume that genes can function independently of one another. (Dutfield & 
Suthersanen ‗Innovation dilemma‘ at 407). See also Paradise et al ‗Scope and claims‘. 
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Research exemptions for research tools 
Some patent systems provide for ‗experimental use exemptions‘ which permit 
researchers to use patented products in the course of their research without having to 
pay licence fees. The Japanese Patent Act, for example, provides that ‗the effects of 
the patent right shall not extend to the working of the patent right for the purposes of 
experiment or research.‘
240
 Several European states recognize research exemptions.
241
 





Research exemptions could potentially fall within the ambit of TRIPS Article 30.
244
 
United States courts have created a common law research exemption for ‗pure 
research‘ (that is, ‗non-commercial‘ research).
245
 In Madley v Duke University, however, 
the US Federal Circuit construed this exemption very narrowly, and held that it should 
apply only to research conducted ‗solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or 
for strictly philosophical inquiry.‘
246
 The Court held that this excluded university 
research, even if the research concerned had no direct commercial application, 
because the research would nevertheless further the university‘s ‗legitimate business 
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 Madley v Duke University 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed Cir 2002) at 1362. 
247
  at 1362. Nelson points out that universities which themselves have a history of patenting 
their findings (occasionally, making a profit from such patents) undermine their ‗non-profit‘ 
based arguments. (Nelson ‗Scientific commons‘ at 466); See also Miller ‗Bayh-Dole‘ at fn 61 
making a similar point. Following the Madley decision, the US Supreme Court delivered a 













Madley illustrates the dangers associated with recognizing exemptions for 
certain types of research, since it is often very difficult to decide what should be 
regarded as ‗non-profit‘ research, and what should be regarded as ‗commercial.‘
248
 
Unclear definitions could have a chilling effect on research.
249
 One way of 
distinguishing between commercial research and non-profit research is to make the 
exemptions available to researchers only on condition that they ‗refrain from 
patenting discoveries made in the course of their work.‘
250
  
Some scholars advocate using certain types of compulsory licences rather than 
more general research exemptions.
251
 As discussed in Chapter 3, TRIPS provides for 
the issue of compulsory licences, which under Article 30, may be granted without 
specifying their purpose, provided that ‗they do not unreasonably conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the interests of 
the patent-holder ….‘
252
 In Germany, such licences are available where a researcher 
needs to use an invention in the public interest, cannot obtain a licence from the 
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 See Garde ‗Targeted treatments‘ at 272 ff, arguing for ‗license of right‘ to NIH-funded 
research. 
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patentee at reasonable fee, and there is no reasonable alternative to using the patenting 
invention.
253
 For the United States, Strandburg suggests that the patentee should have 
an absolutely exclusive monopoly for a few years, after which those who need to use 
the invention should be able to obtain a compulsory licence at a reasonable cost.
254
  
As I will discuss in the following chapter, even the existing research 
exemptions have come under considerable threat in the SPLT negotiations,
255
  and 
many TRIPS-plus agreements have attempted to close this policy space.
256
 
Developing countries, however, need policy levers of this kind, because of the 
enormous costs of research-tool patent fees.
257
 The WHO Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health has concluded that developing states 





This chapter has outlined two important challenges facing developing states. I 
discussed the HIV/AIDS crisis and the need for essential medicines. TRIPS has made 
it more difficult for developing states to source generic medicines as part of their 
public health programmes, and states that have attempted to rely on TRIPS exception 
clauses have been pressurized to drop these activities.  
I also discussed some of the difficulties for developing countries in promoting 
local innovation, focusing on the problems posed by research-tool patents, which are 
exacerbated in developing countries. At the moment, the global patent system has 
enough flexibility for states to try to deal with this problem by insisting on more 
stringent novelty and utility requirements for patenting, or by offering either research 
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 Berman & Dreyfuss ‗Structural biology‘ at 906. 
254
 Strandburg ‗What does the public get?‘ The very term ‗research tool‘ implies that the 
product or process is important primarily as an ‗input‘ for further research. It is important to 
bear in mind, however, that some research institutions invest considerable R&D into the 
development of such ‗research tools‘ and that many of them have an independent utility as 
diagnostic tools. (Arnold & Ogielska-Zei ‗Patenting genes‘ at 429; Dutfield ‗DNA patenting‘ 
at 390 ; Garde ‗Targeted treatments‘ at 260; Dreyfuss ‗Public domain‘ at 463). Thus, any 
research exemption or compulsory licence scheme should be carefully balanced so that it 
‗permits research with a patented invention but does not eviscerate incentives to invent 
research and diagnostic tools.‘ (Berman & Dreyfuss ‗Structural biology‘ at 906). 
255
 Reichman ‗Patent law harmonization‘ at 7. 
256
 Kapczynski et al ‗Open licensing‘ at 1059. 
257
 Reichman ‗Patent law harmonization‘ at 7; Musungu ‗Public health‘ at 437. 
258













exemptions or compulsory licences for non-profit research. This policy space is also 
being squeezed, however. 
Developing countries need enough IP policy space to respond to these 
challenges. In the following chapter I will discuss some of the attempts by developing 
states to claw back some of their policy space under current agreements, and will also 

















CHAPTER FIVE  
CLAWING BACK THE POLICY SPACE THROUGH NEGOTIATION
  
 This chapter is about negotiations and negotiating strategy. I begin 
with the first of the developing countries‘ collective attempts within the WTO to 
regain enough policy space to enable states to respond appropriately to pressing 
public health and welfare needs. During the Doha Ministerial discussions in 2001, 
their primary demand was for enough flexibility to use compulsory licences to 
respond effectively to the HIV/AIDS crisis. At Doha, the developed states and 
pharmaceutical companies both presented counter-arguments, which I also examine. 
I then look at attempts by developed states to close the IP policy space through 
bilateral TRIPS-plus treaties and a new multilateral agreement, the Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty. This provides the context for the WIPO Development Agenda 
discussions, which I discuss later in the chapter. 
During the Doha talks, the developing states relied on a ‗public health‘ 
argument. At the WIPO Development Agenda talks, they adopted a new approach, 
appealing specifically for a ‗development dimension‘ to all IP law-making. I will 
review the strengths and weaknesses of these strategies and provide theoretical 
perspectives on the inherent weakness of internal arguments, compared to the 
potential power of external human rights-based arguments. 
Doha: the appeal to public health 
In Chapter 4, I discussed the HIV/AIDS crisis and the reasons why access to 
generic antiretrovirals is an important part of developing countries‘ public health 
response. At the WTO Doha talks in 2001, those countries sought to clarify whether 
TRIPS gave them sufficient IP policy space to respond to the crisis.  
The Developing States’ Arguments 
The Doha discussions on TRIPS and Public Health were initiated by the 
African Group early in 2001. These states, together with other developing countries, 













medicines, particularly those needed to combat the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic.
1
 
This initiative was partly a response to attempts by the United States and 
pharmaceutical companies to thwart TRIPS-compliant measures instituted by 
developing countries, such as the South African and Brazilian cases described in 
Chapter 4.
2
 Although those actions were suspended following political pressure, 
developing countries‘ abilities to use TRIPS flexibilities remained uncertain and 
insecure.
3
 The Developing Country Group
4
 thus sought both greater clarity and an 
express agreement by WTO members that the TRIPS flexibilities allow states to 




In the months leading up to the Doha meeting in November 2001, two 
opposing camps emerged. One, the African Group, backed by other developing 
states,
6
 circulated a draft declaration which declared that, as a matter of principle, the 
TRIPS Agreement does not prevent any WTO member state from formulating its own 
public health policies and programmes.
7
 The Developing County Group members 
affirmed their commitment to TRIPS, based on their  
expectation that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, in accordance with the objectives of the Agreement (Article 7), 
―should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
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 Ovett ‗Access to medicines‘ at 176; Correa ‗Implications‘ at 1; Bridges ‗IPR flexibility‘; 
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 Musungu ‗Public health‘ at 449; Thomas ‗Trade policy and drugs‘ at 254; Correa 
‗Implications‘ at 1-2; Mercurio ‗TRIPS‘ at 223-224; Harrison Human rights Impact of WTO 
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 Outterson ‗Pharmaceutical arbitrage‘ at 257; Sell ‗TRIPS‘ at 492. 
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 A coalition of 80 developing countries led by the African group, India, and Brazil and 
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TWN and the TAC. (Ovett ‗Access to medicines‘ at 176). 
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 Correa ‗Implications‘ at 2. 
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 The states which co-sponsored the African draft text were Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela. (Correa ‗Implications‘ at 3, fn 
18). 
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 Developing Country Group‘s paper IP/C/W/296 para 22, citing TRIPS Article 8. 
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The Group referred to Article 8, particularly the clauses in Article 8(1) and 
8(2) dealing with exceptions to patent protection which permit member states to act to 
meet their public health objectives;
 9
 to Article 6, which allows members to adopt the 
principle of international exhaustion of rights and freely import drugs sold in foreign 
markets at affordable prices,
10
 and to Article 31, which permits compulsory licensing, 
in which context they noted the problems associated with the import of generic drugs 
by countries with insufficient local manufacturing capacity.
11
 
The Developing County Group argued that in light of Articles 7 and 8 and 
other limitation and exception clauses, TRIPS had sufficient built-in flexibility to 
allow states to ‗promote and protect‘ their public health needs, especially for access to 
medicines.
12
  However, their attempts to use these flexibilities to improve access to 
essential medicines had met with opposition.
13
  
They also argued that under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, all 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement ‗should be read in the light of the objectives and 
principles set forth in Articles 7 and 8.‘
14
 The Group ointed out that Article 7 ‗clearly 
establishes that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights do not 
exist in a vacuum. They are supposed to benefit society as a whole and do not aim at 
the mere protection of private rights,‘
15
 and in the context of health pandemics 
particularly, patent rights should be exercised in a way that achieves a balance 
between the rights of the patent-holders and the needs of the users of patented 
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 paras 28-34. This was the result of Article 31(f), which limits exports from manufacturing 
counties and the supply of generics. 
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 para 5, and paras 17-23. Correa ‗Implications‘ at 2. 
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 Shanker ‗Treaty negotiations‘ at 2; Correa ‗Implications‘ at 2. 
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Convention, which provides that a ‗treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
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object and purpose.‘ In the Canada –  Pharmaceuticals case (WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000), 
the dispute settlement panel considered Articles 7 and 8 when interpreting use of the Article 
30 of the TRIPS Agreement. (Correa ‗Implications‘ at 14).  
15
 Developing Country Group‘s paper IP/C/W/296 para 18. This is typical of their approach, 
which is based largely on ‗balance and welfare enhancing‘ narratives. 
16













At a practical level, the Group highlighted the difficulties that TRIPS 
presented for states wishing to import generic medicines. It proposed that ‗Members 
should take the view that the TRIPS Agreement in no way stands in the way of public 
health protection, and therefore it would provide the broadest flexibility for the use of 
compulsory licences.‘
17
 Given that many developing countries ‗have limited industrial 
capacities and very small domestic markets to manufacture medicines locally‘ it 
should be noted that that ‗nothing in the TRIPS Agreement prevents Members from 
granting compulsory licences to foreign suppliers to provide medicines in the 
domestic market.‘
18
 The Group also called on the TRIPS Council to confirm that 




This proposal differed from the others. Article 31(f), as originally drafted, 
clearly limits the export of generic drugs manufactured under compulsory licence. It 
specifies that compulsory licences be granted ‗predominantly‘ for the domestic 
market, implying that at least 50 percent of the generics produced should be intended 
for domestic use.
20
 While most of the other Developing Group demands amounted to 
nothing more than affirmation of certain parts of the original TRIPS text, this would 
require an amendment to the treaty. 
Response by the developed states 
In response to the Developing Country Group, the United States, Japan, 
Switzerland, Australia and Canada issued an alternative text, which emphasized the 
importance of patent protection for R&D in the pharmaceutical sector, and argued that 
‗intellectual property contributes to public health objectives globally.‘
21
 The European 
Communities paper agreed that intellectual property rights ‗provide an essential 
stimulus for creativity and innovation‘ and ‗need to be adequately protected.‘
22
 
However, to the extent that TRIPS provisions such as Article 31(f) impeded access to 
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“Patents are not a problem in practice” 
In the months before the Doha meeting the pharmaceutical industry widely 
distributed a study by Amir Attaran and Lee Gillespie-White, arguing that the primary 
reasons for non-availability of antiretroviral medicines in Africa are poverty and lack 
of adequate funding, and pointing out that relatively few antiretroviral agents are 
actually patented in Africa.
24
 The industry also released its own study, which 
concluded that patents are not the reason for non-availability of drugs.
25
 Relying on 
these studies, developed states asserted that patents did not present a barrier to the 
achievement of public health objectives.
26
 
The first part of the argument: that ‗patents are not a problem because few 
drugs are patented in Africa and other developing countries‘ has been exposed as a 
red-herring. While it is true that antiretrovirals are not patented in all developing 
countries,
27
 the most important and effective drugs, as well as crucial fixed-dose 
combinations, do tend to be patented in most countries.
28
 Furthermore, almost all new 
drugs are patented in those countries with the capacity to manufacture generics, or 
economically attractive potential markets for generic products.
29
 Thus, patents are 
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of the drugs in South Africa, the largest and richest potential market, and the state with the 
best capacity for producing generic competitors. (see for example Flynn ‗Legal strategies‘ at 
540; Oxfam et al ‗Patents do matter in Africa‘ and CPTech et al ‗Comment on Attaran‘). 
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 For example, the crucial combination pill lamivudine-zidovudine (Combivir) is patented in 
37 African states, making it the most patent-protected drug in Africa. (Attaran and Gillespie-
White ‗Patents‘ at 1887). Many fixed-dose combinations are only available as generics. 
29
 All the combination therapies were under patent in South Africa, and 13 of the 15 single 
substances were patented there. (Attaran and Gillespie-White ‗Patents‘ at 1887). South Africa 
has the best capacity to produce generics of the African states surveyed, as well as the largest 
potential market for ARVs. (Flynn ‗Legal strategies‘ at 540; CPTech et al ‗Comment on 













concentrated in those states with the largest pharmaceutical markets, the highest 
numbers of infected people, and the highest GDPs.
30
 Market size is crucial for 
encouraging the production of affordable generic medications.  Economies of scale 
lower the unit cost of production, and generic companies, just like originator 
companies, are profit-seeking commercial enterprises.
31
 Drugs that are relatively 
cheap and easy to produce generically also tend to be more widely patented.
32
 Sean 
Flynn of the Consumer Project on Technology has argued that the Attaran study ‗is 
actually useful for showing how patents do block access to needed drugs.‘
33
 It is of 
course somewhat paradoxical that developed states insist on the importance of full 
patent protection in developing countries, while simultaneously claiming that patents 
have little practical effect in these areas. 
“Patent protection is essential for the promotion of public health” 
The second part of the developed states‘ argument is more fundamental: the 
claim that pharmaceutical products require full patent protection globally, because 




Most scholars agree that patent protection is required to stimulate innovation 
in the pharmaceutical sector – probably more than in any other.
35
 While it is clear that 
patent monopolies lead to enormous increases in the price of drugs,
36
 pharmaceutical 
companies argue that they need to charge inflated prices for new products to recoup 
their R&D costs, and that without the companies‘ considerable investment in research 
and development, new drugs would not be developed, and there would be no drugs for 
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31
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33
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the generic manufacturers to copy.
37
 In the United States, the pharmaceutical industry 
spends 15.6 percent of its global sales income on R&D, compared to 3.9 percent for 
other industries.
38
 During the 8-12 years required to research and develop a new drug, 
the companies also incur opportunity costs for not investing this capital elsewhere at 
higher rates of return.
39
 Danzon and Towse conclude that when opportunity costs are 
added to the actual costs of the research and development itself, they account for 
about 30 percent of the total cost of ‗developing and marketing new drugs.‘
40
 
Research and development funds are invested in both successful and unsuccessful 
drugs.  Since only a fraction of the drugs tested ever reach the market (and only a few 
of those become ‗best sellers‘), overall R&D costs must be recovered from what are 
in the end a ‗relatively few commercially successful products.‘
41
  
In addition, the companies must bear the cost of negotiating the extensive 
regulatory procedures for new medications:
42
 In the United States, a new-drug 
application must be filed with the FDA, after which there are three phases of clinical 
testing on humans before final review.
43
 ‗As a consequence, the process of 
discovering and developing a drug typically takes eleven to twelve years and can cost 
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39
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at 251). Hassim et al point out, however, that it usually takes about two years for the generic 
alternative to become available. (Hassim et al Health & Democracy at 449). 
42
 Watal ‗Differential pricing‘ at 5. 
43
 Rai ‗Information revolution‘ at 181; see also Skillington & Solovy ‗Protection of test data‘ 













hundreds of millions of dollars per successful drug.‘
44
 The patent filing process itself 
can take one to three years.
45
 The costs associated with this are ‗substantial‘ – 




The drug companies argue that in order to recoup their R&D investment in 
both successful and unsuccessful drugs, they require patent monopoly income well in 
excess of the simple manufacturing costs of the patented drugs and that, in effect, the 
patent monopoly prices reflect the true cost of producing the drugs.
47
 
Although the initial development of a new pharmaceutical is expensive and 
time-consuming, it is comparatively cheap and easy to copy it thereafter. The 
marginal costs to produce either subsequent bulk runs of brand-name drugs or 
generics are comparatively low.
48
  Companies manufacturing a generic copy of a drug 
do not have to recover the same R&D and regulatory costs and can to sell the products 
at far lower prices.
49
 It is thus unsurprising that the pharmaceutical industry has 
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Counter-arguments to the drug companies’ and developed 
states’ claims  
The arguments put forward by the drug companies and developed states in 
favour of high monopoly prices (and limited compulsory licensing) seem compelling. 
However, much of the R&D that resulted in successful HIV/AIDS medication was 
sponsored by the state, which both paid the costs and bore the risk.
51
 The industry also 
benefits from tax deductions for both R&D and marketing expenses.
52
 A considerable 
proportion of R&D expenditure is spent on ‗me-too‘ follow-on drugs, modified 
versions of existing drugs that offer little therapeutic advantage, but are often very 
expensive.
53
 The pharmaceutical industry is extremely high profit, and able to recoup 
billions before generic competition is possible.
54
  
Most importantly, numerous studies have concluded that pharmaceutical 
companies do not need to sell their products in all markets to be profitable, As the 
WHO points out, ‗Developing countries account for a very small fraction of the global 
pharmaceutical market and the generation of income to fund more research and 
development is not dependent on profit from these markets.‘
55
 Pharmaceutical 
companies do not and cannot reasonably expect to recoup their R&D costs through 
the sale of their products in developing countries: Africa comprises only 1.2 percent 
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of the global market; India 1.3 percent; and the rest of Asia 2.6 percent.
56
 The loss or 
reduction of these markets to generic competitors would have a negligible effect on 
global originator drug profits.
57
 
It has also been pointed out that the originator companies do not need to sell 
their products at the full on-patent price in all markets. Drug companies could 
maintain their overall profit margins (and probably increase them) by selling more 
drugs to more people using differential pricing models:
58
 selling the drugs at the full 
on-patent price in developed-country markets
59
 while selling them at a price closer to 
production cost in the developing world. According to economists, differential pricing 
always tends to be more profitable than selling commodities at the same price in all 
markets.
60
 With pharmaceuticals, such models allow the companies to recoup their 
investment, and indeed maximize their profits, while still ensuring that the right to 
health of the poor is not endangered.
61
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This can be represented graphically as follows: 
 
A  B 
The pharmaceutical industry 
invests R&D into products 
which it anticipates selling at 






Those who can afford to, pay 
monopoly prices for the new 






The pharmaceuticals that 
happen to be generated by 
the system represented in 
box A can be sold to 
outsiders at marginal 
production cost, without 
impacting the system. Sales 
to outsiders do not affect 
system A‘s ability to 
provide incentives, and do 
not prejudice any of the 
parties or dynamics of 
system A. 
Differentially priced sales 




of system A. 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, originator companies have already instituted many 
differential pricing schemes. Because compulsory licensing involves the payment of 
‗adequate remuneration,‘
63
 and the patent-holder would not incur the production costs 
required under existing discount and donation schemes, it is difficult to see how 
compulsory licensing would prejudice their income. It appears that any loss would be 
negligible, compared to the potential benefit for developing countries (in having full 
control over their antiretroviral programmes). This suggests that the ‗balance‘ on 
which the developed states and drug companies insist is skewed in favour of patent-
owners. 
Patent monopolies may be an important and even necessary incentive for the 
research and development of new drugs intended for developed-country markets, but 
developing-country markets are not a necessary part of this incentive. Originator 
companies develop new drugs without the expectation of selling them in developing 
countries – and indeed, have been very reluctant to develop drugs to serve this market 
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 Granting compulsory licences to supply essential medicines in 
developing countries facing national emergencies, therefore, should have no impact 
on the patent system‘s ability to encourage research and development of medicines 
such as ARVs, developed primarily for sale in rich countries.
65
 
The Doha Discussions begin 
What is most striking about the Doha talks is how difficult it was for 
developing countries to convince the developed countries of their cause. The 
developing countries were able to demonstrate a real emergency, could identify 
relevant Articles in TRIPS that permitted flexibilities in those circumstances, and 
could refute claims that compulsory licences for developing countries would 
undermine the ability of patents to act as incentives.  Still, the United States and other 
developed states continued to insist that full patent rights were indispensable for 
pharmaceutical research and development. When developing states pointed out that 
TRIPS provided that the protection of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
social welfare
66
 and that member states may adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health,
67
 the developed states countered that intellectual property protection 
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(Rai ‗Proprietary rights‘ at 303). Commercial 
companies do not invest R&D into ARVs that are specifically suited for patients in 
developing countries. There is a lack of drugs specifically suitable for developing-country 
patients who are also infected with malaria and tuberculosis – a large percentage of patients – 
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itself promotes public health objectives by encouraging the development of useful 
new medicines, and is indeed essential to this end.
68
 
This kind of circular discussion could go on forever because it is based on the 
inherent tension within the patent system – the balance between monopoly benefits 
and consequent social costs. As noted above, it is impossible to set a universally 
optimal balance. Because they rely on income generated by their pharmaceutical 
sectors, and are subject to the companies‘ political influence, countries such as the 
United States and Switzerland are inclined to favour the protectionist side of this 
balance when interpreting phrases like Article 7‘s ‗mutual advantage of producers and 
users … and balance of rights and obligations‘ or Article 8‘s ‗provided that such 
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.‘ 
At Doha, it was not argument that won the day,
69
 but rather, the threat of 
anthrax attacks in the United States and Canada in the aftermath of the September 11, 
2001 tragedy. Concerned that the patent-holder would be unable to produce sufficient 
quantities of Ciprofloxacin to protect their residents from widespread attack, 
American and Canadian authorities considered issuing compulsory licences.
70
 The 
threat of compulsory licensing enabled them to negotiate a far cheaper price with 
Bayer, the originator company.
71
 Politically, however, it also made it far more 
difficult to oppose similar compulsory licensing strategies by other states.
72
 
Eventually, on November 14, 2001, WTO members agreed on the 
‗Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,‘
73
 which was ‗adopted by 
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The Doha Declaration 
The Doha Declaration begins with four preambular paragraphs setting out 
basic principles. These affirm that WTO members ‗recognize the gravity of the 
public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, 
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics‘
75
 and stress ‗the need for [TRIPS] to be part of  the wider national and 
international action to address these problems.‘
76
 The Declaration explicitly 
recognizes that ‗intellectual property protection is important for the development of 
new medicines,‘
77
 but also acknowledges ‗the concerns about its effects on prices.‘
78
 
With these considerations in mind, the WTO Members agree in Paragraph 4 that 
TRIPS ‗does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect 
public health‘ and reaffirm ‗the right of WTO Members to protect public health, and, 
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.‘
79
 In this regard, it reaffirms ‗the 
right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
which provide flexibility for this purpose.‘
80
 Therefore, while ‗reiterating [their] 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement,‘ the Members affirm that TRIPS ‗can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members‘ 




Paragraph 4 was probably the most controversial of the provisions in the 
months leading up to and during the Doha discussions.
82
 Its inclusion was a 
significant political victory for the developing states, which had sought a declaration 
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that TRIPS could and indeed should be interpreted in a way that allowed them to 
adopt the measures necessary to protect public health.
83
 
Paragraph 5 of the Declaration sets out some of these flexibilities in more 
detail, confirming that: 
 ‗Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted,‘
84
 thus 
confirming that compulsory licensing is a question of national discretion.
85
 
 ‗Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that 
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 




 ‗The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant 
to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to 
establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN 
and national treatment provisions . . . .‘
87
 This provides that WTO members may 
permit parallel imports provided that they are not discriminatory.  
The final section of the Declaration, paragraph 7, ‗reaffirm[s] the 
commitment of developed-country members to provide incentives to their enterprises 
and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to least-developed 
country members pursuant to Article 66.2.‘ 
88
 
The Declaration also notes that many developing countries lack the 
manufacturing capacity to produce their own generic pharmaceuticals and that TRIPS 
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presents certain obstacles to the importation of generics.
89
 Paragraph 6 required the 
TRIPS Council to work out a solution and report back to the General Council by the 
end of May 2002.
90
 
Reaction to the Doha Declaration was mixed, because it failed to resolve the 
most pressing practical problem: the rules relating to the export of generics 
manufactured under compulsory licence. Beyond this, its practical significance 
seemed uncertain. 
Although ministerial declarations are not binding, commentators agreed that 
the Declaration would probably be very persuasive in interpreting the treaty.
91
 
Matthews and Drahos termed the Doha Declaration a ‗―concrete success‖ for 
developing countries,‘
92
 even though the text of the Doha Declaration was 
‗interpretive in nature and designed to reaffirm the flexibilities already contained in 
the provisions of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.‘ 
93
 Correa hoped that the Doha 
Declaration amounted to a specific rule of interpretation‘ of the TRIPS Agreement, 
with important implications for the practical application of Articles 7 and 8.
94
 
Other commentators focused on the political importance of the Declaration. 
Schott, for example, concluded that ‗the Declaration is merely a political document 
with ambiguous and possibly insignificant legal implications since such flexibility 
already exists in the TRIPS provisions.‘ He conceded, however, that the political 
impact of the Declaration was ‗substantial; it erects a major political obstacle to 
bringing dispute cases against countries that, in response to public health 
emergencies, approve the compulsory licensing or parallel imports of patented 
medicines,‘ and concluded that although ‗the Declaration in no way undermines the 
legal rights of patent-holders as set out in TRIPS … it makes it politically more 
difficult to exercise them.‘
95
 Gupta argued that, essentially, the Doha Declaration 
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changed nothing and merely ‗leaves open all the possibilities that already existed 
under the TRIPS Agreement, without providing clear guidance as to which one of the 




The political significance of the Declaration was put into some doubt because 
it failed to resolve the question of manufacture of generics for export, and because it 
took almost two more years of heated debate for members to solve the problem.
97
 
Eventually, those debates culminated in the WTO Decision of the General Council on 
the Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration (‗Implementation 
Agreement‘),
98
 endorsed by the General Council of the WTO on 30 August 2003.
99
  
The Implementation Agreement permits states to export generic medicines 
manufactured under compulsory licence (to countries that meet certain criteria), and 
thus allows states lacking the capacity to manufacture their own generics to import 
them. The Agreement is not limited to the treatment of particular diseases (such as 
HIV/AIDS),
100
 or to particular countries (such as least-developed nations).
101
 Most 
importantly, if the necessary conditions are met, it dispenses with the Article 31(f) 
requirement that generics manufactured under compulsory licence shall be 
‗predominantly for the supply of the domestic market.‘
102
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Agreement applies to all diseases, and is not restricted to HIV/AIDS. (Musungu ‗Public 
health‘ at 452).  
101
 This had been another controversial issue during the two-year negotiations. Developed 
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However, the generic manufacturing procedures replacing Article 31(f) have 




 and ‗needlessly 
complex.‘
105
 Although producer nations are permitted to manufacture generic 
pharmaceuticals ‗for the express purpose of providing those drugs to another nation in 
order for that nation to combat a public health problem or epidemic,‘
106
 the red tape is 
significant. Importer nations must inform the TRIPS Council of the ‗names and 
expected quantities of the products needed;‘
107
 confirm that the recipient state is a 
least-developed country or that it ‗has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in 
the pharmaceutical sector for the products in question;‘
108
 and, if the product in 
question is patented in its territory, that ‗it has granted or intents to grant a 
compulsory licence in accordance with Article 31.‘
109
 Exporting nations may produce 
‗only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the importing Member‘ and the 
‗entirety‘ of generics produced for this purpose must in fact be exported to the 
importing state concerned.
110
 The generics produced must be clearly distinguishable 
from the on-patent products.
111
 
These procedures require that decisions concerning generic production be 
made case-by-case and drug-by-drug.  Apart from being exceedingly cumbersome, 
this makes it difficult for the generic drug companies to develop the economies of 
scale necessary for affordable production.
112
 Médecins sans Frontières commented: 
‗Without the pull of a viable market for generic pharmaceutical products, 
manufacturers are unlikely to want to take part in the production-for-export system on 
a large scale. And without competition among several manufacturers, MSF fears it 
will be extremely difficult to ensure that prices of newer medicines will fall the way 
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first-generation AIDS medicines did.‘
113
 Baker argues that the scheme was designed 
in a way that would prevent states from using the Implementation Agreement 
flexibilities to build up their local generic manufacturing industries.
114
 In addition, the 
procedures requiring that generics be clearly distinguishable from originator drugs 
may add significant and wasteful costs.
115
 Generic producers might be reluctant to 
produce drugs under these conditions.
116
 Yu concludes that although the Doha 
Agreement gave developing countries a temporary reprieve, and seemed to recognize 
their particular circumstances and difficulties, it did not in any way ‗enable them to 




The battles over policy space have continued. I will argue in subsequent 
chapters that the Doha discussions might have had a more favourable outcome had 
developing countries adopted an explicitly human rights-based approach. 
Restricting TRIPS flexibilities: TRIPS-plus agreements, the 
SPLT and WIPO 
Notable features in the Doha discussions were the weakness, in practice, of 
the existing ‗TRIPS flexibilities‘; the rather aggressive attempts by some developed 
states to close this policy space; and the difficulties that developing countries faced 
when seeking an express recognition of the public welfare objectives of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Developing states have had to fight hard to implement the policy space 
that TRIPS affords through its flexibilities.  
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Meanwhile, some developed states have tried to further reduce the TRIPS 
policy space through a series of ‗TRIPS-plus‘ agreements, negotiated bilaterally or in 
regional contexts, with the United States as the primary initiator
118
 (partly because of 
intense lobbying by the pharmaceutical sector).
119
 TRIPS-plus treaties aim to give 
rights-holders more rights than they have in terms of the TRIPS Agreement, or to 
reduce the ‗scope or effectiveness‘ of the TRIPS flexibilities, limitations and 
exceptions.
120
 In practice, these treaties reduce the policy space available for 
developing countries to respond to local social and economic needs, in ‗sectors of 
vital importance to their socio-economic and cultural development including health, 
environment, and food and nutrition.‘
121
  
One recent multilateral attempt to raise patent standards and reduce policy 
space is the WIPO initiative, the Substantive Patent Law Treaty. WIPO launched its 
new ‗Patent Agenda‘ process in September 2001, identifying the international 
harmonization of patent law as a priority issue.
122
 The Agenda involved three treaties: 
the existing Patent Law Treaty,
123
 the Patent Cooperation Treaty,
124
 and a new treaty, 
the Substantive Patent Law Treaty, envisaged as a complementary treaty to the Paris 
Convention. 
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Intellectual property rights, including patents, have historically had a national 
character.
125
 Existing patent treaties supervised by WIPO (such as the Paris 
Convention) do not deal with ‗deep‘ substantive issues like patentability standards or 
the scope and duration of the monopoly awarded by the patent.
126
 While the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement provides that ‗patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, 
involve an inventive step … and are capable of industrial application ...‘
127
 it neither 
defines ‗invention‘ nor sets forth substantive rules concerning novelty, utility or 
inventiveness. This provides some national policy space,
128
 which can be used to stem 
the ‗deluge of patents‘
129
 for important research tools. 
The SPLT is intended to set uniform substantive standards on such matters as 
novelty, utility, and inventiveness
130
 in order to promote ‗deep harmonization‘ of the 
international patent system.
131
  I have discussed some of the ways in which TRIPS has 
made it more difficult for states to exercise IP policy space, noting that TRIPS retains 
certain important flexibilities that states can use to set appropriate IP standards. The 
aim of the SPLT is to close more of this remaining policy space by establishing firm 
and non-derogable standards in certain areas of patent policy.
132
 The proposed 
harmonization of compulsory standards at higher levels than currently mandated is 
unlikely to be in the interests of developing countries.
133
 It will rather seriously 
compromise the TRIPS flexibilities, potentially undermine the modest gains made at 
Doha, and reduce developing countries‘ available policy space in ways which will 
make it far more difficult for them to respond to pressing social welfare and 
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Some SPLT proposals would reduce the flexibility of states to define 
patentability requirements, for example the ‗inventive step.‘ At present, the United 
States has a very low non-obviousness standard
135
 (as discussed earlier with reference 
to gene sequences and other potential research tools), but other countries still have 
enough policy space to set a higher standard under which routine sequencing (for 
example) would not qualify for patent protection.
136
 Writers such as Correa warn 
against the international standardization of the low American non-obviousness 
standard, which has created considerable difficulty in the United States.
137
 
TRIPS Article 27(1) reduces states‘ policy space by insisting that patents be 
awarded for all types of products or processes, but a product or process must still be 
‗capable of industrial application.‘
138
 The SPLT would eliminate the requirement that 
inventions be technical in nature, and proposes that the ‗industrial application‘ 
requirement be met as long as the invention can be used in any kind of commercial or 
economic activity.
139
 Furthermore, the SPLT intends to prohibit states from ‗imposing 
any further conditions, other than those specifically provided for in this treaty, on 
patent applications,‘
140
 thus further reducing policy space to define the nature of 
inventions or to specify the requirements for their ‗technical character,‘
141
 and thereby 
closing down some of TRIPS‘s flexibilities and limiting governments‘ flexibility to 
adjust local patent regimes to respond to local problems and needs.
142
 The CIPR has 
recommended that developing states adopt stricter standards for distinguishing 
between patentable inventions and unpatentable discoveries.
143
  The new rules 
proposed in the SPLT would make this impossible. Other TRIPS flexibilities may be 
threatened by provisions for new limitations on compulsory licences,
144
 and to 
introduce ‗matters of equivalence in international patents rules.‘
145
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The substance of the SPLT is troubling to developing states because it 
proposes additional limitations on the available policy space, but they are also 
concerned about the genesis of the SPLT, WIPO‘s conduct in this regard, and the 
negotiations themselves. Musungu and Dutfield have no doubt that ‗the SPLT 
negotiations were launched in major part to respond to pressures from the knowledge 
industry.‘
146
 The early SPLT talks resembled the TRIPS negotiations in that most of 
the submissions and interventions were from developed states, and most developing 
countries present did not participate at all – indeed, there was more active 
participation from groups representing the IP sector.
147
 Many of the SPLT provisions 
are merely versions of United States patent law endorsed by wealthy and powerful 




The conduct of the WIPO bureaucracy in all of this was troubling, especially 
during the early discussions. WIPO‘s International Bureau sidelined several proposals 
put forward by developing countries,
149
 and seemed unperturbed that the initial 
proposal for a patent harmonization treaty had been made by developed countries and 
four associations representing industry and practitioners, with no support or 
encouragement from developing states.
150
  
In theory, WIPO‘s most important decision-making organ is the General 
Assembly, comprised of all WIPO member states.
151
 But WIPO has an enormous (and 
in practice, very powerful) secretariat established as the International Bureau under 
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the Director and two Deputies,
152
 and supported by two important committees: the 
Policy Advisory Committee (consisting of IP experts) and the Industry Advisory 
Committee (consisting of representatives from the knowledge industries).
153
 ‗The 
International Bureau is very active. It plays a significant role in determining the vision 
of the organization, shaping the nature and final outcome of treaty and other 
negotiations and discussions, drafting recommendations by various bodies on various 
matters, admitting observers to various WIPO bodies, and preparing the draft agenda 
for the General Assembly.‘
154
 It has even more influence on soft-law processes, 
including decisions on treaty interpretation and practical implementation,
155
 and is 
particularly influential in the context of the ‗technical assistance‘ that WIPO offers 
developing states in becoming ‗TRIPS-compliant.‘ Very often WIPO‘s technical and 
legal advisers insist on maximalist pro-protectionist interpretations that do not take 
advantage of TRIPS‘s flexibilities.
156
 One way that the WIPO bureaucracy resisted 
marginalization after TRIPS moved many IP matters into the WTO, was to support 
more protectionist interpretations of TRIPS through its technical assistance 
programmes. It has tended to be supportive of the knowledge industries and 




In response to WIPO‘s activities, including the SPLT process, the developing 
states have pushed back with their own new initiatives such as a proposed Access to 
Knowledge (A2K) Treaty
158
 and the WIPO Development Agenda. The Development 
Agenda proposals explicitly object to WIPO‘s conduct in international negotiations 
and to its technical assistance programmes. They request WIPO to re-examine its 
practices in the of the UN‘s development priorities. 
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Negotiating strategy  
What kinds of arguments should developing states use to make their most 
effective case for more IP policy space? I begin by returning to the Doha talks to point 
out the weaknesses of relying solely on a ‗public health‘ argument. I then look at the 
WIPO Development Agenda and examine whether broadening this argument to 
include a ‗development dimension‘ has overcome these weaknesses. In Part three of 
this section, I introduce the theoretical concept of ‗regime change‘ and begin to look 
at some of the reasons why introducing human rights arguments should strengthen the 
developing states‘ position. 
Part one: The appeal to public health and the public interest 
The developing states‘ ‗public health needs‘ arguments were not very effective 
at Doha. The developed states made some concessions, but this was because of 
external political pressures rather than the strength of the developing countries‘ 
arguments. The developing countries negotiating position did not introduce norms 
external to the IP regime, but was based on principles internal to the intellectual 
property system: first, that patent protection will encourage innovation and 
technological development for the benefit of society; second, that the inherent social 
costs of the patent system should be balanced against its long-term social benefits. 
Both are well-established principles of the IP regime, and are expressly recognized in 
the TRIPS Agreement, particularly in Articles 7 and 8. 
The weakness of this approach was seen when it was so easily turned around 
by developed-state negotiators, arguing that patents need to be strong (and that 
compulsory licences should therefore not be readily granted) precisely because of the 
public interest and public health care needs. They argued that strong patent protection 
is necessary to promote the development of new medicines, which are less likely to be 
developed without patent protection.  
The developing states‘ arguments for an acceptable balance between social 
costs and long-term social benefits were weak because they did not move the 
discussion beyond the costs-benefits tension inherent in the patent system. 
Economists and other theorists are unable to resolve this tension by identifying 













bottom line at which the short-term social costs associated with patent monopolies 
must be deemed unacceptable, regardless of the anticipated longer-term benefits. It is 
necessary, therefore, to find this bottom line somewhere outside of the IP regime. In 
Chapters 6 and 7, I argue that the human rights regime offers a clear and measurable 
bottom line of this nature, while offering other benefits such as greater clarity and 
detail, and the normative force of a high status and binding international treaty
 
. 
Negotiating strategy part two: The appeal to „development‟ 
The Group of Friends WIPO Development Agenda proposal starts moving the 
discussion outside of the IP regime by expressly referring to documents that do not 
refer specifically to intellectual property, and were fashioned outside of IP forums 
such as the WTO and WIPO. These include high status international documents such 
as the Millennium Development Goals (adopted unanimously by the UN General 
Assembly),
159
 and other widely-endorsed declarations such as the Programme of 
Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010, the 
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development and the Plan of 
Implementation, and the Sao Paulo Consensus.
160
  
In this way, the GFD sketch a new context for WIPO activities, arguing that, 
as a UN agency, WIPO has an obligation to support the overall goals of the United 
Nations.  Because the United Nations has committed itself to ‗development,‘ WIPO 
should incorporate a ‗development dimension‘ into all its activities.
161
 Stressing 
WIPO‘s status as a UN agency has potential for development-based arguments, but 
would have been more powerful had it been linked to the United Nations ‗right-based 
development‘ programme, discussed below. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the Group of Friends of Development expressed 
concerns about WIPO‘s ‗uncritical‘ approach to the role of IP in development. WIPO 
appeared to assume that development is an automatic consequence of the 
strengthening of intellectual property rights.
162
 As discussed in Chapter 2, however, 
these assumptions are widely questioned by economists, IP scholars, public interest 
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NGOs, and government investigators. The GFD proposed that WIPO critically 
examine whether particular IP policies are likely to promote development in particular 
contexts,
163
 as well as the impact of proposed levels of IP protection on ‗the public 
interest, innovation and access to science, technology and the promotion of diverse 




The GFD recognized that IP can play a role in development, but stressed that 
‗in order to ensure the credibility of the IP system … more has to be done in order to 
ensure that peoples all over the world have access to knowledge and technological 
development.‘  As the UN agency charged with IP matters, WIPO ‗could have a new 




One of the most notable features of the Development Agenda Discussions
166
 
was the apparent consensus among all parties – both developed states and the GFD – 
on the ‗importance of development.‘ What was also notable, however, is that no-one 
ever defined ‗development‘ explicitly – perhaps deliberately.
167
  A look at the 
priorities identified by each group, and at the policies they advocated, however, 
suggests that they had in mind somewhat different conceptions of development. The 
Group B countries
168
 (in particular, the United States), as well as WIPO itself, 
appeared to view macroeconomic development as the end goal.
169
 Their focus was on 
growing the economy, increasing the GNP, by growing local industry and expanding 
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 Central to all this was the concept of ‗technological 
development‘ as the engine behind the growth of industry, the expansion of 
commerce, and macroeconomic growth.  
The link between technological improvement and economic growth and 
development is fairly well established in economics,
171
 and well beyond the scope of 
this thesis, especially as both ‗sides‘ in the WIPO Development debate seemed to 
agree on this principle.
172
 As outlined in Chapters 2 and 4, however, it is far from 
clear that strengthening IP protection in developing countries will in fact promote 
local innovation or technological development, a point made repeatedly by 
developing states during the discussions. In particular, developing countries noted that 
inflexible IP protection at too high a level was likely to retard innovation in 
developing states, rather than promote it.
173
 In this regard, a number of developing 
countries specifically noted the importance of access to patented research tools in the 
development of a local science and technology sector, and the development of 
therapies for neglected diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis.
174
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Although the developing countries repeatedly stressed these and similar 
points, the developed countries, particularly the United States, clung fast to their 
‗absolute truth‘
175
 – that increased IP protection levels lead to development.  During 
the April 2005 session, for example, the United States delegation ‗welcomed the 
opportunity‘ to discuss ‗the important role intellectual property played in fostering 
economic, social and cultural development.‘
176
 The Delegation believed that 
development was ‗one of the most important challenges facing the international 
community‘ and that ‗intellectual property protection played a key and positive role in 
development.‘ For this reason, ‗WIPO … should continue to promote the protection 
of intellectual property as a tool for development.‘ The Delegation noted that ‗several 
developing countries had made great strides using the intellectual property system,‘ 
although it did not specify which countries or what the ‗great strides‘ entailed.
177
  
Because they believed that protecting intellectual property is essential for 
promoting development, the developed countries believed that WIPO already had a 
development agenda, to be found precisely in its ‗contribution to the development of 
intellectual property‘
178
 and its efforts to ensure better and stronger IP protection. 
Stronger and better IP protection would itself promote ‗development of individuals 
and societies all across the globe.‘
179
  This ‗absolute truth‘
180
 was consistently 
repeated by the developed countries despite attempts by the GFD and other 
developing-country groups to present contrary evidence, or discuss alternative ways 
of understanding ‗development.‘
181
 The assertions were also strongly and repeatedly 
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paras 36, 79; Italy IIM/1/6 paras 42, 98; Switzerland IIM/1/6 para 59; Canada IIM/1/6 para 













supported by representatives of the pharmaceutical and other knowledge industries 
present and active in the discussions,
182
 with the pharmaceutical industry specifically 
noting the importance of patent protection for development of new medicines.
183
 
During discussion by the Provision Committee on Proposals Related to a 
WIPO Development Agenda in February 2006, the United States reasserted its 
position even more explicitly, once again welcoming ‗the opportunity to continue the 
discussion on the important role that intellectual property protection played in 
fostering economic development,‘ noting that WIPO‘s mission was ‗to promote the 
protection of intellectual property throughout the world,‘ and concluding that 
‗because strong intellectual property protection [is] a fundamental part of any nation‘s 




The GFD, other developing-country delegations, and the public interest NGOs 
present at the discussions not only questioned this assertion repeatedly, but also 
demonstrated an entirely different understanding of what development entails. From 
their perspective, development is something more than technological development, 
the expansion of trade, or macroeconomic growth. They stressed the importance of 
improvements in health, public welfare, nutrition, and education, demonstrating an 
understanding of development as having an important human dimension, that its goal 
is improving the quality of life for everyone.
185
 
While the developing states did not expressly link their assertions to the 
development economics advanced by theorists such as Amartya Sen, their 
understanding of development can be broadly understood within Sen‘s framework, ‗as 
a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy … [which include] the 
freedom to satisfy hunger, or to achieve sufficient nutrition, or to obtain remedies for 
                                                                                                                                            
February 2006 talks of the WIPO Provisional Committee (PCDA 1/6 Prov 2): United States 
paras 24, 35, 60, 86, 125, 151; Switzerland para 96; Australia para 130. 
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  For Sen, development is ultimately about the freedom to 
choose to live a worthwhile life.  He has called this the ‗capabilities approach.‘  
‗Human capabilities‘ refer to the ‗ability of human beings to lead lives they have 
reason to value and to enhance the substantive choices they have.‘
187
 A person‘s 




The GFD and other developing countries referred consistently to health, 
nutrition, education and other aspects of development that enhance human capabilities 
and freedom.
189
 They emphasized the ways in which the international intellectual 
property system prevents many people from accessing goods such as pharmaceuticals 
which have a direct bearing on their quality of life. For them, it is not enough that 
patents may encourage innovation – they stressed the importance of disseminating 
new inventions so that more people can enjoy their benefits.
190
 And while they 
recognized that an intellectual property system may indeed encourage innovation, 
they questioned whether this is necessarily true in all circumstances.  
No doubt, the United States and other developed countries agree that everyone 
should be fed, housed, educated, and given medical treatment. In the WIPO 
Development discussions, however, they seemed to assume that these are probable 
by-products of the technological and macroeconomic growth that an intellectual 
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 These issues were raised by many developing country delegations at the April 2005 
meeting, for example, Nigeria on behalf of the African group noting that ‗public interest 
considerations like education and health‘ should be considered when establishing an IP policy 
(IIM/1/6 para 56); Chile noting the importance of public health, the environment and 
education ( IIM/1/6 para 61); Pakistan noting the excessive pricing of development essentials 
such as pharmaceuticals and textbooks (IIM/1/6 para 63); Kenya noting the importance of 
‗public health and social medicine‘ (IIM/1/6 para 81). Similar concerns were expressed by 
public interest NGOs (for example MSF IIM/1/6 para 129; Third World Network IIM/1/6 
para 130) and by international organizations such as the WHO (IIM/1/6 para 109). 
190
 See comments by Nigeria at IIM/1/6 para 56; Chile IIM/1/6 para 61; Pakistan, noting 
particularly the excessive on-patent price of pharmaceuticals IIM/1/6 para 63; Venezuela 
noting the right of all peoples to benefit from the progress flowing from science and 
technology IIM/1/6 para 76; South Africa IIM/1/6 para 57; Paraguay IIM/1/6 para 84; Cuba 
IIM/1/6 para 88; Argentina IIM/1/6 para 94; Egypt IIM/1/6 para 99. Similar concerns were 
expressed by public interest NGOs (for example MSF IIM/1/6 para 129; Third World 
Network IIM/1/6 para 130) and by the WHO (IIM/1/6 para 109). See also Howse ‗Right to 














property system will foster, rather than direct goals of the system itself. They argued 
that higher levels of intellectual property protection ‗will increase innovation and 
therefore economic growth.‘
191
 Their emphasis was on the ways in which the 
intellectual property system encourages the development of pharmaceutical, 
agricultural and other innovations, and not on whether everyone is actually able to 
gain access to them. 
Thus the consensus on ‗the importance of development‘ was ultimately 
something of an illusion. The parties had rather different understandings of the core of 
the matter – of what ‗development‘ means:  they were not really talking about the 
same thing. This was never spelled out, or discussed explicitly. They did not debate 
their understandings of ‗development,‘ but merely talked past one another, never 
critically engaging, and pretended not to notice.
192
  
Although the GFD may have intended its appeal to a ‗development dimension‘ 
as an ‗external argument‘ (particularly in the light of explicit reference to the MDG 
and other external documents) the goal of development is not external to the IP 
regime or to the patent system: the public goods (medicines, food, education) that the 
GFD referred to in their conception of ‗development‘ have always been the intended 
products of the IP system.
193
 In addition, ‗development‘, understood as 
macroeconomic growth, is a core goal of the IP system for the developed states. Thus, 
the appeal to ‗development‘ is actually yet another ‗internal argument,‘ easily co-
opted by the developed states who continued to present their own internal 
development arguments, allowing the discussions to go round in circles for years. 
My thesis is that an explicit human rights-based approach, linked to precise 
and binding norms, could prevent this kind of circular non-engagement by pointing to 
clear, absolute, and non-negotiable bottom lines that are less vulnerable to this kind of 
high-level and theoretical non-discussion.
194
 Even though ‗rights‘ and ‗human rights‘ 
are mentioned in passing a few times in the discussions, the developing countries do 
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not explore the potential of human rights and binding human rights agreements for 
advancing their position.
195
  A human rights-based argument could have helped to 
focus their demands. 
WIPO adopts the Development Agenda 
In 2005, the WIPO General Assembly established the Provisional Committee 
on Proposals for a WIPO Development Agenda to discuss the Development Agenda 
documents and formulate more concrete proposals. The PCDA held four sessions 
from 2005 to 2007, and in June 2007 achieved sufficient consensus to finalize a list of 
45 Recommendations for adoption by the WIPO General Assembly.
196
 At its session 
in September-October 2007, the WIPO General Assembly adopted the PCDA‘s 45 
Recommendations, and established a new committee, the Committee on Development 
and Intellectual Property to discuss and coordinate their implementation.
197
  
To some extent, the 45 agreed Recommendations can be regarded as a success 
for the GFD: most of their proposals concerning WIPO‘s internal functioning feature 
in some form in the final recommendations. Many of the Recommendations aim at 
making WIPO more transparent, more accountable, and more responsive to the needs 
of its members. In future, WIPO‘s technical assistance programmes must be 
‗development-orientated, demand-driven and transparent, taking into account the 
priorities and the special needs of developing countries, especially LDCs, as well as 
the different levels of development of Member States.‘
198
 WIPO must ‗further 
mainstream development considerations into [its] substantive and technical assistance 
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activities and debates …‘
199
 and its ‗legislative assistance shall be, inter alia, 
development-orientated and demand-driven, taking into account the priorities and 
special needs of developing countries, especially LDCs, as well as the different levels 
of development.‘
200
 WIPO should also ‗… support development of national scientific 
and technological infrastructure, where appropriate, in accordance with WIPO‘s 
mandate.‘
201
 In the past, WIPO has been criticized for advising developing states to 
adopt TRIPS-plus measures, but the Recommendations stipulate that ‗Within the 
framework of the agreement between WIPO and the WTO, WIPO shall make 
available advice to developing countries and LDCs on the implementation and 
operation of the rights and obligations and the understanding and use of flexibilities 
contained in the TRIPS Agreement.‘
202
 In future, WIPO‘s work will be open to public 
scrutiny: ‗WIPO shall display general information on all technical activities on its 
website, and shall provide, on request from Member States, details of specific 
activities …‘
203
 The Recommendations also require WIPO to ‗enhance measures that 
ensure wide participation of civil society at large in WIPO activities …‘,
204
 and to 
hold its meetings ‗in a manner open and transparent to all Members.‘
205
 
The GFD also succeeded in achieving the formal adoption of 
Recommendations concerning the assessment and evaluation of the impact of IP in 
different contexts, even though these fell short of the proposed independent WIPO 
Evaluation and Research Office.
206
 By adopting and implementing this ‗cluster‘
207
 of 
recommendations, WIPO might avoid the uncritical approach to intellectual property 
protection (as necessarily promoting ‗development‘) complained of in the original 
Development Agenda proposal documents,
208
 and in future, its work will be more 
transparent and open to scrutiny by outsiders. 
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The cluster of Recommendations most relevant to this dissertation‘s concern 
with policy space is Cluster B on ‗norm-setting, flexibilities, public policy and the 
public domain.‘
209
 Recommendation 15 provides that:  
Norm-setting activities shall: 
 be inclusive and member-driven; 
 take into account different levels of development; 
 take into consideration a balance between costs and benefits; 
 be a participatory process, which takes into consideration the interests 
and priorities of all WIPO Member States and the viewpoints of other 
stakeholders, including accredited inter-governmental organizations 
(IGOs) and NGOs; and 
 be in line with the principle of neutrality of the WIPO Secretariat.210 
These are extremely important recommendations. They should be considered 
together with Recommendation 45 which mandates WIPO ‗to approach intellectual 
property enforcement in the context of broader societal interests and especially 
development-orientated concerns …‘ particularly in view of TRIPS Article 7, which 
is quoted in full.
211
 In view of these very express recommendations, WIPO‘s norm-
setting activities, particularly those regarding the SPLT, will have to be more 
transparent and inclusive than in the past, and must explicitly consider the impact on 
developing countries and the balance between costs and benefits.  
In addition, ‗in its activities, including norm-setting, WIPO should take into 
account the flexibilities in international property agreements, especially those which 
are of interest to developing countries and LDCs‘;
212
 and should ‗conduct informal, 
open and balanced consultations, as appropriate, prior to any new norm-setting 
activities, through a member-driven process, promoting the participation of experts 
from Member States, particularly developing countries and LDSs‘
213
 WIPO should 
also ‗initiate discussions on how, within WIPO‘s mandate, to further facilitate access 
to knowledge and technology for developing countries …‘
214
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The importance of the adopted Recommendations as guiding principles for 
WIPO‘s future work should not be underestimated. They can be used to hold the 
Organization‘s organs and secretariat more accountable, improve and democratize 
internal processes and WIPO‘s technical assistance programmes. These are important 
gains. Norm-setting activities will involve prior discussion with IGOs, NGOs and 
other experts. In future it will be far more difficult for WIPO to adopt an uncritical 
approach to raised IP standards, or advocate their adoption without considering their 
impact on developing countries. 
The recommendations regarding norm-setting, however, still contain no clear 
bottom lines to resolve the costs-benefits tension inherent in the IP system or avert the 
kind of circular debate that characterized the WIPO Development Agenda discussions 
and the Doha talks. In all those discussions, members agreed that there must be ‗a 
balance between costs and benefits,‘ but they disagreed on how this balance should be 
struck. Within the new CDIP, it appears that delegates are still citing ‗balance‘ as an 
important goal in the implementation of the Recommendations, but developed and 
developing countries understand this in different ways.  While the Recommendations 
call for WIPO to ‗take into account different levels of development,‘ it is not clear 
what this will mean in practice. In the past, developed states have argued that higher 
IP rules will be beneficial to developing countries in the longer term, and that short-
term social losses are unavoidable, reasonable, and in the long-term public good. 
WIPO is mandated to ‗take into account the flexibilities in international intellectual 
property agreements, especially those which are of interest to developing states.‘  One 
can assume from the context that WIPO must consider those flexibilities that allow 
states to avoid unreasonable social costs, but there are still no firm benchmarks or 
indicators against which to assess this objectively.   
The closest the Recommendations come to providing a firm and non-
negotiable bottom line is Recommendation 22, which provides that ‗WIPO‘s norm-
setting activities should be supportive of the development goals agreed within the 
United Nations System, including those contained in the Millennium Development 
Goals.‘
215
 In this regard, particular mention is made of ‗(a) safeguarding national 
implementation of intellectual property rules … (d) potential flexibilities, exceptions 
and limitations for Member States, and (e) the possibility of additional special 
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provisions for developing states.‘
216
 These provisions are thus directed at protecting 
domestic IP policy space in the light of the MDGs.  
The MDGs provide a list of universally-agreed
217
 priorities, which in terms of 
Recommendation 22, IP rules should promote rather than obstruct. The Goals provide 
possible benchmarks against which proposed IP treaties can be assessed. For example, 
promotion of the MDG to ‗Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for 
HIV/AIDS for all those who need it,‘
218
 would seem to suggest that states should have 
enough IP flexibility to provide access to generic drugs or use compulsory licensing 
to negotiate discounts. However, the MDG to: ‗In cooperation with pharmaceutical 
companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries,‘
219
 
could undermine this conclusion by suggesting  that the goal of  universal access 
might be achieved through voluntary donations from pharmaceutical companies, or 
developing states‘ increased buying-power resulting from other parts of MDG 8, such 
as grants, debt-relief, and enhanced export opportunities.
220
 
It appears that the MDGs are not specific enough to ‗counter‘ detailed IP rules, 
nor do they mandate clear enough routes to their achievement. They are open to a 
variety of interpretations. While it is to be hoped that consideration of the MDGs will 
guide WIPO‘s work in future, there is a danger that ‗development‘-related discussion 
will continue to go round in circles as in previous Development Agenda meetings. At 
the CDIP‘s First Session, for example, the United States delegate stressed that the 
Committee faced challenging work in its ‗long-term goal of bringing the full benefits 
of the IP system to every corner of the globe.‘
221
  
Similarly, when WIPO is mandated to ‗further mainstream development 
considerations,‘
222
 the question is: what exactly does ‗development‘ mean in this 
context? And should the word ‗further‘ be interpreted to mean that WIPO has a 
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Human rights norms provide many advantages over policy references to 
‗development‘ or ‗different levels of development‘; to ‗a balance between costs and 
benefits‘; to the ‗priorities and special needs of developing counties and … LDCs‘; 
assessing the impact of proposed norms; taking flexibilities into account; supporting 
the MDGs, and the other policy guidelines in the Recommendations. In contrast to 
policy references, human rights standards provide specific limitations on what is 
negotiable, and lay down precise minimum conditions which are beyond negotiation. 
As put by Mac Darrow: human rights standards provide ‗a solid normative basis for 
values and policy choices which otherwise are more readily negotiable.‘
224
  My view 
is that the GFD should have linked their concerns and demands directly to human 
rights instruments like the ICESCR.
 225
    
However, the MDGs could yet be used to introduce an explicit human right 
focus to IP discussions. It is a question of how the Goals are interpreted.
226
 In recent 
years, the United Nations has adopted an explicitly ‗rights-based approach to 
development‘ defined as ‗a conceptual framework for the process of human 
development that is normatively based on international human rights standards and 
operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights.‘
227
   This has been 
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an approach adopted by SIDA, DFID, and other development agencies,
228
 and to a 
limited extent by the World Bank and IMF.
229
 
There are many benefits to linking ‗development‘ to the norms set out in 
international human rights documents; key among them is the fact that human rights 
norms are specific, measurable, binding, high-status, and already have widespread 
international support. The GFD focus on WIPO as a UN agency obliged to support 
United Nations development objectives could have been more powerful if the GFD 
had focused on the United Nations as a human rights organization and the supervising 
body for important international human rights treaties such as the ICESCR, thus 
obliging WIPO to further the United Nations human rights programme.  
Negotiating strategy part three: „regime change‟  
The ‗international regimes‘ concept developed by international relations 
scholars
230
 may be useful for thinking about negotiating strategy. International 
regimes are ‗principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.‘
231
 The various regimes have their 
own international forums, institutions, machineries, and rules – the international trade 
regime has the WTO and the relevant treaties, while the international human rights 
regime has the United Nations, the International Bill of Rights,
232
 and other human 
rights treaties. International IP law has traditionally been placed within WIPO and 
based on the Berne and Paris Conventions. 
Lawrence Helfer has examined the dynamic of ‗regime changing‘ with regard 
to international IP negotiation and policy-making.
233
 He argues that developed states, 
having become dissatisfied with their lack of success in WIPO during the 1970s and 
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1980s, moved IP discussions into a new forum (the WTO) in the late 1980s and tied 
the question of IP enforcement to a new regime – international trade.
234
 Through this 
move, they were able to establish stronger IP standards which were actually 
enforceable against developing states because non-compliance could be punished 
through cross-sectoral sanctions.
235
 In the aftermath, WIPO has tried to reassert its 
position as the primary site for IP negotiation by supporting the interests of developed 
states and the knowledge industries.
236




As will be explored in Chapter 7, developing countries and non-profit NGOs, 
dissatisfied with the provisions of TRIPS and other intellectual property agreements 
and negotiations, have tried to implement some ‗regime changing‘ of their own in an 
attempt ‗to recalibrate, revise, or supplement‘ these treaties.
238
 They raise IP matters 
in forums outside of the WTO, and in other international regimes such as the 
environmental and human rights regimes ‗whose institutions, actors, and subject 
mandates are more closely aligned with these countries‘ interests.‘
239
 They have used 
these alternative regimes to generate new norms and principles for IP protection, 
trying to offset the private property protection clauses in the TRIPS Agreement.
240
  
Helfer sees several potential strategic advantages in shifting the TRIPS 
discussion from the international trade regime to the human rights regime.  A regime 
whose forums or subject matter are more closely aligned with the needs of developing 
countries enables the development of ‗―counterregime norms‖ –  in binding treaties or 
non-binding soft-law standards‘ that can be used to ‗counter‘ the treaty norms 
developed in venues such as the WTO.
241
 Actors with little power in the WTO may be 
able to exert more influence in alternative forums such as the United Nations.
242
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Generating counterregime norms in other forums might have the effect of changing 
perspectives generally, thus influencing thinking within the WTO,
243
 and perhaps 
challenging the hegemony of the idea that protection of intellectual property can be 
championed with little regard to the possible effects on the public interest.
244
 Soft-law 
declarations generated elsewhere might encourage governments to change domestic 
policies, and might even result in changes to the TRIPS treaty itself.
245
 As noted 
earlier, this has already happened with the first potential amendment to the TRIPS 
Agreement set out in the Protocol of December 2005, inserting Article 31 bis.
246
  
Changes to the substantive law will not always be required, however. The 
TRIPS Agreement already has a number of flexibilities and limitations which could 
be interpreted in ways that give better effect to the objectives in Article 7: to promote 
technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology ‗to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 




I have discussed the difficulties developing states have encountered within the 
IP regime, relying only on its own internal rules and principles. Moving the 
discussion into the human rights regime encourages the development of 
counterregime norms – for example, the norm that IP protection should not violate the 
right to health.
248
 A norm can be used to ‗counter‘
249
 the protectionist norms of the 
trade-IP regimes, in ways that give muscle to those arguments favouring a less 
protectionist interpretat on of the TRIPS Agreement. Indeed, less-protectionist 
interpretations are not only permissible in the light of Article 7 and other TRIPS 
flexibility provisions – for ICESCR member states, such interpretations are 
mandatory to avoid violating their ICESCR commitments. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING THE CASE 
 
Part One:  
Introduction 
In Chapter 5, I sketched the developing countries‘ attempts to regain enough 
policy space to shape their IP policies to local needs and circumstances. I discussed 
their attempts at Doha to rely on TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 and insist on the recognition 
of TRIPS flexibilities, and their appeals to broader development grounds during the 
WIPO Development Agenda debates. 
The rights of intellectual property owners set out in TRIPS are precise, 
detailed, and enforceable. The clauses referring to the public benefit are vague and 
ambiguous, and could be interpreted as merely hortatory, especially as there are no 
benchmarks against which to measure them. The ‗internal arguments‘ used by the 
developing states at the Doha and WIPO Development Agenda talks were not 
particularly effective; in the absence of a measurable bottom line, the developed 
countries were easily able to counter with their own internal arguments. I have 
suggested that developing countries need a non-negotiable bottom line, and that the 
binding ICESCR rights could fulfil this function.  
If human rights are to be raised successfully to counter patent-owners‘ rights 
under TRIPS, or to add interpretative muscle to TRIPS exceptions, the rights raised as 
counterregime norms need to be as specific and detailed as the IP-owners‘ rights in 
TRIPS. Furthermore, it is essential that violations of these rights can be clearly 
identified. 
In Chapter 4, I outlined the current humanitarian crisis facing the developing 
world as a result of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In practice, the implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement may contribute to the severity of this crisis, because the essential 
medicines required to contain the disease become unaffordable when TRIPS is 













In this chapter, I argue that protectionist interpretations and implementations 
of TRIPS are violations of human rights. While they violate several human rights, I 
concentrate on the ICESCR‘s right to health (Article 12). I begin with a general 
theoretical examination of the economic, social, and cultural rights protected by the 
ICESCR, and show how the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and 
others have begun to transform ICESCR obligations into robust yardsticks that can be 
used to identify and measure violations.  
In the second part of the chapter, I use the ‗tripartite typology‘ – the 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil – to examine the right to health.  
In the third part of the chapter, I look at another ICESCR right, Article 15, 
focusing specifically on the problem of research-tool patenting, and its implications 
for the diffusion of science and its benefits. 
This chapter is theoretical. I am trying to ‗make my case‘ using a human 
rights-based argument. In Chapter 7, I will examine the practical possibilities for 
using the argument to resist enclosure of IP policy space. 
The human rights framework approaches the issue of essential medicines from 
the perspective of those who need them. In the context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
medicines exist which could save millions of lives, and help control further spread of 
the disease. Human rights scholars and the CESCR assert that states have non-
derogable obligations to take steps to make these essential medicines available. The 
most important step is to establish pharmaceutical strategies aimed at securing 
essential medicines at affordable prices. States need enough policy space within 
which to set appropriate pharmaceutical policies. 
The human rights approach does not claim that everyone has the right to all 
the newest groundbreaking therapies; the medicines claimed as a ‗minimum core‘ 
right are only those listed as ‗essential medicines‘ by the WHO.
1
 This is a 
comparatively modest demand for the most essential drugs, which does not claim that 
drugs such as ARVs should be available without paying compensation to the 
companies which invested in the R&D leading to their development.  The CESCR 
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makes it clear that reasonable compensation should be paid.
2
 As discussed in Chapter 
5, provision of essential ARVs under compensated compulsory licences will not 
impact drug companies‘ profits or the patent system‘s ability to provide an incentive 
for the development of these medicines, but it makes affordable medicines available 
to the poor, essentially as a ‗by-product‘ of the existing patent system. It is possible to 
provide these essential medicines without prejudice to the drug companies and, under 
the circumstances, this would appear to be reasonable. This is also in keeping with the 
foundational justifications of the patent system – to produce new goods for the good 
of society. 
Reclaiming social and economic rights  
Social and economic rights cannot be strategically useful unless they are 
perceived as precise obligations.  It is difficult to use the ICESCR rights to counter the 
rights set out in TRIPS, because, as worded in the Covenant, the rights seem vague, 
indeterminate, non-specific and unenforceable.
3
 Human rights clauses compare 
unfavourably to trade rules in this way, since trade rules tend to be highly specific.
4
 
Yet, trade rules are not inherently more precise and specific than human rights rules – 




Ever since the adoption of the Covenant, commentators have noted both the 
vagueness of the wording and the need to determine more specifically the scope and 
content of the rights and obligations to enable their enforcement.
6
 Until recently, 
social and economic rights were ‗jurisprudentially undeveloped,‘
7
 compared to other 
rules, not only those of international trade, but also the civil and political rights set out 
in the ICCPR.
8
 Their normative content was perceived as ‗obscure.‘
9
 Some argued 
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 CESCR General Comment 17 para 24. 
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 Shany ‗International justiciability‘ at 82. 
4
 Abbott ‗TRIPS and human rights‘ at 161; Harrison Human rights Impact of WTO at 169. 
They also have better enforcement machinery. 
5
 Abbott ‗TRIPS and human rights‘ at 161. And they have the power that money gives within 
government. 
6
 Alston ‗Out of the abyss‘ at 351 and 332-3; Sepúlveda Obligations at 132; Hunt Reclaiming 
at 112; Craven ICESCR at 104.  
7
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‗Economic and social rights‘ at 31; Alston ‗Out of the abyss‘ at 351).   
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 Farmer ‗Paradigm shift‘ at 655; Leckie ‗Violations‘ at 87. 
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that the ICESCR rights could not possibly function as peremptory norms because they 
‗do not provide the guidance that a rule of law should provide.‘
10
 Others noted that 




During the past two decades, however, human rights scholars have enriched 
our jurisprudential understanding of the ICESCR. They have specified core content, 
clarified obligations, identified specific violations, and generally raised the profile and 
legitimacy of social and economic rights.
12
 In these ways, they have fashioned the 




The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The most important contribution to clarifying the entitlements and obligations 
of the ICESCR is the work of the Committee of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights. The UN Economic and Social Council is responsible for administering the 
ICESCR,
14
 but in 1987, ECOSOC established the CESCR, comprising human rights 
experts, to assist in these supervisory duties.  In practice, the CESCR is the 
supervisory body for the Covenant.
15
  
The CESCR has attempted to spell out specific state obligations both to guide 
states and to invigorate the ICESCR by developing a framework for thinking about 
rights in terms of core minimum obligations and specified violations.
16
 From time to 
time, the Committee issues ‗General Comments‘ aimed at ‗clarify[ing] the normative 
issues [of the ICESCR] for the States Parties.‘
17
 The General Comments are not 
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legally binding and have no formal legal status.
18
 States‘ parties do not formally 
request the CESCR to issue General Comments, and there is no procedure for their 
formal endorsement or adoption.
19
  
Their legal significance and importance should not be underestimated, 
however. They are regarded as ‗authoritative interpretations‘ of the binding clauses in 
the ICESCR, and are intended as firm guidelines for their practical implementation.
20
 
The Committee is ‗the most authoritative bod[y] … for determining the scope of the 
obligations imposed by the [ICESCR]‘
21
 and states parties that fail to act upon the 
Committee‘s recommendations ‗show bad faith in implementing their Covenant-based 
obligations.‘
22
 The General Comments carry ‗considerable legal weight‘
23
 and provide 
valuable ‗jurisprudential insights‘ into the issues discussed by the Committee.
24
 The 
CESCR has developed its practice of issuing General Comments into a ‗quasi-
legislative mechanism‘ and the resulting ‗quasi-legal status‘ of the Comments ‗is to an 
extent supported by the tacit acceptance by States Parties to ICESCR, both to the 
ongoing formation of General Comments, and their utilization as a mechanism by 
which to assess States reports under the Covenant.‘
25
 The General Comments have 
also been used when interpreting human rights in national and regional courts, further 
evidence of the Comments‘ high standing and quasi-legal status.
26
  
Because of the high level of legitimacy which the Committee enjoys,
27
 and the 
consultative procedures through which the General Comments are formulated,
28
 the 
Comments have a very high level of acceptance among states parties.
29
 Over time, the 
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 Craven ICESCR at 104. 
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 Hunt Reclaiming at 20. 
25
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26
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General Comment has become ‗a distinct juridical instrument … that bears some 
resemblance to the advisory opinion practice of international tribunals.
30
   
Other important contributions to the jurisprudential development of social and 
economic include the 1986 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights
31
 and the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
32
 written by human rights experts to clarify the 
status of social and economic rights and facilitate their practical implementation. 
These have ‗achieved wide currency internationally,‘ and have de facto ‗official 
status‘ with the CESCR.
33
 
The CESCR General Comments, Limburg Principles, and Maastricht 
Guidelines, have been invaluable in invigorating the rights set out in the ICESCR. In 
particular, they have explored the meaning of ‗progressive realization,‘ and have 
developed several useful jurisprudential tools.
34
  
„Positive vs negative rights‟ 
Since the decision to divide the Universal Declaration rights into two separate 
binding treaties, there has been controversy over whether the civil and political rights 
of the ICCPR and the social, economic and cultural rights of the ICESCR are 
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Human Rights Q 691. 
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essentially and materially different.
35
 ICCPR rights have been deemed ‗negative‘ 
rights, requiring only ‗state absenteeism‘, demanding few state resources, and thus 
requiring immediate implementation.
36
 ICESCR rights, on the other hand, have been 
deemed ‗positive rights‘, which require state intervention and considerable 
resources.
37
 Furthermore, the ICESCR rights are subject to ‗progressive realization‘ in 
terms of Article 2(1).
38
 Thus, it is claimed that they are neither immediately 
enforceable nor directly enforceable in the same ways as ICCPR rights and that they 




The CESCR and other human rights scholars have pointed out, however, that, 
like ICCPR rights, many ICESCR rights are also ‗negative‘ in the sense that they 
require the state to refrain from interfering with the right, rather than direct fulfilment 
through the ‗provision of goods and services.‘
40
 Furthermore, the ostensibly 
‗negative‘ and ‗immediately enforceable‘ ICCPR rights often require considerable 
state expenditure.
41
 It is now ‗generally accepted that rights in both categories are 
essentially similar,‘
42
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37
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Question of non-justiciability 
It has also been contended that social and economic rights are unenforceable 
or non-justiciable.
44
 Some scholars argue that justiciability is ‗an indication of the 
existence of a legal right.‘
45
 This is not necessarily true, however; many norms of 
international law cannot be enforced through courts or in similar forums, but they are 
still considered ‗binding rules of international law.‘
46
 
Even if a particular right is non-justiciable, this does not mean that it has no 
practical value.
47
 Alston and Quinn argue that non-justiciable rights may still be 
important for interpreting legislation and deciding cases brought on other grounds.
48
 
Actual litigation in court-like forums is not the only mechanism for securing and 
protecting economic and social rights. It is sometimes more practical a d powerful to 
think of social and economic rights as ‗duties for governments, international agencies, 
and other actors to take concrete measures … to restructure institutions so that the 
rights can be fulfilled more effectively.‘
49
 Indeed, Meier argues that the right to health 
is far more powerful as a collective right aimed at policy than as an enforceable right 
for individual litigants.
50
 The strategic use of human rights as a countering tool in 
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and scope‘ at 159 for more discussion about this perspective. 
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international negotiations does not rely on direct litigation for enforcement.
51
 One 
should also remember that ‗violations of economic, social and cultural rights can 
occur with or without being subjected to judicial consideration.‘
52
   
However, it is simply not true that social and economic rights are non-
justiciable: litigants often bring cases based on social and economic rights in domestic 
courts,
53
 as well as in regional human rights systems.
54
 Although many jurisdictions 
do not provide practical machinery for litigating these rights and there is no suitable 
international judicial machinery to enforce them, this does not mean they are 
inherently non-justiciable.
55
 Many experts have argued that most of the Covenant 
rights could, ‗in the great majority of systems, be considered to possess at least some 
significant justiciable dimensions.‘
56
 The drafters of the Limburg Principles clearly 
did not regard the ICESCR as non-justiciable; they commented that ‗the application of 
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55
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Part Two:  
Basing a right to essential medicines on the ICESCR right to 
health (Article 12) 
Social and economic rights cannot be used strategically as countering tools 
unless they are jurisprudentially developed and regarded as legitimate, specific rights.  
In this section, I focus on the right to health set out in Article 12 of the 
ICESCR. The work of the CESCR (along with the work of other human rights experts 
such as Rapporteur Paul Hunt) has been crucial to the jurisprudential development of 
this right and the identification of obligations specific enough to be used as countering 
norms against the detailed rules in TRIPS. I show how this has been achieved, looking 
particularly at some of the jurisprudential tools developed by the Committee.  
To explain how the rather broad ‗right to health‘ can be used as a countering 
tool against protectionist IP policies and in favour of exceptions such as compulsory 
licences, I focus particularly on the right to essential medicines. There is widespread 
recognition of the right to essential medicines: The UN Commission on Human 
Rights, for example, has confirmed that ‗access to medication in the context of 
pandemics such as HIV/AIDS is one fundamental element for achieving progressively 
the full realization of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.‘
58
 The UN High Commissioner has similarly 
stated that ‗access to essential drugs is a human right,‘
59
 and the right has also been 
recognized by many regional
60
 and national courts.
61
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 Human Rights Committee Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemics such as 
HIV/AIDS para 1. 
59
 UNHCHR ‗Impact of TRIPS‘ para 42. 
60
 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has made an interim order in terms of 
the Protocol of San Salvador requiring the government of El Salvador to provide antiretroviral 
treatment to those who need it. (Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al v El Salvador, Case 12.249, 
7 March 2001. (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report 29/01). 
61
 Several states have recognized the provision of essential medicines as an aspect of the right 
to health. In South Africa, the Constitutional Court relied in part on the Constitutional right to 
health in ordering the government to expand the provision of Nevirapine to newborn infants 
(Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC)).  In Argentina, the constitutional right to health was used to order the government to 
manufacture a vaccine for Argentine haemorrhagic fever when commercial pharmaceutical 
companies found it unprofitable to do so. (Coomans Justiciability at 1, citing Viceconte, 













I will show that the ICESCR provides a right to essential medicines, including 
appropriate antiretrovirals, as a core element of the right to health. My primary focus 
is on states‘ obligations to establish pharmaceutical policies and strategies aimed at 
making essential medicines accessible to all who need them. I will show that ICESCR 
member states violate their duties when they fail to establish such policies, or when 
they take steps that impede the development of such policies, either domestically or in 
foreign countries.  
Right to Health: Background, history, and general criticisms 
The right to health is protected in numerous international treaties
62




Article 12 of the ICESCR provides: 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right 
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present 
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall 
include those necessary for: 
a) The provision for the reduction of the still-birth rate 
and of infant mortality and for the healthy 
development of the child; 
b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and 
industrial hygiene; 
c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, 
endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all 
medical services and medical attention in the event of 
sickness. 
                                                                                                                                            
16.986, Causa No 31, Camara Nacional en lo Contencioso-Administrarivo Federal, Sala IX, 
decision of 2 June 1988). Some countries have also ‗explicitly recognized a right to 
antiretroviral treatment in legislation.‘ (Watchirs ‗Human rights approach to HIV/AIDS‘ at 
110). 
62
 Including: Article 25 of the UDHR; Articles 6 and 24 of the Children‘s Convention; Article 
11(f), 12 and 14 of CEDAW. A number of regional human rights conventions similarly 
recognize and protect the right to health: Article 16 of the African Charter on Human and 
People‘s Rights; Article 11(3) of the European Social Charter; Article 11 of the American 
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Until the early 1990s, the right to health was criticized for ‗its lack of 
conceptual clarity.‘
64
 Little was written on its legal aspects;
65
 it was an undeveloped 
right.
66
 During the past 20 years, a number of legal challenges based on the right to 
health have helped clarify its content and scope.
67
 In addition, the World Health 
Organization and various other UN organs (particularly the CESCR) have begun to 
concretize the scope of the right so that specific obligations become legally 
recognizable and potentially enforceable.
68
  
In part, the vague wording of Article 12 is attributable to its drafting 
history.
69
It is based on the first modern formulation of a right to health in the WHO‘s 
Constitution,
70
 which declares that ‗The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being,‘
71
 and defines 
‗health‘ as a ‗state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, not merely the 
absence of disease and infirmity.‘
72
 This definition is almost synonymous with well-
being itself, and suggests that WHO member states have a duty to ‗guarantee or 
provide complete physical, mental, and social well-being for all of [their] citizens.‘
73
 
As Chapman notes, this is ‗simply an impossible goal.‘
74
 The ‗right to health‘ should 
not be interpreted as ‗the right to be healthy.‘
75
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rights‘ at 548. 
65
 Hunt Reclaiming at 108. As the most serious global epidemic of modern times, HIV/AIDS 
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 Toebes Right to Health at 19; CESCR General comment 14 para 8; Marks ‗Human rights 













The drafters of the ICESCR did not provide a definition of ‗health,‘ believing 
that the definition in the WHO Constitution was sufficient.
76
 The right to health set 
out in Article 12 lists some specific states‘ duties, but it too has been criticized as 
vague, overly broad, and inherently unsuitable as an enforceable legal standard.  Hunt 
describes Article 12 as ‗exceedingly imprecise.‘
77
  Chapman points out that ‗health‘ is 
always a relative concept, based on economic, social and cultural circumstances, and 
on individual and medical perceptions of what is normal or achievable.
78
 Reliance on 
the term tends to introduce ‗ambiguity and imprecision.‘
79
 Furthermore, the ‗highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health‘ is conceptually problematic because 
views of what is attainable vary considerably among social groups and medical 
practitioners.
80
 Advances in medical science may expand the scope of what is 
achievable, but usually at great expense. It is not at all clear how the ‗highest 
attainable standard‘ should be measured.
81
  
Do the rather vague rights to ‗the highest attainable standard of physical 
health‘ in Article 12(1); the ‗prevention, treatment and control of epidemic [and] 
endemic … diseases‘ in Article 12(2)(c); and ‗the creation of conditions which would 
assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness‘ in Article 
12(2)(d) create a right to access to essential medicines? If so, what kinds of 
obligations do they create?  
To answer these questions, I will rely on the CESCR‘s General Comment 14 
on The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, the most authoritative 
interpretation
82
 of the right. General Comment 14 has been called ‗the most detailed 
exposition of the right to health,‘
83
  ‗perhaps the most successful attempt to infuse 
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 See the discussion above on the legal status of the General Comments as ‗authoritative 
interpretations‘ of the ICESCR. (E/C.12/1999/11 para 441 and E/C.12/1999/11 para 52). 
83













concrete substance into the right,‘
84
 and ‗in fact the official interpretation of Article 
12.‘
85
 It identifies a specific, measurable, non-derogable right to essential medicines, 
including the antiretroviral medicines required for combating HIV/AIDS. States have 
obligations to establish suitable pharmaceutical policies and strategies aimed at 
making these medicines accessible. 
 I will use General Comment 14 both to assert a right to essential medicines 
(and explore the implications of this for IP policy), and as way of introducing the 
CESCR‘s important jurisprudential tools. 
General Comment 14 and the CESCR’s jurisprudential tools 
General Comment 14 spells out specific obligations, identifies the bearers of 
these obligations, and makes it clear that non-compliance violates the ICESCR. By 
clarifying both rights and obligations, General Comment 14 helps establish the right 
of access to essential medicines in ways that counter the specific and detailed 
intellectual property rules set out in the TRIPS Agreement and other intellectual 
property treaties.  
The Comment relies on the jurisprudential tools developed by the CESCR over 
the past two decades, as well as those in the Limburg Principles and Maastricht 
Guidelines. I will examine some of these important jurisprudential tools (the 
understanding of ‗progressive realization‘; the ‗violations approach‘; the ‗minimum 
core‘; and the ‗tripartite typology‘) and show how they clarify and make more 
specific the rights and obligations in the ICESCR, fashioning them as useful 
countering tools. 
Progressive realization 
All ICESCR rights are subject to ‗progressive realization.‘ Article 2(1) of the 
Convention calls for each state party to: 
take steps … to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
                                                 
84
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85
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understanding the right to health (‗Core obligations‘ at 45). See also Walker ‗Human rights 
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present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.  
Historically, this reference to progressive realization created a perception that 
the ICESCR does not create binding obligations in the same way as the ICCPR rights 
(which are not subject to progressive realization) especially because the ICESCR 




In General Comment 14, the Committee stresses that progressive realization:  
should not be interpreted as removing all meaningful content from States 
parties‘ obligations. Rather, it means that States parties have a specific 
and continuing obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible towards the full realization of Article 12.
87
  
Here the Committee builds on previous General Comments, particularly 
General Comment 3 on The Nature of States Parties‟ Obligations,
88
 which states that 
‗progressive realization‘ demands some evidence of actual ‗progress.‘
89
  
General Comment 3 provides that states parties have an immediate obligation 
to ‗take steps‘ toward the full realization of the ICESCR rights,
 90
 and that ‗the steps 
must be ‗deliberate, concrete and targeted towards‘ the full realization of the rights.
91
 
The ICESCR itself lists the passage of relevant legislation aimed at achieving the 
right as an example of a step.
92
 General Comment 3 states that legislation might be 
‗desirable‘ and in some cases even ‗indispensable‘ for the implementation of a right,
93
 
but the Covenant refers to ‗all appropriate means,‘ of which legislation is just one 
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 The Committee recognizes that states may decide for themselves which 
steps are ‗most appropriate‘ and that these measures could include the ‗provision of 
judicial remedies,‘
95





 In general terms, appropriate steps include the development of 
‗targeted, legally consistent, and sufficiently progressive policies‘ aimed at the full 
realization of economic and social rights.
98
 A state will violates the ICESCR if it does 
not begin to take steps within a short period after the ICESCR comes into force.
99
 
General Comment 14 gives some examples of immediate steps in the context 
of the right to health, noting that states should ‗give sufficient recognition to the right 
to health in the national political and legal systems, preferably by way of legislative 
implementation, and … adopt a national health policy with a detailed plan for 
realizing the right to health.‘
100
 The Committee also identifies the adoption and 
implementation of a ‗national public health strategy and plan of action …‘
101
 as a 
‗minimum core‘ obligation.
102
 As discussed below, this health programme must 
include a pharmaceutical strategy aimed at making essential medicines affordable. 
The adoption of a suitable pharmaceutical policy is one of the most crucial ‗steps‘ that 
states must take under the right to health. States have an immediate obligation to 
adopt such policies,
103
 and must have enough policy space in which to do so.
104
  
In the context of the right to health, ‗there is a strong presumption that 
retrogressive measures‘ which further impede access to health services or which limit 
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 Alston & Quinn ‗Nature and scope‘ at 166. 
100
 CESCR General comment 14 para 36. Indeed, the Committee lists 14 rights and freedoms 
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 Leckie ‗Violations‘ at 106; see also Young ‗Minimum core‘ at 122; Yamin ‗Not just a 
tragedy‘ at 327. 
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the state‘s freedom to adopt appropriate policies are ‗not permissible.‘
105
 
Retrogressive measures are not necessarily prima facie violations of the ICESCR, but 
they can ‗only be justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided in the 
Covenant and in the context of the full use of maximum available resources.‘
106
 The 
‗intentional withdrawal‘ of a currently enjoyed right, the creation of new barriers 
preventing the enjoyment of rights not currently enjoyed, the repeal of legislation 
giving effect to rights, the imposition of detrimental policies, and other examples of 
the ‗active denial‘ of these rights are typical acts that violate economic and social 
rights.
107
 In general terms, violations occur when living conditions deteriorate as a 
result of policy decisions.
108
 
Later, I will examine the possibility that signing TRIPS or TRIPS-plus treaties 
that impede states‘ freedom to adopt suitable pharmaceutical policies constitute a 
retrogressive step in violation of the immediate obligations imp sed on ICESCR 
parties. 
Violations approach 
The ‗violations approach,‘ developed by academics, is intended to 
complement and improve the CESCR‘s work in monitoring the progressive 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights by identifying specific violations.
109
 
It is based on the understanding that the progressive realization clause,
110
 and the 
‗perceived … indeterminate content‘ of economic and social rights, ‗creates inherent 
difficulties in precisely defining obligations, and thus it is easier to outline what states 
must not do, rather than identifying what they must do.‘
111
 Traditionally, there was a 
perception that it is easier to identify violations of civil and political rights than of the 
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‗progressive‘ social and economic rights, and this approach assists in identifying 





 identifies three types of violations: those that result from 
government policies and actions; those related to discrimination; and those resulting 
from the state‘s failure to fulfil minimum core obligations as identified by the 
CESCR.
114
 The Maastricht Guidelines further develop the violations approach. 
Following the tripartite typology,
115
 they confirm that the state has obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil social and economic rights, and actively violates rights 
when it fails to respect, protect or take appropriate measures toward their 
fulfilment.
116
 A state also violates the Covenant when it fails to satisfy minimum core 
obligations identified by the Committee.
117
 Violations may occur though acts of 
commission by the state or by third parties which the state fails to regulate 
properly.
118
 Violations can also occur though acts of omission.  Listed examples 
include ‗failure to regulate the activities of individuals or groups so as to prevent them 
from violating economic, social and cultural rights,‘
119
 and ‗failure of a State to take 
into account its international legal obligations in the field of economic, social and 
cultural rights when entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with other 




General Comment 3 sets out the concept of ‗the minimum core obligation‘ as 
follows: 
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 Thus, it becomes possible to understand the ‗widespread violation of economic, social and 
cultural rights in a technical legal sense instead of merely as a moral injunction.‘ (Craven 
ICESCR at 143). 
113
 Chapman was the first to set out the approach systematically. 
114
 Chapman ‗Violations approach‘ at 24. 
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 Maastricht Guidelines para 6. 
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 para 9. 
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The Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure 
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of 
the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State 
party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of 
essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, or the most basic 
forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations 
under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not 
to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would largely be deprived 
of its raison d‟être.
121
  
These minimum core obligations are in principle non-derogable; if they not 
fulfilled, states will be regarded prima facie as having violated the rights concerned.
122
 
The Committee has recognized, however, that ‗any assessment of whether a State has 
discharged its minimum core obligations must also take account of resource 
constraints applying within the country concerned …‘
123
 Leckie points out that ‗at the 
most fundamental level, any failure by a state to comply with an international legal 
obligation must first be examined in terms of whether the state concerned is unable to 
implement an obligation or if the state is decidedly unwilling to do so.‘
124
 The 
Committee stresses, however, that ‗in order for a State party to be able to attribute its 
failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources, it 
must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations.‘
125
 The approach thus shifts the burden of proof to the state concerned if 
it claims that it was unable to meet its minimum core obligations because of resource 
constraints.
126
 The Committee goes on to stipulate that, ‗even where the available 
resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a State party to 




General Comment 14 seems to go further than General Comment 3, by 
providing that ‗a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its 
non-compliance with the core obligations … which are non-derogable.‘
128
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Most human rights scholars have embraced the concept of a ‗minimum 
core.‘
129
 This is one of the ways in which the vaguely-worded ICESCR rights can be 
made more specific and detailed, by setting clear benchmarks for states to meet and 
making it easier for the CESCR to identify violations.
130
 The notion of core non-




Some scholars have pointed out that the identification of non-derogable 
obligations may present conceptual and practical difficulties when examining the 
practices of a particular reporting state, especially in contexts where the state has few 
resources and many pressing social and economic challenges.
132
 Russell points out 
that, from the CESCR‘s perspective, ‗even in highly straitened circumstances, a state 
has irreducible obligations that it is assumed to be able to meet,‘
133
 but argues that this 
assumption is simply not true.
134
 Some states may indeed be unable to afford the 
essential medicines identified as part of the ‗minimum core‘ of the right to health, for 
example.
135
 Chapman, however, has argued that it is indeed possible to ‗define 
minimum essential levels of the right to health that apply to all States parties 
regardless of their economic development …. arefully targeted policies with modest 
costs can often make significant contributions toward realizing specific human 
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 Indeed, appropriate policies are crucial within the minimum core concept. 
Policies must prioritize spending on minimum core areas, and, importantly, must also 
be aimed at making essential goods and services as affordable as possible. The 
minimum core concept is perhaps most useful as a tool for assessing policy, and, in an 
international context, as a non-negotiable bottom line protecting the policy space 
necessary for establishing policies aimed at meeting minimum core priorities.    
Some scholars have noted that the minimum core concept may also present 
significant conceptual and practical problems if used by individual litigants
 
claiming 
the provision of particular goods (such as essential medicines) from the state. In 
practice, no state can realistically be expected to absolutely guarantee even essential 
health care to all its residents.
137
  In situations where the state simply does not have 
the resources to provide essential health care to everyone who needs it, Lehmann 
argues that the minimum core obligations listed in General Comment 14 do not ‗assist 
decision-makers, in concrete cases, determine whether a particular claimant‘s need for 
health care must, as a matter of right, be prioritized over another claimant‘s health 
care needs,‘
138
 and that that ‗the minimum core approach is inappropriate in the 
context of litigation related to the enforcement of an individual‟s rights.‘
139
 She does 
concede, however, that the minimum core concept might be useful ‗for national 
policy-makers designing national health care programs …‘
140
  
This dissertation does not examine reliance on the minimum core concept by 
individual litigants.  I am interested in whether the concept is strategically useful as a 
non-negotiable bottom line in the context of ‗countering.‘ In this regard, what is really 
at issue is the state‘s pharmaceutical policy.  As explained below, states have an 
immediate and non-derogable minimum core obligation to adopt appropriate 
pharmaceutical policies (for example, policies on generics). Used in this way, the 
concept of a non-derogable minimum core obligation can add weight to demands for 
IP policy space. 
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Identifying actual provision of essential medicines as a ‗minimum core‘ 
obligation could also be useful strategically. Used as a countering tool in international 
negotiations, the minimum core concept adds importance, priority, precision and a 
useful bottom line to the claim for policy space aimed at widening access to essential 
medicines. This could be indispensable when discussing the balance between social 
costs and benefits in international IP negotiations.  
The minimum core of the right to health 
The CESCR uses the minimum core concept in General Comment 14 to 
reaffirm that ‗States parties have a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the 
very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights enunciated in the Covenant, 
including essential primary health care.‘
141
  
In general terms, it is extremely difficult to identify a ‗minimum threshold‘ for 
adequate health care services. States vary considerably, not only in terms of available 
resources, but also in terms of their citizens‘ expectations of what is ‗essential to 
health‘ or even what it means ‗to be healthy.‘
142
  To delineate the minimum level of 
health required for individuals ‗to have a dignified life and to function adequately in 
society,‘
 143
 Toebes endorses the elements of health care listed in the WHO Primary 
Health Care strategy.
 144 
The WHO states that, at minimum, the following should be 
provided: ‗maternal and child health care‘; ‗immunization against the major infectious 
diseases‘; ‗appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries‘; and, importantly 
for my thesis, ‗provision of essential drugs.‘
145
 The WHO‘s work, particularly in its 
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‗Health for All‘ campaign, has been important for developing indicators against which 
to assess compliance with the ICESCR.
146
  
It could be argued that if a ‗right to health‘ is to have any meaningful and 
practical value for people, it should at the very least be understood to encompass the 
most basic health care services identified by the WHO. With the exception of 
essential medicines, the CESCR has not expressly included these basic services in its 
list of six minimum core rights (it lists them as obligations of ‗comparable priority‘ in 
paragraph 44
147
),  but these basic services may nevertheless be understood as 
priorities which the Committee will examine in determining whether the six minimum 
core obligations have been met. 
The six minimum core obligations imposed by the right to health are:
148
  
(a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and 
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child health care; (b) To provide immunization against the major infectious diseases occurring 
in the community; (c) To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic 
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problems in the community, including methods of preventing and controlling them; (e) To 
provide appropriate training for health personnel, including education on health and human 
rights and ‗provide education and access to information concerning the main health problems 
in the community, including methods of preventing and controlling them.‘ (CESCR General 
Comment 14 paras 44 (a) – (e)) 
148
 CESCR General Comment 14 paras 43(a)-(f). 
149
 Hunt points out that non-discrimination implies ‗a particular preoccupation with those who 
are disadvantaged, vulnerable and living in poverty.‘ (Hunt ‗Report of the Special 
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(b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food which is 
nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger for 
everyone;  
(c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and 
an adequate supply of safe and potable water;  
(d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined 
under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs;  
(e) To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods 
and services;  
(f) To adopt and implement a national public health strategy and 
plan of action … 
150
  
In terms of access to HIV/AIDS medicines, the CESCR also made the 
following directly pertinent pronouncements: Paragraph 12 outlines four ‗essential‘ 
and ‗interrelated‘ elements of the right to health, specifying that, within the context of 
a state‘s level of development and available resources, health facilities, goods and 
services must be (a) available in sufficient quantities, (b) accessible, (c) culturally and 
medically acceptable and (d) scientifically and medical appropriate and of good 
quality.
151
 ‗Accessibility‘ was further defined to include access without discrimination 
on prohibited grounds, including race and gender.
152
 In particular, the Committee 
stressed that states have a particular duty to provide health care to the poor, and that 
equality of access to health care and health care services implies that they should not 
disproportionately favour expensive services available only to the wealthy.
153
 
‗Accessibility‘ includes physical accessibility, especially for vulnerable or 
marginalized groups; economic accessibility, which implies that health facilities, 
services and goods should be ‗affordable to all‘; and information accessibility, which 
includes the right to ‗seek, receive and impart‘ information relevant to health.
154
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The importance of pharmaceutical policies 
In paragraph 43(d), the CESCR lists, as a minimum core obligation, the 
provision of: ‗essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action 
Programme on Essential Drugs.‘ The WHO defines ‗essential medicines‘ as ‗those 
that satisfy the priority health care needs of the population.‘
155
 This enables countries 
to develop  pharmaceutical policies aimed at ensuring the regular supply of essential 
drugs, and to make informed decisions about which medications to procure in 
preference to others.
156
 The WHO‘s list of essential medicines is based on evidence of 
a medicine‘s safety and efficacy, its cost-effectiveness (especially when compared to 
other medicines in the same category), its availability, and its stability in terms of the 
expected conditions for storage and use.
157
 The WHO typically recommends single 
rather than complex compounds, but exempts many HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria drugs from this policy because for those diseases combination drugs are 
usually more effective, more easily administered, safer, and reduce the likelihood of 
the emergence of drug-resistant strains.
158
  
It is important to stress that the WHO list of essential medicines does not 
include the latest groundbreaking therapies. Rather, it is a realistic list of affordable 
basic medicines. On the whole, the WHO list is restricted to older, patent-free, 
therapies.
159
  The WHO has explained that it is pointless to recommend unaffordable 
therapies when most developing countries have medications budgets below US$ 30 
per person per annum.
160
 Not only is this a realistic approach, but it should also be 
noted that most of the listed medicines lie ‗outside of the patent system‘ in the sense 
that the patents on the drugs have expired. 
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which may act as a mechanism for balancing the needs of individuals against the needs of the 
collective or community. The WHO devised its first ‗Model List of Essential Drugs‘ in 1977 
at the request of the World Health Assembly to assist states in adopting national medicines 
policies. To date, 156 states have adopted policies based on the WHO list (Chirwa ‗Right to 
health‘ at 554). See WHO Essential Drugs in Brief  Vol 11, November 2003 for an overview 
of states‘ national medicines policies. 
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 for example, chloroquine for the treatment of tuberculosis rather than newer more effective 
remedies, which are 20-30 times more effective. (Abbott ‗Managing the Hydra‘ at 394). See 
also Watal ‗Differential pricing‘ at 6; Chirwa ‗Right to health‘ at 554, discussing 
‗affordability‘ as a factor for inclusion on the Model List. 
160













However, this pragmatic approach proved unsustainable with millions 
suffering from HIV/AIDS. Antiretroviral drugs are the only realistic way to control 
the disease and the pandemic, and are thus absolutely essential medicines. For this 
reason, the WHO added several antiretrovirals to the list, even though most of the 
drugs were still under patent and very expensive when they were first included.
161
 In 
this regard, the Organization has encouraged and assisted states to use TRIPS 
flexibilities to enable them to procure essential medication as cheaply as possible.
162
  
The WHO has stressed that states should adopt pharmaceutical policies 
designed to make essential medicines more affordable – especially where the listed 
medicines are still under patent.
163
 These pharmaceutical policies should include: 
policies on generics, pricing policies, bulk procurement policies, differential pricing 
structures, compulsory licensing, parallel importation, price negotiation with drug 
                                                 
161
 The WHO currently includes the following antiretroviral drugs on its essential medicines 
list:  ●Nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs)  (which prevent healthy T-cells in 
the body from becoming infected with HIV): abacavir (ABC); didanosine (ddI); lamivudine 
(3TC) with lemtictabine (FTC) added as an alternative in 2007; stavudine (d4T); tenofovir 
disoproxil fumarate (TDF); zidovudine (ZDV or AZT)]● Non-nucleoside reverse 
transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs)  (also prevent healthy T-cells in the body from becoming 
infected with HIV): efavirenz (EFV or EFZ); nevirapine (NVP) ● Protease inhibitors (PIs) 
(which prevent T-cells infected with HIV from producing new copies of the virus): indinavir 
(IDV);  ritonavir;  lopinavir + ritonavir (LPV/r);  nelfinavir (NFV); Saquinavir (SQV). In 
addition, the WHO added certain fixed-dose combinations of the above to its essential 
medicines list in 2007. (WHO Model List of Essential Medicines 15th ed). 
162
 Helfer ‗Regime shifting‘ at 42.  See also Seuba ‗Human rights‘ at 402, and further 
discussion below. Unlike most of the drugs on the WHO Essential Medicines list, the ARVs 
are indeed ‗inside the patent system.‘ Not only are they under patent, but the development of 
these drugs depends on the ability of the patent system to provide the necessary incentives. 
However, the WHO‘s recommendations to states to acquire the drugs as cheaply as possible 
through compulsory licensing will not impact the system‘s ability to provide incentives. As 
outlined in the figure and text accompanying footnotes 62 and 64 once the system has 
produced the ARVs, their provision to others outside ‗system A‘ can be understood as a 
costless by-product, and thus a reasonable balancing of interests. It should be noted that this 
does not apply only to people in developing counties. Developed states have similar 
obligations to provide essential medicines to residents unable to afford on-patent prices. Very 
importantly, it must be stressed that this does not apply to all drugs – it applies only to the 
drugs identified as ‗essential medicines.‘ The ARVs listed above are unusual in that, unlike 
most of the listed essential drugs, they are on-patent and expensive. 
163
 See the WHO bulletin Essential Drugs in Brief for overviews of various states‘ 
pharmaceutical strategies. See also NICE Guidelines (at Chapter 7) for a discussion on cost-













companies, and other strategies designed to ensure that prices of essential drugs are 
kept as low as possible.
164
  
Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt confirms that, under the ICESCR, ‗the State has 
to do all it reasonably can do to make an essential medicine available in its 
jurisdiction, e.g. by using, where appropriate, the TRIPS flexibilities, such as 
compulsory licences and parallel imports.‘
165
 Pharmaceutical policies must be aimed 
at acquiring essential medicines from reliable suppliers at the lowest possible prices, 




 The CESCR identifies the adoption and implementation of a national public 
health strategy and plan of action as one of the six minimum core obligations in 
paragraph 43(f). These health strategies should include pharmaceutical strategies and 
action plans.  
States‘ non-derogable minimum core obligations with regard to the provision 
of essential medicines are perhaps best understood by examining General Comment 
14 paragraphs 43(d) and (f) in combination: While the state‘s available resources may 
make it impossible to purchase and distribute HIV/AIDS drugs to all its residents 
immediately, it must make the best effort possible within available resources, 
including efforts to obtain essential medicines at affordable prices. Most importantly, 
the state has an immediate and non-derogable duty to establish appropriate 
pharmaceutical programmes and policies. This understanding accords with the 
Committee‘s interpretation of the ‗progressive realization‘ clause.
167
 The Committee 
has stressed that states have immediate obligations to take steps aimed at the 
realization of the ICESCR rights, using ‗all appropriate means.‘
168
 In the context of 
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 World Health Organization ‗How to develop and implement a national drug policy‘ (2003) 
4; WHO Policy Perspectives on Medicines at 4. The South Africa National Drug Policy, 1996 
is a good example of this kind of pharmaceutical policy. It stresses the use of generics as a 
way of making drugs more affordable (see para 4 particularly), notes that procurement of 
drugs ‗will aim at securing the lowest available prices for products of defined specifications‘, 
and, while preferring local manufactures, notes that the government will ‗reserve the right to 
consider procurement on the international market, which includes the option of parallel 
importation and purchasing on the international generic market.‘ (at para 6.2). 
165
 Hunt ‗Report of the Special Rapporteur‘ para 35.  
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 Yamin ‗Not just a tragedy‘ at 327. 
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essential medicines, pharmaceutical strategies and policies are crucial steps towards 
making essential medicines such as ARVs available. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
ability to issue compulsory licences is extremely important for keeping prices low. 
Not only does this enable the state to procure cheaper drugs directly from generic 
manufactures, but it also enables the state to negotiate better prices with originator 
companies, which are often willing to offer substantial discounts when faced with 
generic competition.
169
 States must ensure that they retain sufficient IP policy space 
within which to establish suitable pharmaceutical policies, so that they are able to 
meet this immediate and non-derogable core obligation.
170
 
The minimum core obligation to establish a pharmaceutical policy accords 
with the Developing Country Group‘s demands at the Doha talks: they demanded 
confirmation that TRIPS flexibilities allowed them to establish national health care 
programmes to respond to the HIV/AIDS crisis and to procure generic drugs from 
reliable sources of their choosing at the lowest possible prices. They based this 
demand on their public health care needs, and on TRIPS Articles 7 and 8. What they 
did not do, however, was link these demands to the non-derogable minimum core 
obligations arising from the ICESCR. 
Tripartite typology 
General Comment 14 uses the ‗tripartite typology‘ to demonstrate that the 
right to health imposes three kinds of obligations: obligations to respect, to protect 
and to fulfil.
171
 The tripartite typology is widely regarded as a valuable way of 
outlining duties, establishing accountability, and identifying violations of all kinds of 
human rights: civil, political, social, and economic.
172
 Given the historically 
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 CIPR ‗Health‘ at 42; May & Sell IPR History at 170. 
170
 This pharmaceutical policy is also linked to the minimum core obligation ‗to adopt and 
implement a national health care strategy … addressing the health concerns of the whole 
population‘ (See CESCR General Comment 14 para 43(f)) and the ‗priority obligation‘ to 
‗take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases.‘ (CESCR 
General comment 14 para 44(c)). In terms of the ICESCR, states have obligations to control 
the spread of HIV/AIDS and to provide treatment to those infected. These obligations should 
influence government policy regarding patents and imports. 
171
 CESCR General Comment 14 para 33. 
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controversial and uncertain nature of economic and social rights, the typology has 
been especially important in this context.
173
 
The tripartite typology was initially suggested by Henry Shue in his influential 
work Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy, and was given 
broader exposure through Asbjørn Eide‘s reports as UN Special Rapporteur.
174
 The 
typology has been especially valuable in demonstrating the similarity between so-
called ‗negative‘ civil and political rights and ‗positive‘ social and economic rights, 
showing that every right entails similar correlative duties (to respect, protect, and 
fulfil), giving rise to both ‗negative‘ and ‗positive‘ obligations.
175
 
In general, the obligation to respect means that the state should ‗not interfere 
with or impair … declared rights … The broad idea is not to worsen an individual‘s 
situation by depriving that person of the enjoyment of a declared right.‘
176
 The 
obligation to protect requires the state to ‗take positive action to safeguard against 
intrusive and harmful action by third parties.‘
177
 The obligation to fulfil requires the 
state ‗to take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other 
measures toward the full realization of such rights.‘
178
  As developed by Steiner and 
Alston, an important aspect of the broader ‗duty to fulfil‘ is the ‗duty to provide goods 
and services to satisfy rights.‘
179
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 Leckie ‗Violations‘ at 91. 
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 Felice ‗Globalized economy‘ at 568. See also Eide et al Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and Koch ‗Trichotomies?‘ at 84. 
175
 Steiner & Alston International Human Rights at 181. 
176
 Ibid at 182. 
177
 Sepúlveda Obligations at 165, or as worded in the Maastricht Guidelines para 6, the 
obligation to protect ‗requires States to prevent violations of such rights by third parties.‘ 
178
 Maastricht Guidelines para 6.  
179
 Steiner & Alston International Human Rights at 183. See also Hunt, who quotes the 
definition used by Scott and Macklem: ‗to provide food, housing, health, and education … to 
those in society without the means to provide for themselves.‘ (Hunt Reclaiming at 33, 
quoting Scott and Macklem ‗Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? Social 
rights in a new South African Constitution‘ (1992) 141 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1 at 20). 
Various academic writers have developed alternative or complementary typologies. Steiner 
and Alston, for example, propose five levels of state obligation (Steiner & Alston 
International Human Rights at 182-184): They distinguish duties (a) to respect the rights of 
others; (b) to create institutional machinery essential to the realization of rights (which would 
contribute to the respect, protection, and fulfilment of rights as set out in the traditional 
scheme); (c) to protect rights/prevent violations; (d) to provide goods and services to satisfy 
rights (a more precise and ‗meaty‘ version of the traditional duty to fulfil); and (e) to promote 
rights with a view to changing public consciousness (emphasizing something that the 













As explored in more detail below, a very important feature of the tripartite 
typology is its ability to identify obligations of states not only to their own citizens 
and residents but to people living in foreign states. Recognizing that developed states 
have ICESCR obligations to people living in developing countries is fundamental to 
using the ICESCR as a countering tool during international negotiations. 
Right to essential medicines within the tripartite typology  
Obligations of States to their own residents 
Obligation of respect  
The obligation of respect requires states to refrain from interfering directly or 
indirectly with the right to health of people within their own territory.
180
 Examples of 
direct interference include denying or limiting equal access to health services to all 
people (including, for example, prisoners and illegal immigrants); enforcing 
discriminatory health policies; or applying coercive medical treatments (unless in 
certain exceptional circumstances such as the control of infectious diseases). Other 




                                                                                                                                            
independent right of its own) (see Sepúlveda Obligations at 166). Sepúlveda notes that there 
is no consensus on precisely what the duties to ‗respect‘, ‗protect‘ and ‗fulfil‘ entail, and that 
to some extent this is specific to the rights in question.
 
(Sepúlveda Obligations at 157 and 
205). She also points out that steps taken with a view to meeting one category of obligation, 
for example to protect the right, might simultaneously serve to respect and fulfil the right.
 
(at 
166 and 205). Thus, the typology is essentially a useful analytical tool (at 170). Like the 
‗minimum core‘ tool, the tripartite typology has met with some jurisprudential criticism. 
Koch, for example,  welcomes its role in overcoming the old negative/positive dichotomy, 
showing that both ‗kinds‘ of rights give rise to similar correlative duties, and confirming that 
all human rights are indivisible, interrelated and interdependent, but wonders if still ‗serves as 
a useful tool.‘(Koch ‗Trichotomies?‘ at 82). She notes that the various categories are not 
watertight and that it sometimes difficult to characterize actions as ‗respect‘ ‗fulfil‘ or 
‗protect‘ respectively: ‗confronted with the complexity of real life the various obligations are 
hard to distinguish from one another.‘(Koch ‗Trichotomies?‘ at 92). She argues that if, like 
the CESCR, one essentially wants to ‗have it both ways – i.e. insist on making use of the 
typology and at the same time accept a blurred picture – one has to face the possibility that 
the typology loses some of its applicability as an analytical tool.‘ (at 93). 
180
 CESCR General Comment 14 para 33. 
181
 paras 34, 50. See also Hunt Reclaiming at 131. A Brazilian incident illustrates a violation 
through a failure to respect: the authorities built a highway through a remote area, allowing 
access to people bearing infectious diseases, but failed to provide adequate medical assistance 
to the local people (Watchirs ‗Human rights approach to HIV/AIDS‘ at 109, citing The 
Yanomami Case, Case 7615, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Res No 12.85, 













Paragraphs 48 to 50 of General Comment 14 are of particular relevance to the 
right to essential medicines. Paragraph 48 notes that violations can occur through ‗the 
adoption of legislation or policies that are manifestly incompatible with pre-existing 
domestic or international legal obligations in relation to the right to health.‘
182
 
Paragraph 50 adds that violations of the obligation to respect include ‗the adoption of 
laws or policies that interfere with the enjoyment of any of the components of the 
right to health,‘
183
 and notes particularly that states violate the obligation of respect if 
they fail to take their health-related obligations into account when entering into 
agreements with other states, international organizations, or transnational 
corporations.
184
 Elsewhere, the Committee has confirmed that ‗any intellectual 
property regime that makes it more difficult for a State to comply with its core 
obligations in relations to health, food, education, especially, or any other right set out 




As discussed above, states have a minimum core obligation to adopt 
pharmaceutical policies designed to secure listed essential medicines at affordable 
prices, and they must ensure that they retain sufficient IP policy space in which to do 
so. Beyond policy, states also have a minimum core obligation to actually provide 
essential medicines to their residents. Resource constraints may make it impossible 
for them to provide universal access immediately, but they will violate their 
obligations of respect if they adopt policies that actively impede access to essential 
medicines (for example, policies making access to generic drugs more difficult). 
It appears that in terms of General Comment 14, entering into multilateral 
agreements that impede the state‘s ability to provide essential medicines or adopt 
suitable pharmaceutical policies (or interpreting existing treaties in ways which have 
this effect) should be regarded as a violation of the state‘s duty to respect the right to 
health. Some interpretations of TRIPS require states to adopt patent and parallel 
import laws that might ‗interfere with the enjoyment of [a] … component of the right 
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 And which thereby interfere with peoples‘ right to health. (CESCR General Comment 14 
para 48). 
183



















 notably the core right to essential medicines.
187
 New patent laws adopted 
in putative compliance with TRIPS could increase prices and thus impede access to 
medicines by making essential medications unaffordable for many people. Patent laws 
of this kind would have precisely the opposite effect to the pharmaceutical policies 
that states have a non-derogable obligation to implement, and are therefore a violation 
of the duty to respect the right to health.
188
 Similarly, if a government abandons 
pharmaceutical strategies intended to control the price of essential medicines (for 
example, compulsory licensing or parallel importation) this would be a retrogressive 
measure, and thus a prima facie violation of its obligations.
189
 
The TRIPS exception clauses give states enough flexibility to honour their 
commitments both to TRIPS and to human rights treaties such as the ICESCR. Failure 
to take advantage of these exceptions – or entering into new TRIPS-plus treaties – 
with the result that governments cannot pursue pharmaceutical strategies designed to 
procure or manufacture affordable essential medicines and make them available to 
their residents, violates the obligation to respect the right to health. States violate their 
duty of respect when they implement strategies and policies that have the opposite 
effect, for example, when they enforce stringent patent protection that makes essential 
medicines unaffordable, particularly to the poor, or when they actively prevent the 
manufacture, import or provision of generic drugs to those who need them.
190
 A state 
which actively impedes ‗access to AIDS drugs that would otherwise be available‘ in 
these ways, is in clear violation of its obligations to respect.
191
  
Obligation to protect 
The state has a duty to implement a pharmaceutical strategy aimed at making 
essential medicines affordable. One aspect of this is a duty to protect the accessibility 
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 CESCR General Comment 14 para 50. 
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 para 43(d). 
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 Cf Musungu ‗Right to health‘ at 307; Yamin ‗Not just a tragedy‘ at 353; Weissbrodt & 
Schoff ‗Human rights approach‘ at 4; Ovett ‗Access to medicines‘ at 185. 
189
 Ovett ‗Access to medicines‘ at 185; Yamin ‗Not just a tragedy‘ at 354.  In the Inter-
American human rights system, regressive measures such as price increases for essential 
medications are a prima facie violation of Article 26 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights. (Yamin ‗Not just a tragedy‘ at 354). Article 26 provides that States parties should take 
measures towards the progressive achievement of the economic, social, educational, scientific 
and social standards set out in the Charter of the Organization of American States. 
190
 Ovett ‗Access to medicines‘ at 185. 
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and affordability of medicines from infringement by third parties such as foreign 
states or transnational corporations.
192
 General Comment 14 confirms that this 
obligation includes the duty to ‗ensure that privatization of the health sector does not 
constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health 
facilities, goods and services … to control the marketing of medical equipment and 
medicines by third parties … [and to] ensure that third parties do not limit people‘s 
access to health-related …services.‘
193
 
A state violates its duty to protect when it fails to control or regulate the 
actions of ‗other entities‘ that infringe peoples‘ access to health.
194
 This includes 
failing to regulate the activities of corporations, which ‗[violate] the health of 
others.‘
195
 In paragraph 51, the Committee gives such examples as the manufacture of 
dangerous products like tobacco or medicines of dubious quality.
196
 Yamin argues 
that paragraph 51 could be interpreted as obliging the state to pr tect people from the 
overpricing of essential medicines: ‗Just as the state would be expected to take action 
against a private corporation that was killing people through tainted medications, so 
too must the state party assume responsibility for protecting the public‘s access to 
affordable medications on a non-discriminatory basis.‘
197
 The state thus has an 
obligation to prevent anti-competitive behaviour that leads to overpriced drugs. 
Yamin argues that the state has an obligation to issue compulsory licences for the 
production of generic medicines if on-patent prices are excessive.
198
 This would help 
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 Yamin ‗Not just a tragedy‘ at 355. See also Ovett ‗Access to medicines‘ at 185 for a 
similar view. Yamin supports this by analogy to the Ogoni Case, where the African 
Commission on Human Rights held that the Nigerian government had failed in its duty to 
protect its citizens ‗from damaging acts … perpetrated by private parties.‘ (Social and 
Economic Rights Action Center v Nigeria, Communication 155/96 (African Commission on 
Human & People‘s Rights, Oct 2001) [Ogoni Case] para 57. In particular, the government 
had failed to protect people from the acts of the oil companies, whose destruction of 
Ogoniland farms and countryside infringed the Ogonis‘ right to health and to a satisfactory 
environment, and indeed threatened the general survival of the Ogoni people. (Ogoni Case 
paras 50, 52, 58 and 67). 
198
 Yamin ‗Not just a tragedy‘ at 355.  Compulsory licences have been granted on such 
grounds in both the United States and Europe. (Love ‗Recent examples‘). Reichman argues 
that ‗if a patentee  ―refuses to grant licenses on reasonable terms and thereby hampers 













ensure ‗the equitable distribution of health facilities, goods and services‘ between the 
wealthy and the disadvantaged, and ‗the right of access to health facilities, goods and 
services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized 
groups.‘ These are listed as core obligations in General Comment 14.
199
 
Yamin argues that where excessive pricing practices of pharmaceutical 
companies impair or reduce access to medicines, the state‘s failure to issue 
compulsory licences or take other measures to obtain the medicines at affordable 
prices would ‗presumptively constitute a violation of the state‘s obligations to protect 
the right to health.‘
200
 She uses the ‗access gap theory‘ developed by Sean Flynn of 
the Consumer Project on Technology to identify the kinds of commercial practices 
against which the state has a duty to protect the public, for example, where the 
number of people who need access to medicine to prolong their lives or to improve 
their health significantly exceeds those with access to the drug.
201
 
Earlier, I discussed Brazil‘s threat to issue compulsory licences for Nelfinavir 
and Efavirenz when dissatisfied by the prices offered by originator companies Roche 
and Merck. Under General Comment 14 paragraph 51, it could be argued that the 
state has a duty of protection to adopt this kind of negotiating position to protect its 
populace against inflated monopoly pricing. This is an important part of its 
pharmaceutical strategy.
202
 In theory, TRIPS provides enough flexibility for this, but 
the United States has tried to prevent states from exercising it and to close this policy 
space altogether through various TRIPS-plus agreements. States must resist these 
pressures to avoid violating their duty to protect. 
                                                                                                                                            
the patented product, or demands excessive prices for such products,‖‘ compulsory licences 
should be awarded (Reichman ‗Universal minimum standards‘ at 355, quoting  GHC 
Bodenhausen). In Chapter 5, I pointed out that the drug companies would not suffer financial 
prejudice (and indeed may maximise profits) through differential pricing.  If these medicines 
are regarded as ‗essential‘, full on-patent prices may be considered ‗excessive‘ in certain 
markets, especially as the drug companies do not need to sell at these prices. They could 
make us much money – indeed, even more – if they sold more drugs to more people at prices 
they can afford. Not only is this a sensible business practice, but it also has the result of 
making essential medicines available to those who need them. (CIPR ‗Health‘ at 41. See also 
Danzon and Towse ‗Differential pricing‘ at 455; Watal ‗Differential pricing‘ at 12). 
199
 CESCR General Comment 14 para 43. 
200
 Yamin ‗Not just a tragedy‘ at 356. 
201
 Ibid, building on Flynn ‗Legal strategies‘ at 544. 
202
 See the discussions in Chapters 4 and 5 on the potentially devastating effect of  monopoly 
prices on the Brazilian Aids Programme on the one hand, versus the negligible negative 













Obligation to fulfil  
General Comment 14 confirms that the ICESCR imposes a minimum core 
obligation on states to ensure universal access to essential medications.
203
 The state 
has an obligation to prevent, treat, and control diseases, for example, by using 
available technologies and other appropriate strategies of infectious disease control, as 
mandated in Article 12(2)(b).
204
 Article 12(2)(c) of the Covenant provides for the 
‗right to health facilities, goods and services‘ which, the Committee stresses, requires 
the ‗creation of conditions‘ assuring that everyone has access to medical services, 
‗appropriate treatment‘ and ‗the provision of essential drugs.‘
205
 
General Comment 14 lists provision of essential medicines as a ‗minimum 
core‘ obligation from which no derogation is permitted.
206
 Another no -derogable 
obligation is ‗to ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a 
non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups.‘
207
 States 
are thus required to make essential medication available at affordable prices, avoiding 
discrimination on the basis of personal wealth.
208
 Indeed, ‗non-discrimination and 
equal treatment are among the most critical components of the right to health.‘
209
 
Within a human rights context, non-discrimination implies ‗a particular preoccupation 
with those who are disadvantaged, vulnerable and living in poverty.‘
210
  A failure to 




Although the rights set out in the ICESCR are subject to ‗progressive 
realization,‘ states not in a position to fulfil all the rights immediately nevertheless 
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 CESCR General Comment 14 para 12 and para 43(d). 
204
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 para 43(d). 
207
 para 44(a). 
208
 Wojahn ‗Conflict of rights‘ at 473. Note that this applies equally to poor people in 
developed countries. The UN Commission on Human Rights has called on UN member states 
to pursue policies which would make medicines available ‗to all without discrimination, 
including the most vulnerable sectors of the population‘ and make them affordable to all 
‗including socially disadvantaged groups.‘(Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemics 
such as HIV/AIDS: Resolution 2002/32).  
209
 Hunt ‗Report of the Special Rapporteur‘ para 25. 
210
 Ibid paras 25-26; Gross ‗Right to health‘ at 306; Chapman ‗Violations approach‘ at 44. It 
should be stressed that developed state governments also have an obligation to make essential 
drugs available to poor people living in their jurisdictions 
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 Taking steps toward the goal of universal access to medicines includes 
adopting a national health policy designed to achieve the goal.
213
 The policy should 
demonstrate sufficient expenditure on health problems and a reasonable distribution 
of resources on health issues relative to other state expenditures.
214
 Within the health 
sector, the state should demonstrate reasonable allocation of resources toward the 
needs of the poor relative to other sectors of the population, and reasonable 
expenditures on the control and treatment of pandemics such as AIDS.
215
 Weighing 
up such relative expenditures is extremely difficult, especially where resources are 




As noted above, these minimum core obligations include the provision of 
essential drugs as defined by the WHO, including some relatively expensive 
antiretroviral medicines. Some states have sufficient resources to implement wide-
ranging antiretroviral programmes, the Brazilian HIV/AIDS Programme being the 
quintessential example. Although Brazil is a relatively affluent developing state, with 
comparatively small numbers of infected people to treat,
217
 its financial ability to 
provide treatment is dependent on its pharmaceutical policies, and on its success in 
negotiating prices with foreign drug companies.
218
  
An appropriate pharmaceutical policy is a crucial step toward fulfilling the 
obligation to provide access to essential medicines. The WHO has historically been 
reluctant to include expensive on-patent medications on its model lists of essential 
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 CESCR General Comment 14 paras 30-31. States that are unwilling, rather than truly 
unable, to fulfil their obligations to the right to health violate their ICESCR obligations (para 
47). 
213
 CESCR General Comment 14 para 36.  
214
 These include other ICESCR obligations such as education and housing. 
215
 CESCR General Comment 14 paras 16, 17 and 19 particularly. 
216
 Gross ‗Right to health‘ at 297. With reference to the question of available resources, 
Yamin points out that antiretroviral drug treatment is often cost-effective. As held by 
Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica it may be cheaper for the state to provide ARVs than 
cope with the economic consequences of widespread illness and death (Alvarez v Caja 
Costarricense de Seguro Social Exp. 5778-V-97, No 5934-97 (Sala Constitucional de la Corte 
Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica) cited by Yamin ‗Not just a tragedy‘ at 362-3). Nattrass 
has made a similar argument in the South African context. (Nattrass Moral Economy). 
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 ‗t Hoen ‗Seattle to Doha‘; Galvão ‗Brazil and access to HIV/AIDS drugs.‘ 
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 The full on-patent prices of the HIV/AIDS medications now listed are 
indeed unaffordable for developing countries, and it would be futile for the CESCR to 
identify the provision of these expensive drugs at these prices as a non-derogable 
obligation. 
As noted earlier, however, the WHO has listed these expensive therapies on 
the understanding that states will pursue pharmaceutical strategies designed to make 
them more affordable by using policy mechanisms such as generic manufacture and 
import, parallel importation, differential pricing, and price negotiation with drug 
companies.
220
 As part of their obligation to fulfil, states must take steps to make 
essential medicines available, accessible, and ‗affordable to all.‘
221
  In this regard, the 
crucial, non-derogable aspect of the duty to fulfil the right to essential medicines is 
the duty to establish a pharmaceutical policy aimed at controlling the prices of 
essential medicines. States violate their obligation to fulfil if they fail to adopt and 
implement suitable pharmaceutical policies. The CESCR makes it clear that if signing 
TRIPS or other IP agreements makes it impossible for the state to pursue such 
pharmaceutical policies, the state is in violation of its ICESCR obligations.
222
 
States should not take action or adopt laws or policies which make it more 
difficult to develop strategies such as the manufacture or import of generics. They 
should not interpret or implement TRIPS in a protectionist manner, or sign bilateral 
‗TRIPS-plus‘ treaties which impede the adoption of pharmaceutical strategies of these 
kinds.
223
   
Thus, an important aspect of the state‘s duty to fulfil its obligation to provide 
essential medicines relates to its negotiation of foreign treaties. In General Comment 
17, the CESCR again emphasized that ‗any intellectual property regime that makes it 
more difficult for a State to comply with its core obligations in relations to health, 
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food, education, especially, or any other right set out in the Covenant, is inconsistent 
with the legally binding obligations of the State party.‘
224
 
Summary and Conclusion: Duties of states to their own residents 
Through General Comment 14, the CESCR has shown that states have binding 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health set out in Article 12 of the 
ICESCR. These include the non-discriminatory provision of essential medicines 
(including certain antiretrovirals) as a non-derogable minimum core right. In this 
regard, states have immediate and non-derogable duties to establish appropriate 
pharmaceutical strategies. In order to meet these obligations and avoid violating their 
Covenant commitments, states must ensure that they retain sufficient IP policy space 
to adopt appropriate health and pharmaceutical policies, and procure reliable supplies 
of essential medicines at the lowest possible prices. The adoption of IP laws that 
restrict pharmaceutical policy options, result in higher prices and impede access to 
otherwise available therapies violates the obligation of respect, as does entry into 
treaties that mandate such IP laws. Failure to retain sufficient policy space to issue 
compulsory licences when anticompetitive pricing by private companies makes 
therapy unaffordable violates the obligation to protect. Failure to retain enough policy 
space to implement pharmaceutical policies aimed at securing a reliable supply of the 
most appropriate drugs at affordable prices violates the obligation to fulfil. It is clear 
that the ICESCR reduces a state‘s IP policy space in a new way – when establishing 
IP policies a state must ensure that these policies do not violate their human rights 
obligations to adopt and implement appropriate pharmaceutical strategies  
Extraterritorial obligations of Third Party ICESCR states 
Do states have extraterritorial treaty obligations? 
The traditional view is that, under most human rights treaties, states‘ 
obligations are limited to their own territories
225
 except where they are able to exert 
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‗effective control‘ over actors in foreign countries.
226
 In the context of the ICCPR, the 
‗effective control doctrine‘ has been used primarily in situations of armed conflict and 
with reference to the control that states are assumed to exert over their military 
forces.
227
 More recently, however, it appears that the ‗effective control‘ doctrine has 
been interpreted more broadly, that extraterritorial obligations are more frequently 
recognized,
228
 and that increasingly, ‗the international bodies responsible for 
scrutinizing compliance with human rights standards have … interpreted those 
obligations as also having an extraterritorial scope.‘
229
 
Coomans and Kamminga argue that jurisdictional concerns are relevant in the 
context of the ICCPR and other treaties that specifically limit their application by 
referring to ‗the territory‘ or ‗jurisdiction.‘ However, the ICESCR has no territorially 
limiting provisions of this kind.
230
 Furthermore, Article 2(1) positively calls on states 
to cooperate in realizing the rights concerned. Thus in the context of the ICESCR the 
‗key question … is not whether states have extraterritorial obligations but … the 
precise nature and content of these obligations.‘
231
 Although the ‗effective control‘ 
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doctrine has been applied to the ICESCR,
232
 it is now generally agreed that, in an era 
of globalization, states have broader extraterritorial ICESCR obligations.
233
 The 
CESCR believes that interpretation and application of the ICESCR should take into 
account the effects of economic globalization.
234
 Increasingly, the actions of one state 
may undermine social and economic rights in foreign territories.
235
 Because 
‗globalization has diminished the ability of all states to control economic outcomes 
that affect the well-being of their citizens,‘
236
 the Covenant needs to ‗reach beyond 
traditional concepts of state sovereignty in order to provide for international solidarity 
and achieve global justice.‘
237
  
Gibney points out that ‗An inescapable consequence‘ of viewing human rights 
protection as restricted to the borders of the acting state is that ‗millions, if not 
billions, of individuals have been left with little human rights protection.‘
238
 
Globalization has powerfully negative effects on the social and economic rights in 
developing countries and on the right to health particularly.
239
 With this in mind, the 
CESCR uses the tripartite typology to identify obligations owed by states parties to 
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Ultimately, the legal foundations of the international human rights obligations 
are found in the UN Charter.
241
 All UN member states have pledged themselves ‗to 
achieve international cooperation in solving international problems … And in 




Article 55 provides:  
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
the United Nations shall promote:  
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development;  
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related 
problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and  
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. 
Article 56 in turn calls for ‗all members pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in co-operation with the Organization‘ to achieve the objectives set out 
in Article 55. 
Obligation to fulfil in foreign states  
Under ICESCR Article 2(1) all member states have the obligation to take steps 
toward the full realization of the ICESCR rights ‗individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical.‘ Some 
argue that this could be interpreted as supplying an extraterritorial obligation to 
provide aid and thus help to fulfil social and economic rights in foreign states.
243
 
Others suggest that while this is a desirable interpretation, particularly under 
conditions of globalization, the question of whether states have transnational 
obligations for the fulfilment of economic and social rights is ‗in a stage of 
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development,‘ still a part of ‗the law ―under construction,‖ that is, the law as it ought 
to be (de lege ferenda).‘
244
  
 This question lies outside of the scope of my own discussion. Nevertheless, 
some aspects of this debate are directly pertinent to the strategic use of human rights. 
As I discuss in the following chapter, some scholars reject a ‗human rights approach‘ 
as a solution to the problems facing the developing world, viewing human rights 
discourse as a continuation of aspects of colonialism, or as insufficiently challenging 
to neoliberalism and globalization. Thus, it is interesting to note that some human 
rights scholars have argued not only that the obligation to provide assistance should 
be further developed, but that extraterritorial fulfilment of economic and social rights 
requires redistribution not only within states but between them.
245
   
Extraterritorial obligation to respect 
I now move on to examine states‘ extraterritorial obligations to respect and 
protect. While it is uncertain to what extent the ICESCR obliges states to provide 
international assistance, it is generally agreed that states have a duty (arising both 




In general international law, states have a clear obligation ‗to refrain from acts, 
omissions, or other measures that result in violations of human rights … in countries 
other than their own.‘
247
 Extraterritorial human rights violations arise when a state ‗is 
in breach of the obligation to respect internationally recognized human rights norms‘ 
arising from treaties, custom or jus cogens.
248
 There is considerable case law 
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It would appear that states also have extraterritorial obligations of respect for 
social and economic rights. Skogly and Gibney argue that ‗Articles 55 and 56 of the 
UN Charter, together with Article 103
250
 provide a clear international duty to respect 
and protect human rights everywhere, while Article 1(3) lists that a purpose of the UN 
is ‗to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights.…‘
251
 Reading these articles together, one can 
conclude that the Charter obliges states to respect social and economic rights in 
foreign states. 
Certainly, this extraterritorial obligation of respect ‗prohibits a state from 
directly interfering with the enjoyment of esc rights by persons in other countries.‘
252
 
This requires, at the very least, that that states do not undertake activities (such as 
dumping dangerous waste) that will result in substantial harm to the social and 
economic rights of people living in foreign states.
253
  
It can be argued that the duty of respect is broader than this narrow example, 
however, and that it should include the indirect violation of social and economic 
rights through international trade and other foreign economic policies.
254
 Indeed, this 
approach is suggested by the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which 
provides that that ‗All states have a duty to conduct their mutual economic relations in 
a manner which takes into account the interests of other countries. In particular, all 
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States should avoid prejudicing the interests of developing countries.‘
255
 In 
Coomans‘s view, this entails an obligation of respect to refrain from activities that 
would have a negative effect on the enjoyment of economic and social rights in 
developing countries.
256
 The CESCR confirms that ‗to comply with their international 
obligations in relation to Article 12, States parties have to respect the enjoyment of 
the right to health in other countries …‘
257
 and that states‘ intellectual property 
policies and trade policies more should therefore not violate this obligation to respect 
the right to health in foreign countries.
258
 The action taken against Brazil and South 
Africa (pressuring them into dropping TRIPS-compliant legislation designed to fulfil 
the right to health) was clearly in violation of this duty of respect.  
 Paragraph 19 of General Comment 14 is clear that under the extraterritorial 
obligation of respect, states parties should ensure that international agreements and 
instruments do not have a negative impact on the right to health in other countries.
259
 
This applies also to states parties‘ actions as members of international organizations 
– states parties have a duty to ensure that the actions of these organizations respect the 
right to health in all parts of the world.
260
  
Paragraph 19 seems to suggest three areas for further discussion: Can the 
conclusion of an international treaty be viewed as a violation of an extraterritorial 
obligation of respect? Do states, as members of international organizations, violate 
their obligations of respect when the organization adopts violating policies? Do 
international organizations themselves have human rights obligations? 
Treaties and trade policies that violate human rights obligations of respect 
In General Comment 14, the CESCR stresses that  
States parties should ensure that the right to health is given due attention 
in international agreements …. In relation to the conclusion of … 
international agreements, States parties should take steps to ensure that 
these instruments do not adversely impact upon the right to health.
261
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It goes on to add that should a state fail  
to take into account its legal obligations regarding the right to health when 
entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with other States, 
international organizations and other entities, such as multinational 
corporations 
 it will violate its obligation to respect the right to health.
262
 
These paragraphs make it clear that when states conclude international 
agreements, they have extraterritorial obligations to respect the right to health.
263
 In 
the context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, states have an obligation to ‗create an 
atmosphere conducive to providing AIDS drugs to the greatest number of people,‘
264
 
and should not enter into treaties which would obstruct the ability of another state to 
provide antiretroviral medications to its residents, or which prevent another state from 
adopting pharmaceutical strategies aimed at procuring these drugs at affordable 
prices. This would be the case if states concluded treaties that prevented the 
manufacture or import of essential generic medicines, or obliged developing states to 
adopt IP policies which made it more difficult to implement HIV/AIDS public health 
programmes. Protectionist interpretations and ways of implementing TRIPS also 
could have these effects, as might TRIPS-plus bilateral treaties, which reduce or 
eliminate TRIPS flexibilities.
265
 If these treaties have a negative impact on the right to 
health in developing countries, they will violate states‘ ICESCR commitments.
266
 
It is a principle of international law that states which have ratified human 
rights treaties violate these treaty commitments if they enter into other treaties which 
are inconsistent with their human rights obligations.
267
 States violate their ICESCR 
obligations if they enter into agreements which prevent them from honouring their 
ICESCR obligations, including the obligation to respect the right to health in foreign 
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countries. States should not, therefore, ratify treaties which oblige them to adopt 
intellectual property policies that infringe upon the right to health of people in other 
countries. Nor should they coerce other states to sign agreements which have the 
effect of violating the right to health of their residents. I will discuss the question of 
potential treaty conflicts in this regard in Chapter 7. 
Responsibility for participation in international organizations 
General Comment 14 states that ‗States parties have an obligation to ensure 
that their actions as members of international organizations take due account of the 
right to health.‘
268
 The Maastricht Guidelines similarly provide that ‗the obligations 
of States to protect economic, social and cultural rights extend also to their 
participation in international organizations. … It is particularly important for States to 
use their influence to ensure that violations do not result from the programmes and 
policies of the organizations of which they are members.‘
269
 Through their 
participation in international organizations, states should ensure that the programmes 
and policies of these organizations take into account ‗issues of economic, social and 
cultural rights, especially when these policies and programmes are implemented in 
countries that lack the resources to resist the pressure brought by international 
institutions on their decision-making affecting economic and social rights.‘
270
 
These statements have part cular relevance to ICESCR states parties that are 
members of the WTO, and thus signatories to the TRIPS Agreement. Those states 
have an obligation to ensure that TRIPS does not impede the right to health of people 
in developing countries. Since almost all WTO member states are also ICESCR states 
parties,
271
 their ICESCR obligations should have played a larger role in the Doha 
discussions. Similarly, most WIPO members are ICESCR state parties;
272
 their 
obligations of respect should have guided them during the recent WIPO Development 
Agenda talks. 
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Skogly has investigated the legal significance of the voting behaviour of 
individual states within international organizations,
273
 basing her argument on the 
obligation of respect and ICESCR Article 2(1).
274
 She argues that 
If these international obligations were to be taken seriously, any 
individual member of the institution would be under an obligation to 
respect human rights in any actions taken through their international 
organization of which it is a member … It would be contrary to the human 
rights obligations of a State if that State supports policies that ultimately 




Coomans uses Article 2(1) to argue that states should be held accountable for 
their behaviour as members of international organizations.
276
 If the policies of 
organizations like the IMF or WTO have negative impacts on countries‘ abilities to 
meet the economic and social rights of their residents, Coomans suggests that states 
which voted in favour of such policies have violated their duty t  respect the 
economic and social rights of the people in those territories.
277
 Similarly, Künnemann 
argues that if the decisions of international organizations are made on the basis of 
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 Skogly Human rights obligations of the World Bank at 134. Her research looked at the 
World Bank and IMF rather than the WTO or WIPO, but the same principles apply in this 
context. 
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 Which provides that ‗Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical.‘ 
275
 The Swedish government adopts this approach in its ‗White Paper on Human Rights in 
Swedish Foreign Policy‘. (Skogly Human rights obligations of the World Bank at 135). The 
Norwegians have a similar White Paper calling for Norway‘s promotion of human rights 
internationally. (Skogly & Gibney ‗Transnational obligations‘ at 785). 
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 Künnemann ‗Extraterritorial application‘ at 215. See also Shelton ‗Human rights in a 
globalized world‘ at 305. Coomans points out, however, that it could be argued that there is 
no legal authority for the claim that states which ‗voted in favour of so-called ―destructive 
acts‖ (in the sense of violating esc rights) may be held responsible for their voting behaviour.‘ 
This is because the ICESCR ‗does not have a jurisdiction clause‘ and the states voting on 
policies do not exercise control over the recipient states nor over the international 
organization itself. This particular qualification applies in the context of organizations like the 
World Bank and IMF where member states do not decide on individual policies and 
programmes. Coomans argues that there is a ‗vacuum of accountability‘ regarding the actions 
and policies of  organizations like the IMF since these organizations ‗yield control to the 
states that contribute financially to the organization, while at the same time states yield 













Narula points out that some states have considerable influence within 
international organizations and are thus ‗capable of influencing the organization to act 
in accordance with international law, as suggested by the Maastricht guidelines.‘
279
 
Those states have an obligation to use their influence to ensure that the organization 
does not adopt violating policies. Künnemann suggests that if less powerful states are 
unable to influence the policies of international organizations, they should resign, ‗as 
they could be forced to breach their obligations under the Covenant.‘
280
 
States participating in international organizations ‗do not leave their human 
rights obligations at the door‘ when they enter the negotiating chamber.
281
 They retain 
their ICESCR obligations to respect social and economic rights everywhere, and 
should not promote or endorse programmes, policies and treaties that impact 
negatively on these rights.
282
 
Obligations of international organizations 
The GFD WIPO Development Agenda proposals argue that, because WIPO is 
a UN agency,
283
 it should support the United Nations‘ development priorities. This 
argument would be more powerful if the GFD insisted that WIPO has an obligation to 
support the United Nations‘ human rights priorities, and should therefore not promote 
policies which violate international human rights treaties such as the ICESCR. 
There has been considerable discussion about whether, as international legal 
actors, international organizations themselves have human rights obligations, separate 
from the obligations of their individual member states.
284
 This is a complex question, 
which differs among organizations depending on their own articles of incorporation 
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 It is a settled principle, however, that international organizations have 
international legal personality,
286
 and are thus subject to international law.
287
 Some 
authors conclude that this includes only those human rights obligations that arise from 
customary international law.
288
 Organizations themselves cannot sign or ratify the 
major human rights conventions, such as the ICCPR and ICESCR, because treaties 
are open only to states.
289
 
However, the Special Rapporteur on the draft Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations has stated that ‗ … it would be rather difficult to accept that 
international organizations, the vast majority of whose members are State Members of 
the United Nations, could disregard the rules of the Charter.‘
290
 Shelton argues that 
because international organizations  
are entities created by states delegating power to achieve certain goals and 
perform specified functions … it would be surprising if states could 
perform actions collectively through international organizations that the 
states could not lawfully do individually. In other words, if states cannot 
confer more power on international organizations than they themselves 
possess, international organizations are bound to respect human rights 
because all the states that created them are legally required to respect 
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 YILC, 1975 Vol II, Un doc A/CN.4/285 Commentary para 5, as quoted by Skogly Human 
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It appears that the UN special agencies, particularly, should be viewed as 
having obligations under the Charter.
292
 
In the Articles of Agreement between WIPO and the United Nations,
293
 the 
United Nations recognizes WIPO  
as a specialized agency
294
 and as responsible for taking appropriate action 
in accordance with its basic instrument, treaties and agreements 
administered, inter alia for promoting creative intellectual activity and for 
facilitating the transfer of technology related to industrial property to the 




These activities are subject, however, to the competence and responsibilities of 
the United Nations and its organs,‘ including UNCTAD, UNPD and UNESCO.
296
 
Under the UN Charter, all UN special agencies should promote the objectives set out 
in terms of Article 55,
297
 an obligation confirmed in Article 5 of the UN-WIPO 
Agreement.
298
 Under Article 2, WIPO agrees to ‗co-operate in whatever measures 
may be necessary to make co-ordination of the policies and activities of the United 
Nations … fully effective.‘
299
 On this basis, the GFD conclude that WIPO is obliged 
to support the UN‘s development policies and activities.
300
 
Article 55 provides for ‗international cooperation in solving international 
problems … And in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms ….‘
301
 In General Comment 2, the CESCR confirmed that all 
UN special agencies should support the UN‘s international development and 
assistance projects, not only in terms of the Charter, but also in terms of Article 22 of 
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 It stressed the importance of incorporating a human rights dimension 
into all activities, with particular emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights. 
While the special agencies cannot formally be states parties of the Covenant, they 




The CESCR recommends that all UN special agencies ‗specifically recognize 
the intimate relationship which should be established between development activities 
and efforts to promote respect for … economic, social and cultural rights ….‘
304
 They 
should consider drawing up ‗human rights impact‘ statements;
305
 the training of their 
staff and personnel ‗should include a component dealing with human rights standards 
and principles‘;
306
 and in specific projects ‗every effort should be made … to ensure 
that the rights contained in the Covenants are duly taken into account.‘
307
 
The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health focuses primarily on the 
responsibilities of WTO members. However, he does mention that the WTO 
secretariat and other staff ‗have international human rights responsibilities,‘
308
 
stressing that international organizations must ‗take steps to ensure that their 
secretariats understand the main features of human rights law‘ and that their activities 
should ‗be respectful of members‘ national and international human rights 
obligations.‘
309
 He further encourages organizations like WIPO, the WTO and WHO 
to ‗include advice on TRIPS flexibilities in their technical assistance programmes,‘
310
 
thereby ensuring that TRIPS is implemented in a human rights-compliant manner. 
It appears that the GFD could have based their case in part on the human 
rights obligations of the UN and its agencies. In addition to proposing that WIPO 
integrate a ‗development‘ dimension into all its activities, they could have insisted 
that, as a UN agency, WIPO is obliged to integrate a ‗human rights‘ dimension into 
all its activities, ensuring that these activities respect economic and social rights.  
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Extraterritorial obligation to protect 
General Comment 14 asserts that all members of society, including ‗the 
private business sector‘ have responsibilities for the realization of the right to health. 
The Committee does not explain this further, but it does call on states parties to 
‗provide … an environment which facilitates the discharge of these 
responsibilities.‘
311
 More particularly, the Committee makes it clear that ‗to comply 
with their international obligations in relation to Article 12,‘ states parties must 
‗prevent third parties from violating the right in other countries if they are able to 
influence these third parties by way of legal or political means.‘
312
 It appears then that 
states parties with legal authority over pharmaceutical corporations should use their 
authority to prevent the companies from violating the right to health through 
needlessly excessive pricing policies.  
In practice, transnational corporations, with the support and backing of their 
home governments, have tried to prevent developing states ‗from exercising their 
legal rights to undertake parallel importing of drugs from cheaper sources of origin or 
to engage in compulsory licensing so that their peoples can have access to modern 
essential treatments.‘
313
 These actions obstruct developing states‘ pharmaceutical 
strategies and violate the right to health of those living in developing countries. 
While private corporations have become increasingly powerful in their own 
right,
314
 it must be remembered that ‗virtually every claim against private actors can 
be re-characterized as one against a public actor,‘
315
 and that states ‗retain the primary 
responsibility‘ for human rights.‘
316
 It is a well-established principle that states may 
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be held liable for the actions of private parties which harm or infringe the human 
rights of private parties within the state‘s territory,
317
 and it has been held that states 
may also be held accountable for the activities of private parties acting in foreign 




According to the Maastricht Guidelines the obligation to protect ‗includes the 
State‘s responsibility to ensure that private entities or individuals, including 
transnational corporations over which they exercise jurisdiction, do not deprive 
individuals of their economic, social and cultural rights. States are responsible for 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights that result from their failure to 
exercise due diligence in controlling the behaviour of such non-state actors.‘
319
 
It is clear that under present conditions of globalization, the activities of 
powerful transnational corporations may result in widespread human rights 
violations.
320
 This is a matter of growing concern to human rights activists and to the 
United Nations.
321
  To the extent possible, ‗home states‘ of large pharmaceutical 
companies should attempt to control the activities of international corporations 
through legislation and trade policy, for example by requiring reasonable market-
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 In practice, developed states have adopted the opposite 
approach.  Rather than trying to control the activities of the pharmaceutical industry 
and mandate competitive and reasonable
323
 pricing internationally, they have allowed 
the pharmaceutical companies to shape international trade policy in ways favouring 
the interests of patent-holders over the needs of the poor.
324
 
Summary and Conclusion: Extraterritorial duties 
General Comment 14 makes clear that states have extraterritorial obligations 
under the right to health, including the obligation of respect, which is particularly 
important for my thesis. States must ensure that their economic policies do not impair 
access to essential medicines in other states, particularly in developing countries, and 
do not prevent other states from adopting pharmaceutical strategies appropriate to 
their circumstances. This obligation extends to their participation in international 
organizations, to the bilateral and multilateral treaties they ratify or pressure other 
states to ratify, and to the interpretation and implementation of such treaties.  
Balancing rights within the human rights system: owners vs 
users 
I have argued that the internal ‗IP balance‘ arguments employed by 
developing countries in negotiations are ineffective because they are unable to supply 
a bottom line indicating when the social costs of IP protection become unacceptable. 
In this chapter, I have shown that IP policies and treaties which impact negatively on 
the right to essential medicines violate the right to health and should not be adopted. 
This supplies the necessary bottom line. 
Another advantage of shifting to the human rights regime is that it recognizes 
the rights of both IP producers and IP users, and is thus better equipped to determine 
an equitable ‗balance‘ than the IP regime, which recognizes and protects only IP-
owners‘ rights.  
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In the next section, I will explore how the human rights of creators and 
inventors protected in the ICESCR can be balanced with other important rights such 
as the right to essential medicines. 
Rights of individuals: authors‟ and inventors‟ rights 
The CESCR‘s recent General Comment 17 examines Article 15(1)(c): The 
right of everyone ‗to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is an author.‘  
Article 15(1)(c) has sometimes been understood as providing a ‗right to 
intellectual property,‘ protecting the rights of ‗IP-owners.‘
325
 General Comment 17 
does not take this approach, but instead states that Article 15(1)(c) does not provide a 
‗human right‘ to ‗intellectual property.‘
326
  While it confirms the human rights of 
authors and inventors
327
 to protection of their moral and material interests in their 
inventions and creations, it stresses that these inalienable human rights are not the 
same thing as the alienable and temporary private law rights awarded through the 
intellectual property system.
328
 They are not intellectual property rights:  
Human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitles 
belonging to individuals and, under certain circumstances, groups of 
individuals and communities. Human rights are fundamental as they are 
inherent to the human person as such ….
329
  
This means that the state does not award them, nor take them away. The 
human right in Article 15(1)(c)  
safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations and 
between people, communities, or other groups and their collective cultural 
heritage, as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to 
enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living.
330
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In contrast, intellectual property rights are primarily instrumental – their main 
function is to encourage creation and invention.
331
 Unlike human rights, they are 
temporary, can be revoked, licensed, or transferred to others.
332
 In practice, they 
‗primarily protect business and corporate interests,‘ and belong to companies rather 
than to individual human beings.
333
 The Committee makes it clear that only natural 
persons are protected by the human rights regime, and for this reason the ‗intellectual 
property rights‘ of corporations do not fall within the scope of Article 15(1)(c).
334
 
Private law intellectual property rights are not human rights, yet they may 
function as means for protecting the human rights of creators and inventors.
335
 
However, they are not the only way, nor necessarily the best way, to protect these 
public law human rights.
336
 The CESCR stresses that protecting authors‘ and 
inventors‘ rights need not necessarily take the form of an intellectual property 
system.
337
 For example, scientists‘ material interests could be (and often are) 
protected, not by copyright and patent, but through employment at state research 
institutes, or through the payment of one-off prizes for valuable scientific discoveries 
or contributions.
338
 Article 15(1)(c) does not ‗provide a prima facie justification for 
patent laws.‘
339
 Despite the Committee‘s clear statements on this issue, however, 
some commentators note that it also makes several comments giving the impression 
that it has a traditional IP system in mind. Its references to ‗unauthorized use‘ and 
‗compensation‘, for example, are borrowed from the existing IP regime.
340
 
Article 15(1)(c) protects the moral and material rights of inventors and 
creators. In General Comment 17, the CESCR interprets ‗moral rights‘ as the 
‗conventional‘ moral interests (the droit moral in the French tradition) that are 
recognized, for example, in the Berne Convention Article 6 bis. These include the 
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right of attribution and to ‗object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification 
of, or other derogatory action‘ in relation to their creations or inventions ‗which 
would be prejudicial to their honour and reputation.‘
341
 In this regard, the CESCR 
‗stresses the importance of recognizing the value of scientific, literary and artistic 
productions as expressions of the personality of their creator ….‘
342
  
Moral rights have a relatively recent history and are usually linked with the 





Their jurisprudential or philosophical source has been the subject of considerable 
debate. Why should an author, for example, have these moral rights with regard to a 
written work? In what way can a written work or invention be associated with the 
creator‘s personality? Not all cultures and traditions recognize creations and 
inventions as the products of individuals, with many communities tending to view 
them instead as products of and for the benefit of the community.
344
 
However, the moral rights question is not particularly relevant for this 
discussion: it is not under consideration in the WIPO Development Agenda 
discussions,
345
 and there appear to be few situations where the recognition and 
protection of moral rights would interfere with the wider communities‘ access to 
inventions and creations. 
Far more contentious is the question of the creators‘ or inventors‘ ‗material 
interests.‘ As noted earlier, the Committee distinguishes these from ‗intellectual 
property‘ rights. It links authors‘ and inventors‘ material interests to other parts of the 
ICESCR: Article 6 protecting the right to earn a living by work one freely chooses, 
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Article 7(a) providing for adequate remuneration, and Article 11 providing for an 
adequate standard of living.
346
  
The Committee stresses that the protection of material interests in Article 
15(1)(c) ‗seeks to encourage the active contribution of creators to the arts and 
sciences and to the progress of society as a whole‘;
347
 it is thus intrinsically linked to 
the other parts of Article 15.
348
 The Article should be understood as a whole, meaning 
that each part is reinforced, but also limited.
349
  
General Comment 17 has a similar structure to other general comments, 
focusing on minimum core rights, as well as on specific obligations to respect, protect 
and fulfil, and the identification of violations. It identifies the protection of the 
author‘s or inventor‘s moral interests and adequate standard of living as a minimum 
core obligation.
350
 One of the obligations to protect is ‗to ensure the effective 
protection of the moral and material interests of authors against infringement by third 
parties,‘
351
 and part of the obligation to fulfil is to establish an administrative, legal or 
other system to ensure that authors can claim the moral and material interests in their 
productions and seek redress if these interests are violated by others.
352
  
Achieving a balance between inventors‟ rights and the rights of others 
Some commentators are sceptical about using a ‗human rights‘ approach to 
protect users‘ rights to the products of the IP system, because this would also 
recognize authors‘ and inventors‘ rights (as in Article 15(1)(c)), and establish an 
additional barrier to distribution.
353
 The ‗pro-protectionist‘ camp sometimes asserts 
‗the right to intellectual property‘ as a sort of inviolable property right that can be 
used defensively against those seeking access. Cornides, for example, argues that ‗… 
the TRIPS Agreement could not have been concluded had its partisans not … been 
able to use human rights as an argument speaking in favour of stronger (and 
                                                 
346
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worldwide) intellectual property protection. For them, intellectual property is 
property, and IPR infringement is theft.‘
 354
 
However, Article 15(1)(c) is not a ‗right to intellectual property.‘ On the 
whole, the major regional human rights instruments do not protect ‗intellectual 
property‘ as such, although there are exceptions, such as the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union.
355
  
Because of its temporary and non-rivalrous
356
 nature and its atypical form of 
‗exclusivity‘
357
 there is some doubt about whether ‗intellectual property‘ even 
qualifies as ‗property‘;
358
 some writers conclude that, technically, it does not.
359
 Most 
agree, however, that IP owners have some kind of property right in their patents, and 
intellectual property is considered to be a type of ‗possession‘ or property in many 
national and regional legal systems.
360
 
While the CESCR distinguishes Article 15(1)(c) rights from ‗intellectual 
property rights,‘ stressing that ‗It is important not to equate intellectual property rights 
with the human right recognized in Article 15,‘
361
 it also links Article 15(1)(c) to ‗the 
right to own property alone as well as in association with others‘ provided in Article 
17 of the UDHR as well as in other human rights instruments.
362
 This raises some 
doubts about its apparent ‗non-recognition‘ of Article 15(1)(c) as a property right. 
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But even if the Article 15(1)(c) rights are related to the right to property, they 
are not inviolable. The international human rights documents that protect property 
rights typically also provide for their limitation in the public interest.
363
 National 
constitutions, too, subordinate private property rights to the public interest.
364
 The 
UDHR, however, emphasizes that ‗no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
property,‘
365
 and property right limitation clauses in regional and national documents 
not only have certain procedural requirements,
366
 but usually also provide for some 
kind of ‗just compensation‘ in the event of expropriation.
367
  
General Comment 17 confirms that Article 15(1)(c) rights may be limited in 
order to give effect to other rights.
368
 In particular, they must be balanced against the 
other ICESCR rights such as the core rights to food (Article 11), health (Article 12) 
and education (Article 13), and by the rights to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications (Article 15(1)(b)).
369
 The limitations ‗must be 
determined by law in a manner compatible with the nature of these rights, must 
pursue a legitimate aim, and must be strictly necessary for the promotion of the 
general welfare in a democratic society ….‘
370
 They must also be ‗proportionate, 
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meaning that the least restrictive measures must be adopted,‘ and ‗compatible with the 
very nature of the rights protected in Article 15(1)(c).‘
371
 This means that they must 
be compatible with protecting the ‗personal link between the author and his creation 
and the means which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of 
living.‘
372
 Limitations in the public interest may require that compensation be paid to 
inventors
373
 – a paragraph which may have in mind the ‗just compensation‘ provisions 




The human rights system necessarily requires balancing the rights of some 
parties against the rights of others.
375
 For many, this is an inherent weakness, since 
very often there are no clear guidelines or yardsticks specifying how to achieve the 
balance, and it sometimes appears that in trying to achieve it the courts curtail or even 
violate the rights of one or more parties.
376
  
The CESCR gives some guidance on striking a balance between the protection 
of moral and material interests and the broader interests of society.
377
 States need to 
ensure an ‗adequate balance‘ between their obligations under 15(1)(c) and under the 
other provisions of the Covenant.
378
 ‗In striking this balance, the private interests of 
authors should not be unduly advantaged and the public interest in enjoying broad 
access to their productions should be given due consideration.‘
379
 Thus measures put 
in place to protect authors‘ rights should not constitute an ‗impediment to [states‘] 
ability to comply with their core obligations‘ in relation to the rights of food, health, 
education and to enjoy the benefits of science.
380
 The Committee mentions 
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 Ibid. The British CIPR concluded that: ‗An IP right is best viewed as one of the means by 













particularly the effects on the costs of food and essential medicines.
381
 Thus we see 
that the protection of authors‘ moral and material interests is a core right,
382
 but that 
this protection must be achieved in a way that does not violate other core ICESCR 
rights. 
This presents a dilemma – the Committee has identified non-derogable 
minimum core rights to food and essential medicines, and non-derogable core rights 
to inventors: their material and moral interests are protected. The ‗primacy of core 
obligations‘ does not help to resolve this conflict, since all these rights have been 
identified as ‗core.‘  
Haugen suggests that one way to balance rights is to give preference to those 
‗which relate directly to human dignity and survival.‘
383
 Young argues that the 
normative basis of the ‗minimum core‘ is human dignity and basic survival needs.
384
 
When the minimum core of the authors‘ and inventors‘ rights in Article 15(1)(c) are 
considered in this way, it would appear that they are very unlikely to conflict with the 
minimum core rights to food and essential medicines. 
There is no real potential for conflict between inventors‘ moral rights and the 
rights to food and health.  
It also seems unlikely that there can be any real conflict between the right to 
essential medicines and the inventors‘ material interests identified as ‗core‘ by the 
Committee: the inventors‘ minimum core rights are comparatively modest, and could 
potentially be funded by the state instead of relying on patent profits. Many scientists 
already work at state-funded universities and research institutes. The state could easily 
protect their material interests without impacting the right to essential medicines. The 
Committee specifically excludes corporations from the protection of Article 
15(1)(c).
385
 In the context of the rights to health and food, most patents are held by 
companies: ‗in the real world, it is only large companies holding … patents whose 
                                                                                                                                            
rights. In particular, there are no circumstances in which the most fundamental rights should 
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actions can have a direct impact on people‘s access to medicines.‘
386
 There is thus ‗no 
direct link between the inventors‘ rights protected in Article 15(1)(c) and the impact 
of medical patents held by big pharmaceutical companies.‘
387
 
Another challenge facing states regarding the balancing of rights is that most 
patent-holders are in developed states – and it is primarily people in developing 
countries who experience potential violations of the right to essential medicines. This 
means that the material rights of inventors in one country need to be balanced against 
the right to essential medicines in another. This is not an insurmountable challenge, 
however, because developed states have extraterritorial ICESCR obligations to 
respect and protect the right to health in other countries. They must ensure that the 
methods they employ to protect the material interests of inventors do not violate these 
obligations.  
It is also important to remember that developing states have ICESCR 
obligations under Article 15(1)(c). They must respect and protect the moral and 
material interests of inventors in foreign states. It might be argued that if developing 
states are indeed to promote and fulfil the right to health to the ‗maximum of its 
available resources‘ in order to achieve progressively ‗full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means‘ (as provided in ICESCR 
Article 2), they should not even pay compulsory licence fees,
388
 particularly given the 
price of such licences and the high transaction costs of licence negotiations 
themselves.
389
 Non-payment of licence fees is unlikely to violate the core material 
interests of inventors, who will probably derive a very small part of their income from 
compulsory patent fees paid by developing states. In practice, therefore, non-payment 
would not be a violation, since it is not the developing-country market which supports 
the material interests of the inventors concerned.  
In terms of TRIPS, ‗just compensation‘ must be paid for compulsory licences, 
and the CESCR confirms that compensation should be paid.
390
 The question of what 
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 See Haugen ‗Relationships‘ at 109-110. 
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is ‗just‘ may differ hugely, however.
391
 The CESCR refers to ‗adequate 
compensation,‘ although again it is not clear what would be regarded as ‗adequate.‘ 
This scenario highlights the fact that the CESCR does not recognize an 
‗intellectual property‘ right in inventions.
392
 When it speaks about the possibility of 
limiting inventors‘ rights in the public good, it is not speaking about the limitation of 
patent or other intellectual property rights – it is speaking about the inventors‘ 
material rights to a decent standard of living. The CESCR does not require that these 
material interests be taken care of through the patent system. This may make it more 
difficult to understand how the ‗adequate compensation‘ referred to in paragraph 24 
might arise, since typically such compensation is paid to property owners whose 
property or intellectual property is used or expropriated by the state for social 
purposes.
393
 Cullet notes that the Committee‘s apparent denial of a ‗human right to 
intellectual property‘ in paragraph 3 seems to conflict with the reference to 
‗compensation‘ in paragraph 24, since ‗compensation‘ seems to imply a property 
rights model,
394
 and possibly even a traditional intellectual property model.
395
  
I submit, however, that the CESCR‘s insistence on compensation is extremely 
useful politically. It enables states to rely on General Comments 14 and 17 to make 
claims for policy space without appearing unreasonable. 
What about incentives to invent? 
The intellectual property system exists to produce new products for the benefit 
of society. Haugen argues that if a patent system is to be used to encourage 
development of useful products like essential medicines, it is unrealistic to expect this 
to be achieved without any short term social costs.
396
 He argues that because ‗only the 
costs and not the potential positive effects are seen immediately, a strict application 
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[of the CESCR‘s] approach might hinder the introduction of patent protection, even in 
situations where it might have been desirable in the long term.‘
397
  
This is not necessarily true, however. The CESCR does not reject the patent 
system and does not necessarily reject the monopoly pricing structures on which it 
relies. It objects only to excessive pricing when this results in ‗unreasonably high 
costs for access to essential medicines … [thus] undermining the rights of large 
segments of the population to health ….‘
398
The essential medicines identified by the 
WHO lie largely outside the patent system, with the exception of the listed ARVs. 




It should be noted, however, that the patent system does not encourage the 
development of medicines and treatments for diseases such as malaria and 
tuberculosis (from which millions die each year),
400
 because there are no attractive 
markets for those therapies. In General Comment 14 on the right to health, the 
CESCR called upon states not only to provide access to the essential medicines that 
already exist, but also to promote medical research into new essential medicines.
401
  
The failure to promote the necessary medical research into tuberculosis and malaria 
could be interpreted as a violation of the right to health.
402
  
I will consider the implicat ons of this in more detail in Part Three of this 
chapter, where I discuss Article 15 in more detail. 
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I will now examine the possibilities of another part of the ICESCR, Article 15, 
for a human rights-based approach to negotiation. Because the broad theoretical 
principles (including the violations approach, minimum core rights, and the tripartite 
typology of obligations to respect, fulfil and protect) are equally applicable in this 
context, I will not re-examine them here. 
Article 15 reads as follows: 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right 
of everyone: 
a. To take part in cultural life; 
b. To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications; 
c. To benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which he is an author. 
2. The steps to be taken by the St tes Parties to the present 
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall 
include those necessary for the conservation, development 
and the diffusion of science and culture. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and 
creative activity. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
benefits to be derived from the encouragement and 
development of international contacts and co-operation in the 
scientific and cultural fields. 
Article 15 has considerable potential, particularly with regard to research-tool 
patents and state responsibility for fostering innovation, and for the right to essential 
medicines. It is also particularly relevant for understanding how a balance can be 
struck between the rights of inventors and the rights of the community to access their 
products. 
I have discussed the ways in which the CESCR has spelled out states‘ specific 
obligations and their potential treaty violations under the right to health in General 
Comment 14. Article 15 has been described as a comparatively ‗―underdeveloped‖ 















 as  ‗the most neglected set of provisions within an international human 
rights instrument‘,
404
 and as ‗skeletal and under-theorized.‘
405
 Thus far, the 
Committee has commented only on the rights of authors and inventors set out in 
Article 15(1)(c). However, Dr Audrey Chapman (one of the authors of General 
Comment 14) has produced some very interesting and useful papers on the rest of 
Article 15, on which I will rely on here, in the absence of a full CESCR comment. 
On the surface, Article 15 resembles the underlying principles and objectives 
of the intellectual property regime. Like the IP regime, it protects the rights of creators 
and inventors.
406
 However, while the IP regime recognizes the interests of users and 
society only as a shadowy guiding principle, Article 15 sets out these interests as 
rights which give rise to binding obligations, making it clear, for example, that any IP 
regime must enable everyone to actually ‗enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and 
its applications‘
407
 and must promote the ‗development and diffusion of science and 
culture.‘
408
 IP regimes that impede access to the research tools or information 
necessary for scientific and other research do not promote the ‗development and 
diffusion of science,‘ they do not allow everyone to ‗enjoy the benefits of scientific 




Scientific and cultural products cannot be distributed for everyone‘s benefit if 
they are not produced in the first place. Thus, Article 15 should also be understood as 
mandating states parties to implement systems that encourage the development of 
science and culture.
410
 Such systems need not necessarily resemble the modern IP 
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system, although in practice they probably will. For an IP system to be human rights-
compliant in terms of Article 15, however, it will need to live up to its own promises. 
Protection levels must be high enough to encourage creativity and innovation, but not 
be so high that creativity and invention are impeded. Protection levels must be 
evaluated and set appropriately for their local context. This argument resembles the 
economists‘ approach I outlined in Chapter 2, but it is no longer merely an economic 
policy argument; it includes a binding legal obligation. As a result, the balance is 
‗more explicit and exacting.‘
411
 
I noted earlier that optimal protection levels tend to be speculative. Article 15 
suggests that policy-makers must achieve some kind of balance, but does not give a 
clear indication of how this balance should be achieved.
412
 In the human rights 
context, states have a binding legal obligation to take seriously studies that have 
concluded that protection levels are too high, to consider the negative social 
consequences, and to ensure that they do not violate any minimum core obligations. 
Under Article 15, states have a legally binding obligation to ensure that the 
users of IP goods can access and use them on reasonable terms. Unlike the IP system, 
the human rights system gives rights to users. Because Article 15 protects the rights of 
IP users as well as those of IP holders it is more likely to achieve an optimal balance, 
and more likely to achieve the foundational objectives of the IP system. Application 
of Article 15 could ensure that the IP system functions for the good of society and all 
who live in it. Article 15 could, to paraphrase the WIPO Delegate from Ecuador,
413
 




Research tools and research innovation 
Some of the difficulties experienced by developing states with regard to 
technology transfer and the encouragement of local innovation arise from the 
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inaccessibility of patented research tools – difficulties that are also encountered in 
developed countries. Many have concluded not only that the increasingly privatized 
model of science is less efficient at promoting the development of science and 
innovation than an open system would be, but that the current system is ‗pathological‘ 
and has impeded or perverted much necessary and important scientific and 
technological progress.
 
Does the human rights system, and particularly the ICESCR, 
have anything to say about this? 
Article 15 is specifically directed to the question of scientific progress, and 
seems to provide some guidance on human rights-compliant research models. Article 
15(1)(b) provides that ‗everyone has the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications‘, while 15(2) obligates States Parties to take the steps 
‗necessary for the conservation, development and … diffusion of science.‘ Article 
15(3) obliges states to ‗respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research,‘ 
while Article 15(4) recognizes ‗the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and 
development of international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural 
fields.‘ 
Yamin and others have linked the rights of everyone to ‗enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications‘ to the right to health, and have argued that 
Article 15(1)(b) can be understood as supporting a right to essential medicines.
415
 
Yamin makes her point in part by quoting Paul Farmer‘s observation that the gap 
between rich and poor and between rich countries and poor countries has now become 
‗a matter of life and death.‘
416
 Because of the enormous progress in medicine during 
the last hundred years, ‗biomedicine can at last offer the sick truly revolutionary new 
therapies …. Antibiotics and vaccines can, for the fortunate few, virtually erase the 
risk of mortality from polio, tetanus, measles, pneumonia, staphylococcal and other 
bacterial infections, diarrheal disease, malaria,  tuberculosis.‘
417
 In the developing 
world, however, millions die annually of precisely these diseases.
418
 Yamin argues 
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 See also Musungu ‗Public health‘ at 424, pointing out that the high prices of medications 













that ‗such gross disparities in access to treatment … that are at the root of so much 
suffering in the world, are starkly inconsistent with the notion of a universal right to 
benefit from scientific progress….‘
419
 Similarly, in his discussion of UDHR Article 
27,
420
 Morsink points out that ‗To participate in the benefits of science means, among 
other things, to be able to receive affordable medicine, which is a prerequisite to the 
full development of one‘s personality.‘
421
 This understanding is consistent with the 
1975 Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests 
of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind,‘
422
 which obliges all States to ‗take 
appropriate measures to extend the benefits of science and technology to all strata of 
the population.
423
 In a human rights context, this means also that benefits should be 
disseminated without ‗discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status,‘
424
 and implies ‗a particular preoccupation with those who are disadvantaged, 
vulnerable and living in poverty.‘
425
 This obliges states to rigorously and carefully 
consider their intellectual property regimes to ensure that they do not exclude the poor 
from the benefits of science.
426
 
As noted earlier, the right to health includes a right of access to essential 
medicines that already exist. It can also be argued that states have an obligation to 
promote the development of new essential medicines.
427
 Millions of people die each 
year as a result of malaria and tuberculosis,
428
 but there has been comparatively little 
scientific and medical research into preventing or treating these diseases. From a 
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human rights perspective, this is clearly wrong – humanity is faced with two major 
pandemics that kill millions annually and yet, until recently, almost no-one was trying 
to develop new essential medicines and therapies, such as malaria vaccinations and 
more effective tuberculosis drugs. In its General Comment 14 on the Right to Health, 
the CESCR called upon states not only to provide access to the essential medicines 
that already exist, but also to promote medical research into new essential 
medicines.
429
  The failure to promote the necessary medical research into tuberculosis 
and malaria, and indeed, the active impediment of such research through ‗pathological 
patenting,‘
430
 could be interpreted as a violation of the right to health.
431
 
‗Pathological patenting‘ might also be a violation of Article 15, which could 
be interpreted to include an obligation to ensure that research scientists and 




Most contemporary pharmaceutical research is driven by the patent system. In 
many areas of medical research, for example, the development of cancer treatments or 
a cure for Alzheimer‘s, states can argue that they promote scientific and medical 
research by administering a patent system that encourages this kind of research and 
development. The CESCR does not dispute that patent rights can play a role in 
promoting socially useful research; it is clear, however, that the patent system has not 
fostered or encouraged research into diseases for which there is no attractive market.   
Since the patent system cannot
433
 promote research into malaria and 
tuberculosis, states have a human rights obligation to come up with something else – a 
research model that will promote this research – or at the very least, to ensure that 
current patent models do not impede essential research. We could argue that there is a 
human rights obligation to find a research model that works for the development of 
                                                 
429
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 As Chapman puts it, Article 15 ‗requires that the type and 
level of protection afforded under any intellectual property regime directly facilitate 
and promote scientific progress and its applications and do so in way that will … 
benefit members of society .…‘
435
 
What kind of research model is most likely to foster scientific and medical 
research into malaria and tuberculosis? As long as the private sector is primarily 
motivated by profit, it would appear that the model must rely on considerable state 
funding. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recognized this in the 2001 
report on the human rights impact of TRIPS.  Cognizant of the role that profit plays in 
the patent system, the report recommended the development of alternative 
incentives.
436
 In recent years there have been several important public-private-
partnership initiatives promoting malaria and tuberculosis research. These initiatives 
rely on state and donor funding, and often include participation by large 
pharmaceutical companies.
437
 In May 2006, the World Health Assembly resolved to 
establish an Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property (IGWG), mandated to compile a strategy to promote research 
into neglected diseases.
438
 Another important initiative brought to the World Health 
Assembly by a coalition of NGO‘s and scholars in 2005 was a proposed Medical 
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Research and Development Treaty, which would establish a different reward system 
for pharmaceutical products intended for diseases that primarily affect the poor.
439
  
But even though the funding for this research is ‗outside the patent system,‘ 
the research itself cannot take place outside the system because it is often impossible 
to conduct scientific, medical and pharmaceutical research without using patented 
research tools. The right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and 
its applications, as set out in Article 15(1)(b), does not imply only a right to essential 
medicines like polio vaccines and ARVs. It also implies the right to enjoy the benefits 
of the enormous scientific progress in biotechnology and genomics over the past 25 
years, which offer considerable potential benefit for humanity – especially in the 
battle against diseases. This scientific progress offers hope for earlier diagnosis of 
diseases, as well as for the development of vaccines and therapeutic drugs.
440
A human 
rights-compliant model demands that these important new advances in biotechnology 
be available to those who are conducting research into diseases such as malaria and 
tuberculosis, and into developing vaccines and therapies to combat them. 
The patent system can have a negative impact on this research, since many of 
the important recent advances in biotechnology are patented. One of the best 
candidates for the development of a malaria vaccine is a protein known as MSP-1 
(merozoite surface protein 1). MSP-1, however, is covered by 39 patents, which 
belong to different patent-holders. This could impede researchers who want to explore 
its potential.
441
 As discussed in Chapter 4, this kind of problem is experienced in all 
sorts of research contexts, and has had a negative effect on research in developing 
countries particularly.  The negative impact of research-tool patents on important 
research appears to conflict with the right of everyone to share in the benefits of 
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Proprietary science also appears to violate some of the other Article 15 rights. 
Article 15(2), for example, presents an obligation to promote the ‗development and 
diffusion‘ of science, while Article 15(3) stresses the importance of respecting the 
‗freedom indispensable for scientific research‘ – in this context, freedom from stifling 
licensing terms of patent-holders. When considering the implications of these parts of 
Article 15, it is important to remember that this Article, as well as Article 27 of the 
Universal Declaration on which it was based, were strongly influenced by 
contemporary understandings of the optimal model for scientific progress. 
Then, as now, scientists understood that scientific progress is always 
cumulative. Scientists who discover things, invent things, expand the boundaries of 
knowledge, always build on the work of their predecessors and on the work of their 
peers. The dominant model of scientific research during the periods when the 
Universal Declaration and Covenants were drafted was a very open model, based on 
the logic that science will progress most effectively when scientists collaborate with 
one another, share information and ideas, critique and test one another‘s results. The 
belief was that an open science model was best for the development of ‗pure‘ 
(foundational) science, and that the findings of those engaged in this kind of research 
should also be widely available to those engaged in applied research aimed at 
developing new technologies such as pharmaceuticals. In terms of Vannevar Bush‘s 
Endless Frontier model, states funded foundational scientific research and scientists 
made their research findings and tools widely available. This model would seem to 
conform to Article 15. During the drafting of both the UDHR and the ICESCR, there 
was widespread agreement among delegates that everyone should have the right to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress – this was an uncontroversial provision.
443
  
Many economists and scientists continue to believe that open science models 
offer many advantages over proprietary models. For example, the Declaration of the 
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World Congress for Freedom of Scientific Research stresses that free and open 
science is ‗one of the main guarantors of human health and welfare.‘
444
  
One could argue that the state has a human rights obligation to promote and 
protect a scientific research system that actually works for the good of society. Of 
course, this is precisely what the IP system itself is intended to achieve. The patent 
system is supposed to advance and encourage innovation – not to impede, retard, or 
pervert it. The American Bayh-Dole Act (perceived by many to be the genesis of the 
privatization of university research) was passed with the intention of advancing 
scientific and technological progress, because by the 1980s the open science model no 
longer seemed to be the optimal way of ensuring the technological development of 
useful inventions for the benefit of society.  
If we understand Article 15 as obliging the state to ‗develop science‘ and to 
ensure the optimal conditions for scientific and technological innovation, we might 
argue that the patent system is one way to meet this obligation, because it was 
developed to achieve this end. However, it is clear that the current patent system may 
have the effect of shackling scientific progress in some situations. Obstructing or 
impeding scientific and medical progress can be understood as a human rights 
violation. At the very least, it would appear to violate a state‘s obligation of respect.
445
 
This should not suggest that patent models have no role to play, or that the patent 
system needs to be scrapped. However, it appears that the patent and proprietary 
models need to be carefully reconsidered. As Chapman argues: ‗A human rights 
approach … establishes a requirement for the State to protect its citizens from the 
negative effects of intellectual property.‘
446
 By this she means not only the potentially 
harmful effects of particular innovations
447
 but more importantly, the potentially 
harmful effects of particular IP regimes and systems.  
In her analysis of the conditions that an IP system must meet to ensure that it 
is human rights-compliant, Chapman suggests several elements: 
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Firstly, ‗Intellectual property regimes should have an explicit human rights 
and ethical orientation.‘
448
 This would require states to ‗restrict the subject-matter 
eligible for intellectual property protection so as to eliminate inventions that are 
inconsistent with protecting human dignity.‘
449
 One could perhaps add to this the 
patenting of certain important research tools.  
Secondly, in order to respect and promote the rights set out in Article 15, the 
IP system adopted by a particular state ‗must reflect the country‘s development 
requirements.‘
450
 As noted earlier, this was one of the demands made by the GFD in 
the WIPO Development Agenda Discussions. Here, Chapman provides a human 
rights basis for this demand, suggesting that state has an obligation to take advantage 
of TRIPS flexibilities to ensure that the IP system it adopts is human rights-compliant.  
She asserts that ‗States Parties should refrain from efforts to interfere with the policies 
of other countries,‘
451
 and highlights the right to participate in a meaningful way in 
decision-making in conformity with Article 1(1) of ICESCR.
452
 In this way, the 
ICESCR, and Article 15 particularly, provide a human rights foundation for some of 
the demands made in the GFD WIPO Development Agenda proposals for more 
participation in norm-setting and for enough IP policy space to shape their IP policies 
to their scientific and development needs. 
Thirdly, Chapman suggests that ‗Intellectual property rights related to science 
should promote scientific progress and broad access to its benefits.‘
453
 Thus the state 
must implement and support a system for the development of science and technology 
that takes into account both ‗the opportunities for scientific advancement and the 
potential societal benefits, particularly to poor and disadvantaged groups.‘
454
 
Thus, the intellectual property system ‗must respect the freedom indispensable 
for scientific research and creative activity.‘
455
 If the patent system impedes scientists‘ 
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freedom to conduct their research, make their findings public, share them with 
colleagues, and co-operate both locally and internationally it could violate Article 
15(3), which demands that scientists have the ‗freedom indispensable for scientific 
research‘, as well as Article 15(2) which requires the development and diffusion of 
science – implying that scientists have the right to publish and communicate the 
results of their research freely to others. 
International cooperation 
Chapman notes particularly that IP regimes should encourage international 
cooperation, consistent with Article 15(4),
456
 bearing in mind that ‗science is one of 
the most international of all activities, [and] advances in science require … the full 
and open availability of scientific data on an international basis .…‘
457
 Article 15(4) is 
particularly relevant in the context of the globalized IP regime because it requires that 
states ‗be supportive of efforts by other countries to develop international contacts and 
co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields,‘
458
 and that ‗Governments of 
industrialized countries should be sensitive to the special needs of less developed 
countries and be supportive of the proposed measures and interpretations of the 




CESCR General Comment 17 reminds states of General Comment 3, 
confirming that member states that have an obligation, both individually and through 
international assistance and cooperation, particularly economic and technical, to work 
towards full realization of all the rights in the ICESCR.
460
 In this regard, it reminds 
states that ‗international and scientific cooperation should be carried out in the mutual 
interest of all peoples.‘
461
 Under Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, and other 
‗well-established principles of international law,‘ including the ICESCR itself, 
‗international cooperation for development, and thus for the realization of economic, 
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social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States Parties.‘
462
 Bearing in mind 
states‘ different development levels, states parties must ensure that the protection of 
moral and material interests ‗facilitates and promotes development cooperation,
463
 
technology transfer and scientific and cultural cooperation.‘
464
  
In his history of the drafting of Article 15, Claude notes that delegates were 
concerned about international distribution of the benefits of science (‗the important 
issue of global equity implicit‘ in Article 15).
465
 As put by the Indian delegation: 
‗Undoubtedly scientific discoveries should benefit not only all individuals but all 
nations, regardless of their degree of development.‘
466
 The Pakistani delegate 
remarked that the Article implied that ‗great efforts‘ should be made at both the 
national and international levels to ensure that ‗countries where science had made 
little progress might attain the goals set forth in the proposed provision.‘
467
 Cullet 
concludes that the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress also has ‗an 
important international dimension [and] implies that everyone in all countries should 
be able to benefit from all scientific and technological advances.‘
468
 He suggests that 
this could be understood as a human right to technology transfer.
469
 
Conclusion: Does Article 15 provide a human rights basis for the GFD? 
The intellectual property system is based on the idea of a ‗balance‘ between 
the social costs and benefits of the system. In order to promote innovation, it is 
necessary to identify an optimal balance between protection and access. Economists 
have been unable to identify the optimal point of balance, but they agree that it will 
differ considerably in different economic contexts, and that that current global levels 
of protection are too high for developing countries. The WIPO Development Agenda 
documents make these points, object to the developed states‘ ‗absolute truth‘
470
 that 
more protection is better and more likely to lead to ‗development,‘ and request 
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thorough investigations into the matter. They also request more IP policy space to 
develop IP policies that will promote local innovation and development.  
I have argued that Article 15 provides a human rights foundation for these 
requests. Article 15 is concerned with the diffusion and dissemination of the benefits 
of scientific progress, and requires that states examine their IP systems critically so as 
to ensure that everyone is able to share in the benefits of science and that socially 
useful research is not impeded. States have a human rights obligation to seriously and 
critically examine the skewed international IP ‗balance‘ and to devise new, locally 
appropriate models to optimize innovation within particular contexts (so as to create 
useful public goods), while ensuring that the moral and material interests of inventors 
are protected, and that core human rights (to food, health, education, and the 
enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and its applications)
471
 are not 
violated. Article 15 offers an external human rights basis to augment the existing GFD 
proposals. 
I have argued that social and economic rights will not be strategically useful 
unless they are perceived as precise obligations. Parties‘ obligations must be specific 
and detailed, and violations must be clearly identified.  The CESCR has successfully 
specified the Article 12 obligations in enough detail that the obligations can provide a 
very clear-cut bottom line for negotiations. However, I do not believe that Article 15 
is sufficiently developed jurisprudentially at this time to make as powerful a case as 
Article 12 offers in the context of the right to health. This could change when the 
CESCR issues a new General Comment on the parts of Article 15 not included in 
General Comment 17, or when other legal scholars investigate the Article more 
thoroughly.  
Human rights-based arguments using other ICESCR rights 
I have outlined a human rights-based argument using ICESCR Article 12 (the 
right to health) and Article 15 (the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress). 
Space constraints prevent discussion of other ICESCR rights. I would like to note, 
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however, that very similar ICESCR-based arguments to the limitation of IP rights 
have been made using Article 11 on the right to food.
472
  
In the following chapter, I will discuss the practical strategic advantages of 
using a rights-based approach in negotiations. I will concentrate on the right to health, 
but it should be noted that the right to food offers a similarly compelling human rights 
basis.
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My thesis is that developing countries will improve and strengthen their 
negotiating position if they adopt a human rights framework in their discussions with 
other parties. Although this is a strategic position, it is important to bear in mind both 
that protection of human rights has an inherent moral value, and that the prevention 
and avoidance of human rights violations is more than a strategy: it is also a binding 
legal obligation for all states that have ratified international human rights treaties. 
In earlier chapters, I outlined the problems which developing states face when 
their IP policy space is restricted by global intellectual property treaties. Raised 
intellectual property protection standards have hampered these states‘ ability to 
provide essential medicines, limited their access to important research tools, and 
curtailed their abilities to devise social and economic policies to improve public 
welfare and promote local innovation and development. 
An increasing number of scholars, non-governmental organizations, and 
human rights bodies have interpreted such IP policy space curtailment as a human 
rights problem. They have cautioned that overly-stringent IP protection may violate 
the human rights obligations that nations have voluntarily assumed under binding 
treaties such as the ICESCR. In Chapter 6, I looked at some of these violations, with 
particular reference to Articles 12, and concluded that certain interpretations of TRIPS 
violate the right to health, and suggested that further development of Article 15 by the 
CESCR might expose violations of this article as well.
1
 
In this chapter, I build on the theoretical discussion in Chapter 6 and argue 
that, in practice, it is strategically viable to adopt a human rights approach. I examine 
the emergence of a human rights critique of the intellectual property system, and 
discuss its potential strategic value for developing countries in countering the 
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demands of developed industrial countries for increased levels of IP protection. Used 
as ‗countering tools‘
2
 in an international context, social and economic rights can 
shape the interpretation and enforcement of existing treaties, as well as the negotiation 
of new agreements. A human rights framework can put pressure on governments and 
international organizations to change or develop programmes and policies to facilitate 
delivery, and ensure the respect and protection of human rights, both domestically and 
in foreign jurisdictions.
3
 I discuss some of the advantages of the human rights 
approach, and examine whether and why states abide by their international treaty 
commitments. I also discuss the issue of treaty conflicts. I end the chapter with a brief 
discussion of the potential pitfalls of a human rights-based strategy. 
The emergence of a human rights critique of the IP regime 
Until the end of the 20
th
 century, links were seldom drawn between the human 
rights and trade regimes, either by the human rights community or the international 
trade community.
4
 The international human rights machinery operated predominantly 
under the auspices of the United Nations, while international trade had its own 
institutions, the GATT, and subsequently the WTO.
5
 State representatives and 
delegations at each institution tended to be different people, responsible often to 
different government departments at home.
6
 Different scholars specialized in human 
rights and in international trade law.
7
 Common wisdom was that these were 
specialized and largely unrelated areas of law.
8
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It is increasingly obvious, however, that there is a direct relationship between 
international trade policy and human rights, particularly social and economic rights.
9
 




The growing interest is also a response to the negative effects of economic 
globalization. The United Nations and other international organizations have 
examined the effects of globalization on the enjoyment of human rights.
11
 While 
many United Nations reports and resolutions recognize the potential benefits of 
globalization and international trade, they also express concerns that these benefits are 
not equally shared, and that some states and vulnerable groups find themselves worse 
off than before.
12
 The human rights system aims to protect the most vulnerable, and 
this has been a focus of many reports and resolutions, which have frequently warned 
that deteriorating economic conditions might constitute a human rights violation.
13
 
Scholars who advocate a human rights approach to the global intellectual 
property regime believe that maximalist interpretations of IP treaties like TRIPS have 
contributed to human misery. As they point out, this is ‗more than a tragedy‘ – it is 
also a violation of human rights,
14
 and inherently objectionable.
15
 At the same time, 
much of the human rights-based critique adopts an explicitly strategic approach, 
                                                 
9
 See the contributions to Alston and Robinson Human Rights and Development ; Benedek, de 
Feyter & Marrella Globalization and Human Rights ; Genugten & Perez-Bustillo Poverty of 
Rights. 
10
 Grant ‗Human rights and trade‘ at 133. Helfer notes that international organizations such as 
the UN and WTO were persuaded to look at these linkages after pressure from NGOs and 
developing states such as Brazil (Helfer ‗Regime shifting‘ at 50-52). 
11
 See CESCR Statement on Globalization ; UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights Resolution 2001/32 ; and the Preliminary report submitted by J 
Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, in accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 
1999/8.  UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13. 
12
 Grant ‗Human rights and trade‘ at 138; De Feyter ‗Introduction.‘ 
13
 Drommen ‗Safeguarding legitimacy‘ at 123; also Hunt „Report of the Special Rapporteur‟ 
para 26), arguing that the human rights principle of non-discrimination ‗reflects a particular 
preoccupation with those who are disadvantaged, vulnerable and living in poverty‘. 
14
 Yamin ‗Not just a tragedy‘ at 327 and ‗Future in the mirror‘ at 1212; See also Watchirs 
‗Human rights approach to HIV/AIDS‘ at 79-80; Tarantola ‗Building on the synergy‘ at 1; 
Ovett ‗Access to medicines‘ at 182. 
15
 Mann ‗Public health and human rights‘; Hunt Reclaiming; Farmer ‗Paradigm shift‘ and 

















Perhaps these scholars have been inspired by the success that advocates for 
civil and political rights have had in changing the normative agenda and, in some 
cases, practices as well. It has been said that ‗Ours is the age of rights,‘
17
 and that 
human rights are the ‗tool of revolution … a revolution anchored in – and inspired by 
– the power of an idea – human rights – an idea emerging as the ―secular religion‖ of 
our times….‘
18
 While some scholars are sceptical of this utopian language with regard 
to social and economic rights,
19
 many share a belief that better awareness and 
protection of economic and social rights can make a real difference to the lives of 
ordinary people, and become a vehicle for social change.
20
 
The HIV/AIDS crisis focused attention on the right to health in the late 1990s: 
the links between prices of essential antiretroviral drugs and the patent system were 
obvious, and in May 2000, the CESCR released its General Comment 14, which 
suggested that patent protection could potentially violate the right to health by 
impeding or restricting access to essential medicines. Later that year, the United 
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Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
broadened this critique, noting that the implementation of TRIPS could potentially 
violate not only the right to health, but other rights protected by the ICESCR and 
other human rights agreements.
21
 Resolution 2000/7 noted that ‗…the implementation 
of the TRIPS Agreement does not adequately reflect the fundamental nature and 
indivisibility of all human rights, including the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits 
of scientific progress and its applications [and] the right to health …‘ and that 
therefore, ‗there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property rights regime 
embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights 
law, on the other.‘
22
  
Since then, other United Nations organs have reached similar conclusions.
23
 
The effects of the international intellectual property regime are now discussed in a 
wide range of international forums, including the WHO and various other UN bodies. 
Intellectual property debate is longer confined to WIPO, the WTO, and other trade 
organizations.  
The CESCR General Comments have been particularly important in the 
development of counterregime norms, stressing that ICESCR member states must not 
violate core aspects of the rights to health, food or education, and explaining how 
their conduct in the WTO might do this. General Comment 14 identifies the provision 
of essential medicines as a minimum core obligation, identifies ways in which 
interpretations of treaties such as TRIPS could conflict with this duty, and creates 
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Surprisingly, however, developing states made very few references to human 
rights in the Doha negotiations about essential medicines or in the WIPO 
Development Agenda talks. I argue that their negotiating position would be 
strengthened if they made more use of counterregime human rights norms in these 
contexts. 
A new kind of balance  
Developing countries have used ‗internal arguments‘ to negotiate the 
maintenance of their domestic policy space in order to balance the protection of 
intellectual property rights and social welfare needs. Yet, although the intellectual 
property system is indeed premised on the idea of a balance between the rights of 
intellectual property holders and the broader interests of society, it is impossible for 
parties to agree on an optimal a balance.  
This problem is aggravated because the intellectual property system 
recognizes and protects only the rights of the owners
25
 of intellectual property. TRIPS 
spells out owners‘ rights in great detail, and devotes a whole chapter to their 
enforcement, but never mentions the ‗rights‘ of members of society to enjoy the social 
benefits that the intellectual property system is supposed to produce.
26
  Like the 
intellectual property system as a whole, TRIPS gives users no rights at all.
27
  
One strategic benefit of introducing ‗human rights talk‘ into intellectual 
property discussions is that other rights are put on the table. The human rights regime 
protects not only inventors and creators,
28
 but users too. Thus, it is more likely to 
achieve an equitable balance than the intellectual property system, which recognizes 
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only owners‘ rights. When human rights are brought into the discussion, the rights of 
intellectual property owners are no longer the only rights that require consideration. 
They must be balanced against something more than a vague reference to ‗public 
welfare‘ – they now must be balanced against countervailing rights.  Within a human 
rights approach, the rights of intellectual property owners can be more effectively 
balanced, or countered, by more considerations than are possible relying solely on the 
balancing principles within intellectual property law itself.
 29
 
The dominant human rights approach to intellectual property rules 
acknowledges both inventors‘ rights and users‘ rights as human rights,
30
  and views 
the IP system and the human rights system as ‗essentially compatible‘
31
 since both 
seek to encourage innovation and creativity for the benefit of society, and to achieve a 
balance between incentives and protection, and access to intellectual property goods.
32
 
Those who base their arguments on the ICESCR cannot pick and choose their clauses 
selectively. All ICESCR articles are binding, and those relying on the Covenant 
cannot deny the validity of Article 15, which explicitly protects ‗the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which 
he is the author.‘
33
 However, the ICESCR also focuses attention on other rights, and 
suggests that ‗user‘s interests are just as rights-based as the interests of owners.‘
34
 
Because it recognizes inventors‘ moral and material interests, the human rights 
approach does not advocate access to important products and resources without 
compensation. It does, however, demand that a balance be struck in a way that does 
not violate core human rights.
35
 
Scholars and organizations adopting this approach argue that, in principle, the 
trade and intellectual property systems can be made human rights-compliant,
36
 and are 
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willing to work within the TRIPS framework, making full use of its flexibilities and 
limitation clauses and perhaps expanding their interpretation. In his Special 
Rapporteur‘s Report, Paul Hunt writes that TRIPS need not violate the human right to 
health if its flexibilities are used, and he points out that the treaty specifically ‗allows 
WTO member States to adopt measures to protect public health and nutrition.‘
37
 
Human rights obligations are used, in effect, to give muscle to the flexibilities and 
limitations already in the TRIPS Agreement, and to resist pressures for TRIPS-plus 
measures and other proposed treaties that limit IP policy space. A primary strategic 
motivation behind the introduction of human rights norms is to provide a 
‗counterweight to economic interests.‘
38
  
Many scholars and authors view the TRIPS agreement as an unsatisfactory 
starting text.
39
 Any concessions TRIPS makes to the needs of users or the public 
interest take the form of rather vaguely-worded and ambiguous exceptions and 
limitations clauses, which developing states have had to fight hard to implement.
40
 
Yet, they seem to have decided to make the best of this treaty, to which 159 states are 
now bound,
41
 recognizing that the small gains made during the TRIPS and Doha 
negotiations might be difficult to retain in new negotiations. In effect, TRIPS itself is 
now used defensively. 
While not rejecting the intellectual property regime altogether,
42
 human rights 
scholars argue that, for states that have ratified the human rights covenants and other 
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human rights treaties, human rights must prevail over trade principles, and intellectual 
property rules or policies that violate human rights must change so that they become 
human rights-compliant. The Human Rights Commission‘s Resolution 2000/7 
provides a good example, stating that the manner in which TRIPS has been 
implemented may be in violation of human rights treaties, and stressing the ‗primacy 
of human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements.‘
43
  
Putting this into practice: using human rights strategically 
This dissertation argues that the human rights approach will be strategically 
advantageous to developing states negotiating intellectual property matters 
internationally. In practical terms, recourse to binding human rights obligations can be 
used in two primary contexts: when negotiating or interpreting international 
intellectual rules and policies; and when defending their domestic IP policies before 
WTO dispute resolution panels. Here, I focus on the strategic value of raising human 
rights commitments in negotiating contexts such as the Doha discussions and the 
WIPO Development Agenda talks. 
Commentators who advocate a strategic shift to a ‗human rights approach‘ 
based on the ICESCR usually advance the following strategic advantages: 
ICESCR obligations are binding 
The theoretical power and significance of relying on the ICESCR in 
international negotiations is obvious. The ICESCR is a high-status international 
agreement which almost all countries, including almost all WIPO and WTO members, 
have ratified.
44
 It is a binding treaty, which means that those states are obligated to 
uphold the rights it protects.  ICESCR member states actively violate their treaty 
obligations when they advocate policies that undermine the ability of people to enjoy 
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the rights protected by the Covenant – whether these people live in their own 
territories or in foreign countries.   
CESCR General Comments been particularly important in the development of 
counterregime norms. The Committee has specified conduct which violates the treaty 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health and other rights, stressed 
that ICESCR signatories must not violate these rights, and explained how their 
conduct in the WTO, WIPO, and other negotiating venues might do this. General 
Comment 14 identifies provision of essential medicines and the adoption and 
implementation of appropriate pharmaceutical policies as minimum core obligations, 
and notes that all ICESCR member states have obligations to respect and protect the 
right of access to essential medicines. The Comment emphasizes that states violate 
their ICESCR duties through any conduct that impairs access to essential medicines, 
and expressly notes that states should not adopt maximalist IP p licies having this 
effect. It notes particularly states‘ involvement in international organizations, and 
international trade and IP treaties. The Committee warns that states must ensure that 
provisions in trade, IP, and other treaties do not violate the right to health in the ways 
it has identified. This creates pressures for human rights-compliant interpretations of 
the TRIPS Agreement, which fashion ICESCR obligations into potentially powerful 
tools that could have been used during the Doha discussions. These and other CESCR 
interpretations of ICESCR-based obligations
45
 could have been useful as well during 
the WIPO Development Agenda discussions. 
The bottom line is that ICESCR member states (that is, almost all WTO and 
WIPO members) have legal and binding obligations not to violate the ICESCR. This 
means that they may not conclude treaties which conflict with and violate their 
ICESCR obligations to protect, respect and fulfil the ICESCR rights; that they must 
interpret and implement existing treaties (such as TRIPS) in ways that do not conflict 
with or violate these obligations; and that they may not pressurize other states to 
conclude conflicting treaties or interpret or implement existing IP and trade treaties in 
ways that violate ICESCR obligations. 
In Resolution 2000/7, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights noted that ‗actual or potential conflicts exist between the 
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implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights,‘ including the right to essential medicines, and reminded all 




In the following section I discuss the important issues this raises: 1) how to 
identify a ‗conflict‘ between TRIPS and a human rights norm, particularly those 
protected by the ICESCR; and 2) in the event of a conflict between these treaties, 
what is the legal basis for ‗the primacy of human rights obligations‘ noted by the Sub-
Commission? I will then consider the possibility that there is no necessary conflict 
between TRIPS and the ICESCR, and that the treaties should be interpreted in ways 
that make it possible to give effect to obligations under both.  
The question of treaty conflicts  
What is a „conflict‟ of norms or rules? 
How can we identify ‗actual or potential conflicts‘ between TRIPS and the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights? What does this mean in practice? 









 Jenks claimed that a ‗conflict of law-
making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of 
different instruments is impossible‘;
51
 in other words, where ‗it is possible for a party 
to two treaties to comply with one rule only by thereby failing to comply with another 
rule.‘
52
 This would be the case in a hypothetical situation if, for example, Treaty A 
provided that generic medicines must never be produced 
53
 and Treaty B provided that 
generic medicines must be produced. This particular hypothetical example is of the 
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Such strict definitions of ‗conflict‘ have been criticized because they fail to 
recognize or resolve many of the actual conflicts that arise in practice,
55
 such as a 
conflict between a particular command or prohibition and a particular right.
56
 An 
example would be where Treaty A provided that states must never produce generic 
medicines and Treaty B provided that states may produce generic medicines. This 
situation does not meet Jenks‘ strict definition of ‗conflict‘ because the obligation ‗to 
never produce generics‘ does not violate the permission to produce generics in treaty 
B. In practice, application of the narrow approach in such situations would mean that 
obligations expressed as commands or prohibitions must always be preferred to rights 
or permissions provided elsewhere.
57
 As Pauwelyn remarks: ‗To preclude that the 
explicit right prevails over the positive obligation simply because of some technical 
definition of conflict is unacceptable.‘
58
 
As a result, many international law scholars have adopted a broader view of 
conflict, which encompasses a wider range of situations.
59
 The International Law 
Commission (ILC), for example adopts a ‗wide notion of conflict as a situation where 
two rules or principles suggest different ways of dealing with a problem,‘
60
 noting 
particularly that ‗policy conflicts‘ might not meet the narrow definition of ‗conflict‘ 
but are nevertheless very important in practice.
61
 They point out that a ‗treaty may 
sometimes frustrate the goals of another treaty without there being any strict 
incompatibility between their provisions.‘
62
 These broader understandings of conflict 
include situations both where a prohibition or command in one treaty makes it 
impossible to exercise a right or permission in another treaty,
63
 and where the impact 
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of one treaty makes it more difficult (although not absolutely impossible) for a state to 
comply with its obligations under another treaty.
64
  
The CESCR appears to adopt these broader understandings of conflict. 
General Comment 17 warns states that IP systems should ‗constitute no impediment‘ 
to the enjoyment of the rights to food, health and education,
65
 thus suggesting the 
possibility of conflict between TRIPS prohibitions and commands and the rights in 
the ICESCR. General Comment 14 states that state parties should take steps to ensure 
that international agreements and instruments do not have a negative impact on the 
right to health in other countries,
66
 thus suggesting that conflicts can arise even in 
situations where TRIPS or another agreement makes it more difficult for states to 
comply with their health obligations. 
TRIPS contains many precise rules expressed as commands and prohibitions. 
The ICESCR is comparatively vague.  While it provides that a state ‗should take steps 
individually and through international co-operation … to the maximum of its 
available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the … Covenant by all appropriate means …,‘
67
 it provides little 
detail or specific instructions on precisely how this is to be achieved.  
Under a strict or narrow approach to conflict, one could conclude that the 
precise commands or prohibitions n TRIPS do not conflict with the more general and 
‗aspirational objectives‘ of the ICESCR because excluding the methods prohibited by 
the TRIPS rules does not necessarily make these goals impossible to achieve.  Rather, 
TRIPS merely excludes some methods, thus obliging states to find other ways of 
meeting the goals. A broader view of conflict would note that excluding certain 
methods of implementation (such as the provision of generic medicines), could have a 
‗negative impact‘ on the right to essential medicines making it substantially more 
difficult for some states to meet their ICESCR obligations, and would recognize this 
as a conflict.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the CESCR has tried to reclaim social 
and economic rights by spelling out the ICESCR in more detail, adopting the 
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violations approach, identifying minimum core rights, and, ultimately, by 
reinterpreting the ICESCR in the form of commands and prohibitions. This makes it 
far more likely that conflicts (in the narrow sense) will arise between TRIPS and the 
ICESCR,
68
 thus also meeting the narrow definition of conflict. 
Naturally, treaty conflicts can only arise where there is ‗overlap between the 
treaty provisions including ratione materiae (same subject matter), rationes personae 
(same state parties) and ratione termporis (same time).‘
69
 Some might argue that TRIPS and 
the ICESCR do not meet these requirements because they deal with different subjects: trade and human 
rights.
70
 The ILC points out, however, that characterizations as trade, or environmental or human rights law 
‗have no normative value.‘ They are merely ‗informal labels that describe the instruments from the 
perspective of different interests or different policy objectives.‘ A trade treaty ‗may have significant human 
rights and environmental implications ….‘
71
 The ILC endorses Vierdag‘s view that ‗If an attempted 
simultaneous application of two rules to one set of facts or actions leads to 
incompatible results it can safely be assumed that the test of sameness is satisfied.‘ 
72
 
The primacy of human rights norms 
In addition to identifying the possibility of conflicts between TRIPS and 
human rights norms, the Sub-Commission stresses the ‗primacy of human rights 
obligations over economic policies and agreements.‘
73
 This suggests that, in conflicts 
between human rights and trade rules, the human rights rule should take precedence, 
and that trade and economic policy must be designed within a ‗human rights 
constraint.‘
74
   
Some human rights experts have concluded that human rights should always 
take precedence over all other obligations, and thus view ‗the primacy of human 
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rights obligations‘ in absolute terms.
75
 This argument is usually based on Article 103 
of the UN Charter, which provides that: ‗In the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail.‘  
While the Charter does not specify particular human rights, it refers to human 
rights in several important places: The Preamble reaffirms ‗faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men 
and women and of nations large and small,‘ and a determination to ‗promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,‘ and to ‗employ international 
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all 
peoples.‘
76
 Article 1(3) specifies that one of the four central ‗purposes of the United 
Nations‘ is ‗To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of 
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion,‘
77
 while Article 55 provides that ‗the 
United Nations shall promote (a) higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development; (b) solutions of 
international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural 
and educational cooperation; and (c) universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion.‘
78
 Article 56 emphasizes the obligations of UN members in this regard, 
providing that ‗All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
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Commenting on a paper by Robert Howse and Makau Mutua,
80
 Andrew 
Guzman sums up their view as follows: ‗They point out that under Article 103, the 
U.N. Charter takes precedence over conflicting obligations, including treaty 
obligations, and argue that it places obligations on member states to promote and 
protect human rights. From these two premises, they conclude that in the event of a 




The Howse and Mutua argument is more nuanced and complex than 
Guzman‘s summary suggests.
82
 They set out to examine the question: ‗Should human 
rights ―trump‖ trade law or vice-versa?‘
83
 and consider the role of the UN Charter as 
one part of their argument. They argue that Article 103 clearly states that Charter 
obligations are to prevail over all other treaty commitments and that it is therefore 
impossible for any other treaty to override Charter obligations.
84
  While they note that 
the Charter refers to human rights on several important occasions, and that ‗broadly 
read, those references place obligations on member states to promote and protect 
human rights,‘ they also concede that the Charter does not explain the nature of these 
‗human rights‘ in any detail, ‗preferring to leave their elaboration to the UDHR and to 
specific human rights treaties.‘
85
 Ultimately they conclude that the ‗UN Charter does 
not resolve the question of hierarchy of law, or … whether human rights law has 
primacy over other domains of international law.‘
86
 
A Charter-based human rights-primacy argument has been expressed more 
strongly by Prof Louis Sohn. Sohn looks at Article 103, the Preamble, and Articles 
1(3), 55 and 56 and concludes that  
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While the provisions are general, nevertheless they have the force of 
positive international law and create basic duties which all members must 
fulfil in good faith. They must cooperate with the United Nations in 
promoting both universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all [and for] this purpose, they have pledged 
themselves to take such joint and separate action as may be necessary. 
Any refusal to participate in the United Nations program to promote the 
observance of human rights constitutes a violation of the Charter.
87
  
Thus, if a state concludes a treaty or enacts domestic legislation that amounts 
to a ‗gross violation of human rights,‘ this treaty or statute would be invalid on the 
grounds that it is ‗contrary to a basic and overriding norm of the Charter.‘
88
 
Sohn replies to arguments that the Charter provisions are ‗too general‘ and 
need to be more precisely spelled out before they can have ‗practical application,‘
89
 
by arguing that this is precisely what the UDHR and the Covenants achieve – 
specification of the broad principles of the Charter.
90
  
Sohn‘s views have been controversial, and are not generally endorsed by 
international human rights scholars.
91
 Most exports, including Simma and Alston and 
Howse and Mutua conclude that in strict international law terms, human rights 
obligations will have ‗absolute primacy‘ for all states over all other treaty obligations 
only if they have ‗jus cogens‘ status. Jus cogens rules are defined in the VCLT as 
those peremptory international law norms which are ‗accepted and recognized by the 
international community of states as a whole as … norm[s] from which no derogation 
is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.‘
92
 Despite its inherently paradoxical 
nature,
93
 the jus cogens doctrine is widely accepted in international law.
94
 The precise 
content of the jus cogens norms has not been established, however, and, apart from a 
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handful of norms which are generally agreed upon, it is not clear which human rights 
norms have jus cogens status.
95
 
The norms that are usually agreed upon are those listed in the US Third 
Restatement.  The list is not necessarily complete or closed.
96
 It includes prohibitions 
on genocide, slavery, ‗the murder or disappearance of individuals, torture or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, 
systematic racial discrimination, [and] ‗a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights.‘
97
 It does not include the social and 
economic rights that are codified in the ICESCR,
98
 and does not help resolve 
questions regarding possible conflicts between TRIPS and the ICESCR by elevating 
the ICESCR rights to a non-derogable jus cogens status. While there is considerable 
controversy over the precise content of the jus cogens norms,
99
 it is doubtful that the 
social and economic rights protected by the ICESCR have this status; thus it is 
difficult to argue the absolute primacy of such rights as the right to essential 
medicines and food, let alone the less specific right to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress, in international law terms.
100
 
I submit, however, that from the point of view of the ICESCR member states, 
the CESCR, and the UN machinery more generally, it is not necessary to prove that 
the ICESCR norms have absolute primacy for all states in the international legal 
system. The states that have ratified the ICESCR have obligations under that treaty, 
including the obligation not to enter into other treaties which require the violation of 
ICESCR obligations, or which make it impossible (or more difficult) for them to meet 
their ICESCR commitments. From the point of view of the ICESCR, accepting 
conflicting treaty commitments is itself a violation of the ICESCR obligations. 
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General Comment 14 stresses that ‗States parties should ensure that the right 
to health is given due attention in international agreements…. In relation to the 
conclusion of other international agreements, States parties should take steps to ensure 
that these instruments do not adversely impact upon the right to health.‘
101
 It goes on 
to add that, should a state fail ‗to take into account its legal obligations regarding the 
right to health when entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with other 
States, international organizations and other entities, such as multinational 
corporations,‘ it will violate its obligation to respect the right to health.
102
 
It is a long-standing principle that ‗states can be held responsible for 
implementing international agreements‘ that violate their human rights commitments 
under other treaties.
103
 In 1958, the European Commission on Human Rights observed 
that states parties to the European Convention on Human Rights violate that treaty if 
they enter into other treaties that prevent them from meeting their Convention 
obligations.
104
 In other words, from the perspective of those states that have ratified 
human rights treaties ‗earlier human rights treaty obligations must prevail over 
inconsistent agreements entered into at a later stage.‘
105
 
Thus, from the perspective of the UN human rights machinery, ICESCR 
member states have assumed obligations under that treaty, and do indeed have to 
prioritize ICESCR norms; if they fail to do so, they violate their ICESCR obligations. 
This is not the same thing as claiming a general ‗primacy of human rights norms‘ for 
all states in the international law system generally. It is merely saying that in order to 
avoid violating the ICESCR, member states must behave in a certain way: they must 
prioritize the ICESCR human rights obligations they have voluntarily assumed. This 
is the approach adopted by the High Commissioner on Human Rights.
106
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General conflict rules 
As discussed above, human rights do not usually enjoy absolute legal primacy 
over other treaties obligations. In the absence of a ‗human rights primacy‘ rule, how 
can conflicts be resolved? Some treaties have their own ‗conflict clauses‘ to resolve 
such situations,
107
 but neither the ICESCR nor TRIPS has this kind of clause. In the 
absence of conflict resolution clauses, Article 30 of the Vienna Convention sets out 
several rules aimed at resolving conflicts between treaties.
108
  
Article 30(2), for example, provides that ‗when all the parties to the earlier 
treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the treaty is not terminated or suspended 
… the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with 
the later treaty.‘
109
 This rule is an expression of the principle lex posterior derogate 
priori, or, ‗a later expression of intention is presumed to prevail over an earlier 
one.‘
110
 Under this principle, if a TRIPS rule conflicts directly with the ICESCR, the 
TRIPS rule will be presumed to override the ICESCR provision, since TRIPS was 
concluded later. 
As discussed below, however, this rule is itself subject to the principle pacta 
sunt servanda, which has the effect of prioritizing an interpretation of both treaties in 
ways that make it possible to give effect to both of them. 
Another conflict resolution doctrine, the ‗lex specialis‘ rule, provides that 
‗special law derogates from general law.‘
111
 It has been suggested that TRIPS and the 
WTO system generally should be viewed as ‗lex specialis‘, or a self-contained 
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 and that in cases relating specifically to IP rules, TRIPS should be regarded 
as ‗lex specialis‘ and its particular provisions should take precedence. The ILC points 
out, however, that ‗it is often hard to distinguish what is ―general‖ and what is 
―particular‖ and paying attention to the substantive coverage of a provision … one 
might arrive at different conclusions.‘
113
 The lex specialis rule is particularly difficult 
to invoke when comparing TRIPS and the ICESCR because the TRIPS rules cannot 
be regarded as a special exceptions to, or specific examples of, the more general 
ICESCR rules. One might argue that while TRIPS is lex specialis with regard to 
intellectual property, the ICESCR is lex specialis with regard to human rights.
114
 




The treaties do not necessarily conflict 
In the hypothetical examples of ‗conflict‘ discussed earlier, I explained that 
under the ‗broader‘ view of conflict, a conflict would arise if a compulsory TRIPS 
command or prohibition made it impossible or more difficult for states to comply with 
their ICESCR obligations. For this reason, the UN Sub-Commission and CESCR have 
identified actual or potential conflicts between the treaties. 
However, the two treaties do not necessarily have to conflict. Another 
important customary rule, pacta sunt servanda, is now incorporated in Article 26 of 
the VCLT, which states that: ‗every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.‘
116
 This rule implies that states are obliged 
to interpret their existing treaties in ways that which avoid conflict and allow them to 
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fulfil all their treaty obligations,
117
 especially since there is a strong presumption 
against treaty conflict in the international law system.
118
  
In an effort to avoid or resolve potential conflicts, the VCLT provides that 
treaties should be interpreted to take into account ‗any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.‘
119
 Thus, wherever possible, 
TRIPS, like all treaties, should be interpreted in a way that does not conflict with 
other existing obligations.
120
 For ICESCR member states, with non-derogable 
obligations under that treaty,
121
 the challenge is to interpret and implement their 
TRIPS commitments in ways that are human rights-compliant, and do not conflict 
with their ICESCR obligations.
122
 
The UN High Commissioner on Human Rights report points out that TRIPS 
and the ICESCR have the same overall objectives: both treaties envision a balance 
between the rights of producers of intellectual property goods and the needs of 
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 Far from expressly detracting from or providing exceptions to the human 
rights regime,
124
 the WTO agreements, as well as their GATT predecessors, should be 
understood as complementary treaties to the ICESCR.
125
 Under the ICESCR, 
however, the human rights obligations must be prioritized.
126
 It is possible for 
ICESCR states to abide by all their treaty commitments, both ICESCR and TRIPS, 
provided that full use is made of TRIPS flexibilities and the exception clauses are 
interpreted in a human rights-compliant manner.
127
  Strategically, the ICESCR offers 
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an important ‗interpretative basis‘ to legal actors such as developing states ‗that is 
lacking in simple policy arguments about social concerns.‘
128
  
It should be stressed that ‗interpretation‘ of a treaty cannot ‗read in‘ provisions 
that are not in the text. The VCLT requires that ‗A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose,‘
129
 and defines  the treaty ‗text‘ 
to include the Preamble and Annexes.
130
 The TRIPS Preamble, and Articles 7 and 8 
clearly lay the groundwork for a human rights interpretation of more specific 
exception clauses such as those in Articles 27, 30 and 31. The Preamble expressly 
requires that the interests of the users of intellectual property should be considered, 
and recognizes the ‗special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect 
of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in 
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.‘
131
 
Berger points out that these ‗foundational Articles clearly indicate that 
TRIPS‘s primary role is the balancing of competing interests – and not the protection 
of IPRs.‘
132
 This suggests that substantive articles that ‗cut back on the exclusive 
rights of the patent-holders‘ should be seen not as ‗exceptions‘ or ‗departures from an 
established norm‘ but as ‗integral parts of the agreement.‘
133
 Without the specific 
exception clauses, ‗Articles 7 and 8 would be devoid of any real meaning in a large 
number of situations.‘
134
 Thus, the specific exception clauses such as those in Articles 
27, 30 and 31 must be understood as promoting TRIPS‘s overall ‗balancing‘ 
objectives. While treaty interpretations may not read norms into a treaty which are not 
there,
135
 TRIPS itself lays the groundwork for a human rights-compliant 
interpretation. 
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 See for example Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms at 245; Howse ‗The Shrimp/Turtle case‘ at 













In addition, VCLT Article 31(3)(c), provides that treaty interpretation should 
take into account ‗any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.‘
136
 There has been considerable debate about whether or not the 
WTO dispute resolution machinery is competent (or obliged) to consider treaties 
outside the ‗covered agreements‘,
137
 but most commentators agree that because the 
TRIPS provisions themselves require interpretation, it would be acceptable to 




It is thus permissible to use the TRIPS exception clauses to ensure that the 
Agreement is implemented in an ICESCR-compliant manner, thereby avoiding a 
conflict between the two treaties. This conforms to the principle pacta sunt servanda. 
Given the human rights obligations of ICESCR member states, the TRIPS exception 
clauses must be used to ensure that TRIPS does not violate the ICESCR. This 
becomes more obvious when ICESCR provisions are spelled out more clearly and in 
more detail, as the CESCR has done with the right to health.
139
 Once the ICESCR 
clauses are properly understood, it becomes clear that TRIPS should be interpreted in 
a way that gives full effect to the various exceptions and limitations, as well as to the 
interpretative clauses in Articles 7 and 8.
140
 If TRIPS must be interpreted either in a 
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less-protectionist or a more-protectionist manner, and the more-protectionist 
interpretation violates ICESCR, the VCLT rules appear to favour the less-




Practical implications   
As noted earlier, the ongoing work of the CESCR
142
 has been indispensable 
for identifying potential conflicts between human rights obligations and the rules set 
out in TRIPS and other IP agreements. The Committee has clearly identified specific 
conduct that will violate the ICESCR: it has noted, for example, that obligations 
which make it more difficult for states to provide essential medicines violate the 
ICESCR obligations of respect.  
Similarly, new treaties should be negotiated with ICESCR commitments 
clearly in mind so that the application of human rights standards becomes ‗the 
commencement point from which multilateral lending institutions embark on the 
formation of their policies, rather than a point of reference when things have gone 
wrong.‘
143
 States must not enter into new TRIPS-plus treaties or the SPLT if this 
prevents them from meeting their existing ICESCR obligations, both domestic and 
extraterritorial.  
These human rights obligations should be strategically useful to developing 
states during negotiations. At Doha, the developing states could have noted that 
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failure to implement Articles 7 and 8 would result in a conflict between TRIPS and 
the ICESCR, and that all ICESCR member states would violate their ICESCR 
commitments to respect the right to health.
144
 
In the WIPO Development Agenda discussions, developing states could have 
linked their ‗welfare enhancing‘ and ‗development‘ arguments to binding ICESCR 
obligations. Instead of referring to social policy, development and public welfare – all 
of which can be seen as vague, open to a variety of interpretations, non-binding,  and 
easily deflected, they could have put the binding human rights obligations on the table 
and pointed out that the developed states‘ negotiating positions violated their 
obligation to respect human rights in developing countries by closing the policy space 
which those countries need to fulfil, respect and protect the human rights of their 
residents. They could have argued that international IP agreements must be ICESCR-
compliant, and pointed out the ways in which present and proposed international IP 
rules violate ICESCR members‘ obligations. ICESCR member states present at those 
negotiations would have a duty to take these allegations seriously and ensure that their 
negotiating stances did not violate their ICESCR obligations. As the CDIP 
coordinates the implementation of the Development Agenda Recommendations, it 
should link these to binding ICESCR obligations. 
Developing states can also use the Covenant as a ‗shield,‘ arguing that their 
binding ICESCR obligations prevent them from adopting economic or trade policies, 
or interpreting existing agreements such as TRIPS in ways which would interfere with 
their capacity to realize the rights protected by the Covenant.
145
  
Who is bound? The United States position 
I have suggested that developing countries can improve their negotiating 
position by pointing out that proposed new clauses, or interpretations of existing 
clauses, violate ICESCR obligations. Because most WTO and WIPO states have 
ratified the Covenant, this should be a useful strategy. However, the most powerful 
WTO member, the United States, is not an ICESCR state party, and is therefore not 
bound by Covenant provisions in the same way as other states. It is far more difficult 
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to make the case that the United States has duties to respect and protect the Covenant 
rights. 
 Some scholars have argued that, despite not ratifying the ICESCR, the United 
States has a duty to respect the right to health. There are two main arguments: 
First, there is the argument that the right to health is part of customary 
international law, which binds all states and does not rely on treaties. The argument is 
grounded in the widespread ratification of the ICESCR, the protection of the right to 
health in many national constitutions, and the large membership of the WHO, which 
recognizes a right to health in its founding Constitution.
146
 Some argue that the 
UDHR (including its right to health
147
) has become part of customary law, although 




The customary law argument has two main weaknesses. One is that it is 
extremely difficult to identify rules of customary law. Customary international law 
arises from the settled practice of states (usus) accompanied by the acceptance of an 
obligation to be bound (opinio juris sive necessitates).
149
 However, states and scholars 
disagree about the nature of ‗settled practice‘ and ‗opinio juris‘.
150
 How one defines 
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and recognizes practice and opinio juris, will determine whether the right to health 
has customary law status, leaving its status extremely controversial.
151
 
The second weakness is that even if the right to health is considered to be part 
of customary international law, the United States does not recognize this right. Recent 
American administrations have ‗categorically denied that there is any such thing as an 
economic, a social, or a cultural human right.‘
152
 The Reagan administration 
consistently portrayed economic and social rights as illegitimate socialist 
inventions,
153
 and, even after the Cold War, social and economic rights have often 
continued to be viewed as ‗foreign‘ to the American legal system,
154
 and as mere 
‗utopian ‗goals‘ or aspirations,
155
 to be distinguished from ‗ ―real‖, enforceable, civil 
or political rights.‘
156
     
States can be bound to rules of customary law only on the basis of their 
consent, and ‗persistent objectors‘ are not bound by customary rules to which they 
have consistently objected.
157
 Some scholars contend that states are bound by certain 
rules of customary international law even if they have been persistent objectors to the 
rules in question,
158
 but this is a controversial view.  Even if accepted, it would be 
unlikely to apply to the right to health or to other social and economic rights.
159
 
The customary law argument is therefore weak, both because it is far from 
clear that the right to health has customary law status, and because, even if it does, the 
United States has consistently rejected the idea of health as a human right. 
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The second argument is based in the United States having signed the ICESCR 
(though it has not yet ratified it), and therefore having undertaken to ‗guarantee the 
effective exercise‘ of social and economic rights.
160
 Yamin argues that ‗Third party 
states that are signatories but not parties to the ICESCR assume obligations in 
accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ―to refrain from acts 
that would contravene the object and purpose‖ of the treaty, an obligation that remains 
in force until such time as the state makes clear its intention not to become a party to 
the ICESCR.‘
161
 Thus, it is argued, international law prohibits the United States, as a 
signatory to the ICESCR, from taking steps to defeat its object and purpose.
162
 
On this basis, it could be argued that conduct which threatens the right to 
health in third party states contravenes the ‗object and purpose‘ of the ICESCR, 
something that the United States is prohibited from doing by signing the Covenant.
163
 
Although recent American administrations have consistently denied the existence of a 
‗right‘ to health (or any other social or economic right), there is some evidence of a 
change in perception (discussed below), and the signature itself could be a useful legal 
foundation on which to build important normative expectations. 
 Strategically, however, developing states should probably concentrate initially 
on those developed states with a strong tradition of social and economic rights.  As 
noted in the discussion of the TRIPS negotiations, the United States cannot easily 
make global policy on its own, but requires the support of its allies, especially Japan, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the other EU states. These states are all 
ICESCR members and bound by Covenant obligations. Most European states 
recognize certain social and economic rights in their domestic legal systems, and there 
is a far greater public consciousness of these rights in Europe than in the United 
States. Convincing these states that certain interpretations of TRIPS or new proposed 
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However, given the enormous global power of the United States it will be 
difficult to undermine its relationships with its developed-country allies even in the 
face of cogent legal arguments.
165
 It remains essential also to shift the United States‘ 
position.  This may be possible (as outlined in more detail below) using the normative 
strength of the human rights treaties in conjunction with grassroots public option.  
The United States benefits enormously from TRIPS and other international 
treaties that protect American IP exports;
166
 the US has more at stake than any other 
nation, and will probably be the least willing to compromise on protection standards. 
This will probably be true for any American administration, and is unlikely to change 
materially even if Senator Barack Obama is elected President in November 2008.
167
 
On the other hand, a Democratic Administration headed by a President with a law 
degree and an avowed long-standing commitment to social justice
168
 is less likely to 
ignore arguments based on international human rights norms or dismiss them out of 
hand, as the current administration seems willing to do.
169
 Thus, while the legal 
foundation of the United States‘ ICESCR obligations may be relatively weak until the 
Covenant is ratified, this may provide an important starting point for raising 
normative expectations in the United States. 
 I argue in more detail below that democratic governments can be persuaded to 
comply with international law, but that this depends heavily on local understandings 
of what international law requires. Acceptance of social and economic rights has 
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historically been underdeveloped in American public opinion in comparison to the 
civil and political rights protected by the United States Constitution,
170
  even in its 
legal and academic communities.
171
American public opinion is changing, however, 
and ‗the right to health‘ is a particularly useful catalyst in this regard.  
Human rights are have international legitimacy, and are 
objective, specific, and measurable 
I have argued that a strategic advantage of arguments based on the ICESCR is 
that member states have binding obligations under that treaty to negotiate and 
interpret other treaties in an ICESCR-compliant manner.  
A further strategic advantage is that these rights are objective and have 
international legitimacy.
172
 They were identified by the international community after 
long discussion and negotiation, first as part of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and then as part of the Covenant itself.
173
 Almost all states have signed both 
the UDHR and ICESCR.
174
 Together with the UDHR and the ICCPR, the ICESCR is 
part of the International Bill of Rights, which enhances its status above most other 
treaties.
175
 It impossible for ICESCR states parties to deny the validity and legitimacy 
of the Covenant rights. Philip Alston has observed that ‗characterization of a specific 
goal as a human right elevates it above the rank and file of competing societal goals, 
gives it a degree of immunity from challenge, and generally endows it with an aura of 
timelessness, absoluteness and universal validity.‘
176
  
The ICESCR obligations are specific and measurable.
177
 The CESCR, an 
independent United Nations Committee which enjoys considerable international 
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 has been indispensable in this regard.  The Committee has clearly 
spelled out the duties of states and the conduct that will be regarded as a violation of 
treaty obligations, and has reached its conclusions using clear, logical, legal 
reasoning. This particularity and specificity could greatly strengthen the negotiating 
position of developing states by enabling them to identify particular clauses in 
existing treaties like TRIPS (or proposed clauses in new treaties like the SPLT), and 
then specify how their implementation would lead to a violation of the Covenant 
obligations shared by almost all of the negotiating parties. In this regard, it is useful to 
develop indicators against which state conduct (or omissions) can be measured.
179
 
Reliance on the objective and international nature of specific ICESCR 
obligations would improve the credibility of developing states‘ arguments.  They 
would not be relying merely on unilateral preferences or positions that benefit them; 
rather, they would be insisting that the international community live up to the binding 
human rights standards that it has voluntarily assumed.
 180
 
The high status of human rights instruments such as the ICESCR and the 
specificity achieved by the CESCR thus offer ‗an interpretative basis to legal actors 
that is missing in simple policy arguments about social concerns.‘
181
 Human rights 
standards provide specific limitations on what is negotiable, while stating precise 
minimum conditions which are beyond negotiation. They provide ‗a solid normative 
basis for values and policy choices which otherwise are more readily negotiable.‘
182
 
Human rights standards thus create a non-negotiable bottom line.  In my comments on 
the Doha and WIPO Development Agenda debates in Chapter 5, I noted that this is 
precisely what the developing states‘ ‗internal arguments‘ lacked. 
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A human rights approach is useful for framing positive 
agendas 
Earlier, I noted that the Doha and the Development Agenda discussions 
seemed often to go round in circles without achieving any practical plan of action; 
social and economic rights could have been useful for framing positive agendas.
183
 In 
the context of the WIPO Development discussions, for example, a human rights 




 Mary Robinson notes that all decision-makers should ‗draw upon human 
rights standards in ways that will help to improve the transparency and accountability 
and quality of their decisions.‘
185
 Taking human rights into account may suggest 
additional indicators for examination, may help when choosing among policy options, 
and will focus attention on the potential outcomes of proposed policies and 
programmes.
186
 The GFD proposal documents request these kinds of examinations; 
these requests could have been more powerful and more focused if they had been 
linked to binding human rights obligations. 
Most states prefer to avoid violating their treaty commitments,
187
 but this does 
not mean that they always fully understand what these commitments require, or how 
to reshape policy to avoid treaty violations.
188
 An explicit human rights focus can help 
them to do so. 
Why do states care?  
International law requires ICESCR states to ensure that the intellectual 
property rules in TRIPS and similar treaties do not lead to violations of ICESCR 
obligations. But do states really care what international human rights law requires? Is 
it likely to influence their behaviour?  
                                                 
183
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TRIPS has a well-developed enforcement system, and non-compliance can be 
punished by the imposition of trade sanctions in crucial sectors of the violator‘s 
economy. International human rights law, on the other hand, has comparatively weak 
enforcement machinery. In formal terms, it relies almost exclusively on reporting and 
‗naming and shaming.‘
189
 Can human rights law really make a difference to states‘ 
behaviour when it is essentially unenforceable by the international community?
190
 
Although Louis Henkin once famously observed that ‗almost all nations 
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations 
almost all of the time,‘
191
 it is clear that states do flout international law periodically.  
And it may sometimes appear that there is very little that the international community 




It is sometimes tempting to accept the view that ‗international law … is not 
really law,‘
193
 and that ultimately, it is nothing more than a reflection of international 
power and politics.
194
 Post World War II realists such as Hans Morgenthau argued 
that international law does not constrain or influence the actions of powerful states 
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when this is not in their interests, and that when diplomats and politicians claim to 
respect international law or general moral principles, this is often a veneer, hiding 
self-interested motivations.
195
 This pessimistic view of the importance and influence 
of international law sometimes persists in contemporary scholarship. Goldsmith and 
Posner argue that the major human rights treaties have had virtually no impact on 
state conduct, and that compliance with human rights standards is due to a 
‗coincidence of interest‘ – states do not violate human rights simply because it is 
usually not in their own interests to do so.
196
  
During the past two decades, however, scholars in the broad realist tradition 
have focused on other motives for international law compliance.  Although they have 
broadly understood compliance in terms of coinciding with states‘ political self-
interest, they have also tended to adopt a more nuanced and sophisticated approach 




An examination of international relations theory is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. I acknowledge the persistence of a degree of pessimism concerning the 
value of international law in general and of international human rights law in 
particular,
198
as well as considerable theoretical debate about why states usually do 
obey.
199
 I will focus here on insights from recent international law scholarship that 
seem particularly relevant and practical in examining the possible value of using a 
binding human rights treaty as part of a negotiating strategy. 
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I referred earlier to Lawrence Helfer‘s insight that developing states might 
benefit by moving IP-related discussion out of trade forums such as the WTO and into 
United Nations human rights forums, and by insisting that international trade law be 
subjected to human rights law scrutiny. ‗Institutional‘ or ‗regime‘ theorists might 
argue that this kind of regime change is potentially powerful – based on the theory 
that it is not in the long-term interests of most states to undermine the international 
institutions or regimes that states have voluntarily established to promote and ease 
international cooperation.
200
 While I do not rely on ‗regime theory‘ as an analytical 
model, it does appear that changing forums and shifting the terms of the discussion 
would be beneficial to developing states, by highlighting binding international human 
rights norms. 
Norms, epistemic communities and the disaggregated state 
Recent international law and international relations scholarship has borrowed 
ideas from the social sciences. One is the importance of ‗norms‘ in influencing 
behaviour. It is seldom possible to directly compel state compliance with international 
law. Law and society scholars have pointed out, however, that even in domestic legal 
contexts, the real power and influence of law lies not in direct enforcement or 
litigation, but rather in its ability to shape people‘s perceptions.
201
 In international 
law, scholars have argued that state action cannot be explained solely in terms of 
‗interests,‘ either foreign or domestic, but must also take into account ‗the influence 
and importance of ideas.‘
202
 
Abram and Antonia Chayes argue that enshrining values as binding legal 
norms gives them a symbolic power that reaches beyond their potential for direct 
enforcement.
203
 Most individuals accept that they are obliged to obey the law.
204
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Similarly, according to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, states accept that they 
have an obligation to abide by the legal norms in the treaties which they have ratified, 
and indeed, states do comply with their international obligations most of the time.
205
 
According to the domestic law of democratic states, governmental power itself should 
be exercised subject to the law. This adds additional normative force to the state‘s 
obligation to comply with its international legal commitments.
206
 As discussed below, 
enshrining human rights values as rules gives them an important normative force, 
which, in terms of theories like the Chayes‘, influences state behaviour. 
Many of the ‗norm-based theories‘ of state behaviour adopt a constructivist 
approach, recognizing that states and other actors are never ‗fully formed‘ and their 
interests are not ‗unchanging‘. ‗Rather, they are constituted or ―constructed‖ by and 
through interaction with one another.‘
207
 The constructivist school considers the 
importance of a state‘s ‗identity‘: its ‗sense of self as a nation.‘
208
 From this 
perspective, ‗norms do not merely constrain behaviour; rather they help shape agents‘ 
identities …‘
209
 If a state perceives itself as a law-abiding nation, to live up to its self-
expectations it will tend to comply with rules of international law even when these 
appear to conflict with other more immediate interests.
210
 Some states may see 
themselves as international ‗hegemons‘ – as states which have the moral authority to 
shape the norms and rules of the international order.
211
 Once it has taken such a 
leadership position, a state is obliged to conform to these rules, both to set an example 
to others, and to prevent undermining the normative order it has initiated.
212
  
In this regard, I would like continue examining the international human rights 
record of the United States. Historically, the United States has had a rather ambiguous 
relationship with international human rights norms. On the one hand, the United 
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States has clearly perceived itself as a ‗hegemon‘, as the ‗the land of Thomas 
Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln,‘
213
 as the country which had enshrined certain civil 




 and as the 
country which had the moral authority to be an international leader in promoting those 
rights and freedoms throughout the world.
 215
 On the other hand, given its long civil 
rights tradition, the United States has tended to perceive its own understanding of 
‗civil rights and freedoms‘ as the optimal understanding,
216
 has appeared reluctant to 
broaden its approach to include economic and social rights,
217
 and has generally 
followed a path of ‗American exceptionalism‘ with regard to certain civil rights, for 
example in the context of the death penalty.
218
  
The administration of President George W Bush has shown an unprecedented 
level of disregard for international norms and rules of all kinds, as demonstrated by 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003
219
 and by the formal repudiation in March 2001 of the 
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 the US had made in signing the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.
221
 These 
kinds of actions have undermined the United States‘ international moral authority and 
‗hegemon‘ status in the world community,
222
 something of considerable concern to 
many Americans, including Senator Obama, the Democrat presidential candidate. In 
June 2008, Obama declared that his election as the Democrat nominee ‗was the 
moment … when we ended a war, and secured our nation, and restored our image as 
the last, best hope on Earth … when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our 
planet began to heal … when we came together to remake this great nation so that it 
may always reflect our very best selves and our highest ideals.‘  He declared that: ‗We 
must once again have the courage and the conviction to lead the free world. That is 
the legacy of Roosevelt and Truman and Kennedy.‘
223
 
These are the words of a man on the campaign trail, but there is no reason to 
doubt his sincerity; Obama has consistently promised to rehabilitate America‘s 
international moral standing and leadership.
224
 It seems quite possible that a 
Democrat-led American Administration will abide by international human rights 
norms provided that it recognizes the legitimacy of these norms. It is true that, 
historically, the United States has not formally recognized international social and 
economic rights; this could change, however, if domestic and international actors 
champion the ‗internalization‘ of these rights. 
 Liberal democratic states tend not to violate norms which have become 
sufficiently ‗internalized‘.
225
 ‗Legal process‘ theorists like Harold Koh
226
 explain how 
international norms, including human rights norms, become internalized through 
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repeated interaction in international forums, and why this tends to promote 
compliance.
227
 Koh submits that the internalization process has three phases. In the 
first phase a transnational actor provokes an interaction with other actors which forces 
an interpretation of a particular global norm. The goal of this interaction is to 
convince the other parties of a particular interpretation of the norm, thereby 
generating a legal rule. If the other parties can be persuaded by this interpretation, 
they will be bound to obey it as part of their own ‗internal value sets.‘
228
 Repeated 
interactions lead to further internalization of the norms concerned, and through this 
process, norms of international law eventually acquire their ‗stickiness.‘
229
  
Koh emphasizes both transnational and domestic interactions between actors. 
It is important to recognize that ‗states‘ are not monolithic, unitary entities ‗like 
billiard balls or black boxes.‘
230
 Rather, ‗the disaggegated state‘
231
 consists of a range 
of actors and institutions, including its legislative, legal, executive and regulatory 
arms. These actors and institutions interact with each other domestically, as well as 
with their foreign counterparts.
232
   
The internalization of norms happens on a number of levels. Policy-makers are 
affected on a personal level by knowledge that their actions will be perceived to 
violate norms which have gained widespread acceptance internationally.
233
 A 
government‘s foreign interactions may also be influenced by domestic actors such as 
the legal and judicial community, the academic community, and NGOs.
234
 These 
domestic actors also internalize norms through their transnational interactions, and 
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their views can influence both domestic and foreign policy.
235
 In this regard, Koh 
stresses the importance of ‗issue networks‘ or epistemic communities within 
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, academic institutions and other private 




With reference to human rights, these communities have an important role to 
play in developing and clarifying an understanding of the rights concerned and in 
developing a ‗human rights consciousness‘ not only among the political and legal 
elite, but also at the grassroots level.
237
 Awareness and acceptance of human rights 




Using these insights to shape strategy 
Social and economic rights as legal norms 
In practice, human rights have certain inherent strengths that can be used to 
promote compliance.
239
 They are legal norms, binding those states which have ratified 
the human rights treaties. This normative aspect is important, because it creates 
expectations of compliance.
240
 Government administrations accept that they must 
comply with binding rules,
241
 and have a propensity to comply with norms that they 
have internalized.
242
 In liberal democracies particularly, members of civil society 
expect the government to b  rule-abiding and to meet its international obligations.
243
 
Conduct in violation of human rights might provoke moral outrage, but non-
compliance with a binding rule of international law ‗carries its own, additional 
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stigma, undermining the capacity of violators to defend their conduct, while 
enhancing the force of condemnation.‘
244
 
A basic first step for the internalization of norms is to stress that social and 
economic rights are rights and that states have binding obligations in this regard. As 
Yamin puts it: ‗… perhaps the greatest obstacle to advancing ESC rights … is that 
there is a lack of consciousness about ESC rights as rights, and a concomitant lack of 
indignation at the systematic violation.‘
245
 It is thus very important to develop a 
‗human rights consciousness‘ around social and economic rights.
246
  
The GFD and other developing states could have raised human rights concerns 
as part of the WIPO Development Agenda debates, and publicized the human rights 
implications of current and proposed IP treaties. This would have led to 
consciousness-raising, and the ensuing debates would have contributed to the norm 
internalization process which, as noted by Koh and others, increases the propensity of 
states to adhere to their treaty commitments.  
Clarifying what the rules require 
It is also important to clarify the content of human rights obligations and to 
specify the conduct that will violate states‘ duties. The CESCR has made a significant 
contribution, particularly with its analysis of the right to health.
247
 The Committee‘s 
more general work promoting an understanding of human rights obligations as 
obligations to fulfil, respect, and protect, also adds a very important dimension to 
understanding the consequences of state conduct.  
One of the challenges is to clarify the link between suffering in the developing 
world and the foreign economic and trade policies of the developed countries.
248
 One 
of the inherent strengths of human rights obligations is that they can be made specific 
and measurable, which makes it possible to set out clear normative standards.
249
 It is 
important to state clearly and precisely what conduct will be regarded as a violation 
(for example, an insistence that compulsory licensing should be restricted), as well as 
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the practical consequences of this violation (developing states are unable to develop 
an efficient antiretroviral provision programme, and people do not have access to 
essential medicines).
250
 The argument should be supported by data showing ‗broader 
patterns‘ that result from the violation of the rights concerned, 
251
 and it is useful to 
develop indicators against which state conduct (or omissions) can be measured.
252
 It 
is essential to be clear precisely who is responsible for the violation and what they 
should do to remedy it.
253
 
Specifying the content of human rights obligations facilitates government 
accountability for violations.
254
 The fact that human rights are binding legal 
obligations accepted by almost all states in the international community also adds to 
the legitimacy of demands for enforcement, whether from developing states, people 
living in developing countries, or the general public in the developed countries which 
has legitimate demands that their governments comply with their international 
obligations.
255
 In this sense, human rights are empowering – people have the power to 
insist that governments fulfil their duties.
256
 ‗Rights talk‘ also helps to ‗encapsulate 
and …  inform … expectations,‘
257
 ‗can have a profound influence on public 
perceptions of who is entitled to what,‘
258
 and enhances peoples‘ ‗capacity to 
aspire.‘
259
 It also provides people with an important vocabulary for demands, an 
international vocabulary that can be used to improve the prospects for international 
solidarity.
260
 Human rights have enormous power as a ‗rhetorical tool.‘
261
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It is also important to remember that as policy-makers internalize human 
rights norms, specific measures can be an important guide to help them amend 
policies and programmes so as to prevent human rights violations.
262
  
Putting this into practice 
Developing states, international human rights organizations (such as United 
Nations bodies), human rights NGOs, and academics have important roles to play in 
articulating these norms, ‗improving norm specificity‘, developing a ‗human rights 
consciousness‘ around them, and stressing the international obligations to which 
states are bound.
263
 These activities can reshape ‗domestic dialogues in law, politics, 
academia, public consciousness, civil social and the press‘,
264
 and can lead to both 
direct norm internalization by policy-makers (with the concomitant propensity to 
comply), and norm internalization by sectors of civil society. Widespread public 
acceptance of the norms will itself promote norm internalization by policy-makers, 
and result in demands from the public that their governments comply with 
international norms.
265
 It is important not to underestimate the ‗enormous rhetorical 
importance of rights … [and] their historical role in the mobilization of social 
movements, professionals, and others ….‘
266
 Epistemic communities ‗of like-minded 
rights advocates in non-governmental groups, sympathetic governments, academia, 
and the media‘
267
 have an important role in this process, working together ‗across 
national and professional boundaries to promote shared values and agendas.‘
268
  
The HIV/AIDS crisis and the Access to Medicines campaign have catalysed 
the growth of human rights consciousness among health care workers in developed 
countries. In some ways, the right to medicines campaign is a particularly effective 
                                                                                                                                            
discourse stems from its ability to constitute social events by interpreting the grievances and 
interests of actors who have some bearing on these events and to define them as violations 
that should not and need not be tolerated.‘  
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In the United States, Physicians for Human Rights
270
 has had tremendous 
success in mobilizing support from American doctors for the Access to Medicines 
Campaign.
271
 An important aspect of this work has been a re-conceptualization of the 
idea of ‗public health‘ and an explicit understanding that public health objectives are 
closely linked to human rights.
272
 Despite the American emphasis on the civil and 
political rights protected in the United States Constitution,
273
 Professor Yamin found 
that her New York  public health students ‗immediately accept the right to health in 
all of its complexity … Students generally are critical of the U.S. for not ratifying the 
[ICESCR].‘
274
 One indicator of how deeply these ideas have penetrated into the 
medical community is the number of articles appearing in major medical journals like 
The Lancet and JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association explaining 
and exploring the links between health and human rights, and advocating a human 
rights-compliant health policy, both within the United States and elsewhere.
275
 
This strategy is particularly effective in liberal democracies with a free press. 
Human rights activists can use the media to inform the public about binding human 
rights obligations and, to the extent that the norms are internalized, gain public 
support in insisting that the state comply with its international commitments and 
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international law in general.
276
 Governments facing democratic election and 
accountable to the public in other ways are sensitive to public opinion. If sufficient 
‗social outrage‘ can be generated, human rights activists might be able to create 




Human rights activists are probably most effective when they combine use of 
the media with direct lobbying of the government itself in efforts to raise 
consciousness among policy-makers and further develop the internalization of human 
rights norms.
278
 Other strategies might include NGO parallel conferences at inter-
governmental and international meetings. These activities can be ‗the key to public 
shaming and popular domestic political response … mobilizing voters, lobbying 
legislatures, endorsing candidates, disseminating information, bringing lawsuits, 
persuading the public and influencing opinion leaders.‘
279
 Slaughter has highlighted 
the importance of judicial global networks, both formal in the sense of reference to 
each others‘ precedents or participation in international and regional tribunals, and on 
a more informal personal level.
280
 Such interactions have been particularly important 
for the development and internalization of human rights norms.
281
 
This kind of campaign may be more likely to succeed in European Union 
states, which are signatories to the ICESCR, have domestic constitutions enshrining 
social and economic rights, and have to some extent internalized the idea that people 
are entitled to various social and economic rights. The strategies suggested here are 
intended to ensure that the voting public understands the existence and nature of 
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The role of NGOs and human rights organizations 
Traditionally, human rights NGOs and other community organizations have 
played important roles in monitoring compliance with human rights treaties, 
investigating and reporting violations, and raising public awareness and human rights 
consciousness.
283
 These groups are particularly important in bringing new facts and 
evidence to the fore, because their grassroots involvement provides unique insight 
into what is happening on the ground.
284




 Some organizations have extremely sophisticated publicity wings, making use 
of a wide range of public awareness tools.
286
 Over time, human rights organizations 
have become more effective in using the power of the formal press and broadcast 
media, as well as the Internet, to publicize abuses, and organize campaigns to put 
pressure on states to respond.
287
  
High profile international NGOs like Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch have been criticized for being slow to campaign for social and 
economic rights,
288
 but they have begun to do so.
289
 Other organizations campaign 
specifically on these issues,
290
 and there has been very visible campaigning for social 
and economic rights by NGO groups over the past ten years.  
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These organizations have also begun to monitor compliance with the ICESCR 
and to prepare shadow reports to the CESCR and other international organizations.
291
 
They have also conducted and published research into the patent regime and its 
effects on the availability of essential medicines, have had enormous influence within 
the UN human rights machinery, and are beginning to participate in a wider range of 
international forums.
292
 They participate formally within international organizations 
and decision-making forums,
293
 contributing actively to the drafting of international 
treaties.
294
 As noted above, transnational corporations are deeply involved in setting 
and negotiating international intellectual property standards, and involvement by not-
for-profit and human rights NGOs is needed to off-set this.
295
 Indeed, NGOs and 
social movements
296
 have succeeded to some extent in ‗transform[ing] the political 
space of rulemaking and implementation in international law,‘ especially when well-
organized and well-resourced NGOs based in developed states cooperate with 
grassroots movements in developing states.
297
 
NGO involvement is extremely valuable for internalization of human rights 
norms.  NGOs are important components of the epistemic community, and are 
                                                                                                                                            
especially when presenting reports to international organizations, which results in needless 
duplication of effort and wasted resources. 
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especially valuable as ‗transnational advocacy networks … working internationally on 
an issue … bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense 
exchanges of information and services.‘
298
 
NGO campaigning has also influenced the approach of the World Health 
Organization, which has adopted an explicitly human rights-based approach, and now 
often refers to the ‗right to health‘ or the ‗right to essential medicines.‘
299
 In marked 
contrast to the Organization‘s earlier approach,
300
 the WHO now advocates that 
developing countries use all the available TRIPS flexibilities to obtain essential 
medicines at the cheapest possible price.
301
 
In practical terms, developing states would benefit strategically by joining 
forces with NGOs based in developed countries.
302
 NGOs can offer important 
publicity, raising the awareness of the domestic electorates in developed states.
303
 
Such coalitions have already had important practical successes, particularly in the 
Access to Medicines Campaign. The American public protest leading to the 
withdrawal of US 301 sanction threats against South Africa as well as the civil suit 
brought by pharmaceutical companies
304
 resulted from the combined efforts of the 
South African Treatment Action Campaign working together with international 
NGOs.
305
 The protests also influenced the course of the subsequent Doha 
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  Wai regards this as an example of how protest outside the trade 
regime can influence ‗the political negotiation of the trade treaties themselves.‘
307
  
Conclusion: strategic advantages of a human rights approach 
In this chapter, I have argued that a human rights-based approach offers 
several strategic advantages.  All ICESCR member states have binding obligations, 
and developed states‘ extraterritorial obligations of respect forbid them from adopting 
IP policies or treaties that have a negative impact on the enjoyment of social and 
economic rights in other countries. These obligations are specific and measurable, and 
have international legitimacy, thereby offering the non-negotiable bottom line for 
international negotiations that is lacking in the internal arguments previously raised 
by developing countries. Human rights-based arguments will be even more effective 
when combined with public consciousness-raising in developed countries, which will 
pressure governments to adopt human rights-compliant foreign economic policies and 
promote norm-internalization. Although this is likely to be most effective in Europe 
and in other ICESCR member states that have long traditions of ESC protection, there 
is evidence of a growing awareness and acceptance of social and economic rights in 
the United States, and there is the possibility of a more norm-compliant United States 
administration in 2009. Developing states, together with NGOs, international 
organizations, academics, judges, and other epistemic communities should take 
advantage of opportunities to discuss social and economic rights, thus assisting in 
norm-internalization in dev loped countries. 
Concerns have been raised, however, that ‗the human rights movement might, 
on balance … be more part of the problem in today's world than part of the 
                                                                                                                                            
their South African court cases and to lowering of prices (see the discussion in Chapter 4). 
This sort of action, however, although potentially powerful, is no substitute for legislative 
reform (Wai ‗Countering‘). 
306
 Wai ‗Countering‘ at 72. 
307
 Ibid at 73. See also Plantey International Negotiation (at 404 and 522) discussing the 
impact of public opinion on the negotiations themselves, particularly as the public can learn 
of progress quickly through the mass media and Internet (at 522). However, ‗Even if, in the 
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 With this in mind, I turn now to consideration of some of the criticisms 
of a human rights-based approach as well as a discussion of some of its potential 
shortcomings. 
Potential pitfalls of a human rights approach 
Criticisms and potential weaknesses of a human rights-based approach can be 
grouped into two main categories: philosophical and practical. I will not embark on a 
philosophical discussion on the nature, inherent worth, or legitimacy of ‗human 
rights‘ or particular human rights themselves, having adopted a positivist and 
pragmatic approach: human rights exist and are valid because they are enshrined in 
international treaties, declarations and Covenants. 
Many writers and activists remain sceptical about the political motives of 
those adopting a human rights approach. The linkage of human rights to trade 
particularly has a controversial history:  in the past, developed states have sometimes 
employed human rights standards in the context of the WTO Agreements as 
apparently non-protectionist (and therefore permissible) trade barriers to developing 
countries‘ goods regarded as cheap because of inadequate labour standards.
309
 As a 
result, developing states have been resistant to ‗rights talk‘ in the WTO context,
310
 




However, the human rights approach to trade and intellectual property adopted 
by the United Nations and others in recent years takes a very different approach, 
focusing on the ways in which social and economic rights may be violated by the 
trade regime. In particular, the approach focuses on the role of the more powerful and 
wealthy states in shaping global trade and intellectual property rules, and their 
insistence that less powerful states implement these rules regardless of the damage 
this might cause to their local economic and social programmes. 
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Among the critics of the human rights movement is Makau Mutua, who 
perceives the current human rights project as the modern successor to colonialism.
312
 
Mutua argues that, in a manner reminiscent of 19
th
 missionaries and colonialists who 
spoke of ‗civilizing the savage‘, the subtext of the contemporary human rights 
movement is ‗marked by a damning metaphor‘ of ‗savages-victims-saviors.‘
313
 Within 
this subtext, the human rights movement is the ‗redeemer,‘ which can save various 
‗victims‘ (usually the poor and powerless of the south) from modern-day ‗savages‘ 
(usually identified as developing-state governments).
314
 The human rights regime 
presents itself as politically and ideologically neutral and as embodying certain 
universal truths. Mutua argues that it is instead founded on selected western 
philosophical and political principles, and based on ‗materialism, self-interest, and 
―ideology;‖‘
315
 at base, it seeks to install western-style liberal political democracy and 
free market principles everywhere, remaking the world in the western image.
316
 
Ignatieff has also observed that in contemporary times, ‗As the West intervenes ever 
more frequently but ever more inconsistently in the affairs of other societies, the 
legitimacy of its rights standards is put into question. Human rights is increasingly 
seen as the language of a moral imperialism just as ruthless and just as self-deceived 
as the colonial hubris of yesteryear ….‘
317
 
Some of the cynicism towards human rights project approaches ‗arises 
particularly when the human rights movement [is] identified with the United 
States,‘
318
 and human rights are used to maintain the global status quo.
319
 The core 
‗global‘ human rights programme currently championed by the United States 
expressly rejects social and economic rights, favouring some kinds of human rights 
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 Ignatieff Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry at 19-20. Many writers have noted that the 
bourgeois civil liberties protected by 18
th
 century documents such as the United States Bill of 
Rights and the French Declaration on the Rights of Man particularly protected rights such as 
private property, free speech, and freedom of association which were necessary for the rising 
middle class. Once established, these rights, ‗especially the right to property, came to be used 
to impede further change, not as an instrument for political change.‘ (Donnelly Universal 
Human Rights at 29). See also Stammers ‗Social movements‘ at 988. 
318
 Mutua Human Rights at 6. 
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 The favoured rights continue to be those that ‗guarantee liberal 
freedoms as a prerequisite for the pursuit of private satisfactions [and] … At the heart 
of this necessity is the right to enjoy and dispose of property arbitrarily, free of all 
social or political hindrances, except those commensurate with the equal rights of 
others.‘
321
 The role of the state in protecting human rights is ‗limited to protecting 
civil and political rights associated with free market economics. Although this limited 
set of civil and political rights is vigorously defended, the liberal ideal of limited 
government severely constrains the state‘s ability to secure economic, social and 
cultural rights.‘
322
 As a result, the global civil rights programme seems to offer 
impediment rather than hope for those living in poverty.
323
 
The approach advocated in this dissertation, however, is based on the social 
and economic rights in the ICESCR, and seems to avoid many of these criticisms; 
scholars and activists championing social and economic rights view the Covenant as 
‗a radical project that can serve the interests of the poor.‘
324
 Paul Farmer, for example, 
consistently critiques ‗―liberal‖ views on human rights‘
325
 – defined as those which 
ignore social and economic rights – and much of his work is aimed at ending 
suffering through meaningful redistribution of the world‘s affluence. Alicia Yamin 
argues that it is time to promote rights to social and economic entitlements, thereby 
using the human rights regime to ‗subvert the naturalness of … dominant economic 
assumptions.‘
326
 Paul Hunt, the UN Rapporteur on the Right to Health, adopts a 
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Furthermore, global neoliberalism and the decline of the welfare state appear 
to have encouraged the ‗globalization‘ of a more radical grassroots human rights 
discourse.
328
 Economic globalization and neoliberal policies can be viewed as 
fundamentally ‗antithetical to human rights,‘ and as ‗creat[ing] conditions of 
increasing oppression.‘
329
 Under these circumstances, ‗civil society increasingly turns 
to human rights discourse and doctrine to defend itself. … As a response to the 
negative impact of neoliberal globalization, human rights has emerged as an important 
discourse of resistance movements all over the world.‘
330
 
Grassroots adoption of human rights discourse as a tool to be used in local (or 
broader) political, social, and economic struggles suggests an important shift in the 
use and meaning of ‗human rights‘. Stammers notes that grassroots social movements 
have increasingly adopted and used human rights discourse as a ‗challenge to 
power.‘
331
 The human rights discourse may function as a powerful mobilizing tool, 
allowing actors to recast grievances and demands as ‗violations.‘
332
 
On the other hand, anthropologists and other ‗non-lawyers‘ are dubious about 
the ‗legalization of rights‘
333
 or ‗politics by other means.‘
334
 They note a tendency in 
the human rights community to make moral and political claims justiciable.
335
  While 
individuals and groups may articulate social norms and moral claims in a number of 
different ways, human rights activists perceive that ‗in the rough-and-tumble of 
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national and international politics such articulations must be enforceable in a court of 
law if they are to endure.‘
336
 Some criticisms of this process suggest that it is 
depoliticizing: ‗it turns political problems into technical legal problems‘;
337
 ‗it uses 
the bureaucratic and legal system, but does not challenge it‘;
338
 and it ‗raises false 
expectations that the state can solve social and economic problems.‘
339
 A related 
criticism is that rights discourse may accentuate ‗an individualistic notion of the 
political subject and in this manner [hinder] massive grass roots mobilization.‘
340
 
Stammers notes that human rights discourses may either ‗challenge‘ or 
‗sustain‘ existing power relations, depending on the context and how they are used.
341
 
He warns that ‗institutionalization‘ of human rights is more likely to lead to 
maintenance of the status quo than to a meaningful challenge to power.
342
 Brown 
echoes these concerns, arguing that ‗rights‘ may become a way of containing and 
limiting resistance, and that rights-talk may become ‗a regulatory discourse, a means 
of obstructing or co-opting more radical political demands.‘
343
 This can work both 
ways, however. History is replete with examples of resistance movements which have 




                                                 
336
 Wilson ‗Tyrannosaurus lex‘ at 351. He notes that, this strategy has been successful 
sometimes and that this has ‗exacerbated the tendency to channel societal discord into the 
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social and material conflicts … a e now expressed by local political actors in such a way that 
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Ultimately, most authors conclude that use of human rights norms can indeed 
achieve practical and welcome results, and should not be rejected out of hand.  
Human rights need to be employed strategically and carefully.
345
 
Sidelining of human rights in unthreatening forums 
Related to the concerns raised in the previous section, Helfer notes that regime 
shifting as a strategy may have unintended and negative results. Powerful states might 
indulge the emergence of new norms in alternative regimes – such as the human rights 
evaluations and critiques of TRIPS – because they function as a ‗safety valve.‘
346
 It 
might be very strategic to allow these norms to develop in forums where they do not 
directly threaten rules and principles discussed in forums such as the WTO.
347
 
Similarly, developed states have little to lose by agreeing to vaguely-worded soft-law 
declarations, which might relieve some of the political pressure (including that 
generated by publicity back home) without directly impacting such hard law treaties 
as TRIPS.
348
 For developed states, non-binding declarations are preferable to 
changing treaties; thus ‗regime shifting might actually serve the industrialized states‘ 
interests by diverting attention and resources from potentially effective treaty-making 
efforts in WIPO or the WTO while simultaneously creating the appearance of sharing 
developing countries‘ concerns over imbalanced intellectual property standards.‘
349
  
This thesis has focused on ‗hard law‘ – the binding human rights in the 
ICESCR. Without question, the development of a human rights critique of the IP 
system and the identification of potential violations of binding human rights 
commitments can promote norm-internalization, and impact the conduct of developed 
states in international negotiation.  
Nevertheless, generating ‗soft law‘ counterregime norms might also change 
perspectives generally and thereby influence thinking within the WTO and WIPO. 
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The generation of counterregime norms to the dominant notion that IP should be 
protected with little critical examination of its effects on the public interest could be 
very important as a ‗way to subvert the prevailing legal landscape and provide fuel for 




The influence and importance of soft law is illustrated by the international 
negotiations over climate change. Eckersley argues that the European Union had a 
‗hegemon‘ status as a ‗green leader‘,
351
 and that internalization of ‗green norms‘ 
among European states, as well as their ‗green‘ self-identities
352
 was material to their 
continued promotion of the Kyoto agenda in the face of growing United States 
opposition.
353
 She points out that the soft norms generated by the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992
354
 were not inconsequential,
355
 
because they made it virtually impossible for the United States, a signatory, to engage 
in ‗subterfuge either in orchestrating ‗non-decision‘ or in getting other states to agree 
to legal norms that would undermine the principles of the UNFCCC.‘
356
 Indeed, the 
United States made no moves to renege on its soft commitments during subsequent 
negotiations in 1997 and 2000.
357
 She concludes that an assumption that ‗only binding 
legal norms are consequential would seem to be … naïve ….‘
358
 
The human rights approach endorses western understandings of IP 
The notion of ‗universal human rights‘ appropriate to all communities in all 
contexts has been extremely controversial.
359
 While I recognize the important 
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contributions of cultural relativists to discussion of human rights, the more 
philosophical parts of this debate fall outside of the scope of my dissertation. I believe 
that my discussion of some of the ways in which grassroots communities have used 
human rights as a resource for shaping the human rights discourse in new and locally 
meaningful ways responds to some of the relativists‘ concerns.  
One relativist criticism that is pertinent to this discussion is that the dominant 
human rights approach to intellectual property appears to endorse culturally-specific, 
‗western‘ understandings of creativity and invention.
360
 The dominant human rights 
narrative does not reject the IP system out of hand, but rather, seeks only ‗to contain 
its effects.‘
361
 For Okediji, endorsement of the IP system, even in some revised form, 




The current global IP system can be understood as ‗western‘ in the sense that 
its principles have evolved from European and Anglo-American traditions. There are 
some differences in the philosophical foundations of European and Anglo-American 
intellectual property law:
363
 The Europeans based recognition of intellectual property 
on individual moral rights (identified in France as the droit moral
364
 and in Germany 
as part of a separate ‗immaterial property right‘ (immaterialgüterrecht)),
365
 based 
historically on the premise that creative or inventive works reflect or embody part of 
the author‘s personality.
366
 The Anglo-American tradition was partly premised on 
John Locke‘s labour theory of property, whereby a person acquired ownership of 
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anything he or she created whether this be tangible or intangible.
367
 This 
understanding was subsequently reshaped to emphasize the value of creative works 
and inventions to the broader community, and IP monopolies were increasingly 
justified on utilitarian grounds.
368
  
However, the historical philosophical differences between the two systems 
have perhaps been exaggerated,
369
 and the global intellectual property regime as 
negotiated over the past two decades is probably best described as a version of the 
(predominantly) Anglo-American system with the addition of the (predominantly) 
European concept of moral rights. In this way, it can be called a ‗western‘ system, 
emerging from the United States, the United Kingdom, and continental Europe. 
Okediji offers a general critique of the human rights system as a reflection of 
northern liberal values, which emphasize individual rights and individual property 
ownership.
370
 The ICESCR right set out in Article 15(1)(c) recognizes creators‘ and 
inventors‘ material interest in their creations, as well as their moral rights to their 
works. Okediji argues that both human rights and the intellectual property rights are 
based on the idea of individual authors and inventors having exclusive moral and 
material rights to their creations. 
She points out, however, that this model is not shared in much of the South, 
and creates a danger that uncritical adoption of an individualized and commodified 
view of creation and invention by human rights campaigners could be viewed as 
fundamentally arrogant, and as a quasi-colonial imposition of western understandings 
and capitalist economic relations on the rest of humanity.  
Many authors have observed that the modern international IP system reflects 
historically western understandings of intellectual property, based on a philosophy of 
possessive individualism. The system‘s foundational premises might therefore violate 
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the rights of those in traditional communities where cultural and scientific knowledge 
and applications are not commodified but considered to be developed by groups 
collectively and for their collective benefit.  As observed by United Nations 
Rapporteur Erica Daes: ‗Indigenous peoples do not view their heritage in terms of 
property at all … but in terms of community and individual responsibility.‘
371
  
Because western intellectual property law requires the identification of 
individual authors or inventors,
372
 documentary evidence of creations and inventions, 
and a date from which copyright or patent protection can be measured, indigenous and 
traditional knowledge produced in communal settings and in oral cultures often fails 
to meet the requirements.
373
 
It is clear that the current western intellectual property system has failed to 
offer adequate protection either to those communities who wish their indigenous 
knowledge to remain private, secret, or sacred,
374
 or who otherwise object to its 
removal from its original context and commercialization by outsiders.
375
 It has also 
failed to protect those groups who are happy to share their knowledge, but who object 
to biopiracy or the use of valuable indigenous or traditional knowledge with no 
recompense to the communities who discovered or invented it.
376
  





 for example, have initiated projects and programmes 
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to investigate the protection of indigenous knowledge, while the United National 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) established a Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in 1982, which in 1994 produced a Draft 
Declaration on the Rights on Indigenous Peoples,
379
 recognizing a collective right to 
protect and develop cultural traditions (Article 12) and to full ownership and control 
of indigenous intellectual property (Article 29). The Convention on Biological 
Diversity
380
 requires states to  
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of 
indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity 
and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of 
the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage 
the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such 
knowledge, innovations and practices.
381
  
There have also been numerous attempts by regional and national authorities 
to recognize and protect indigenous and traditional knowledge systems.
382
 
These sui generis and other schemes raise some complicated, difficult and 
controversial questions:
383
 It can be extremely difficult to define ‗indigenous 
communities‘ or ‗indigenous knowledge‘, or to distinguish them from ‗local 
communities‘ and ‗community knowledge‘ or ‗traditional communities‘ and 
‗traditional knowledge‘. Anthropologists have also raised serious questions about how 
to define the communities concerned – what are the ‗borders‘ of a particular 
community? Is it possible to identify the ‗traditional‘? Is it possible to identify 
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traditional knowledge that a particular community has developed on its own (and for 
which it therefore deserves compensation)? Who should establish which knowledge a 
particular community has itself borrowed in the course history?
384
 What happens 
when two different communities claim the same or similar ‗traditional knowledge‘ – 
particularly if they cannot agree whether, how, or on what terms such knowledge 
should be made more widely available?
385
 Who has the authority to speak on behalf of 
a particular community or make decisions on the community‘s behalf?
386
 How is it 




In General Comment 17, the CESCR tried to interpret Article 15(1)(c) in ways 
that do not necessarily endorse western conceptions of the ‗romantic author‘
388
 or the 
individual inventor, and extended the ‗moral rights‘ concept to include the rights of 
communities, and of indigenous communities in particular. The Committee looked not 
only at individual inventors and creators but also at the ‗protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
indigenous peoples.‘
389
 Paragraph 9 specifies that ‗any scientific, literary or artistic 
production‘ includes the ‗knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and 
local communities,‘ thus perhaps broadening the scope beyond what might usually be 
defined as ‗indigenous communities.‘
390
 
The CESCR requires that ‗States should adopt measures to ensure the 
effective protection of the interests of indigenous peoples relating to their productions, 
which are often expressions of their cultural heritage and traditional knowledge.‘
391
 
General Comment 17 thus identifies a specific legal obligation to establish a system 
for the recognition and protection of indigenous and local knowledge, ensuring the 
protection of the moral and material interests of the communities concerned. 
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To some extent, this interpretation of Article 15 is illustrative of Merry‘s 
observation that neither the concept ‗rights‘ nor that of ‗culture‘ is fixed and 
unchanging.
392
 On the one hand, ‗The notion of rights deployed within transnational 
human rights talk has stretched to include a broad range of new meanings well beyond 
its individualistic European forebear;‘
393
 on the other, ‗globalization and capitalist 




The CESCR‘s interpretation of Article 15 is potentially consistent with 
alternative community-based understandings of creation and invention. 
Fundamentally, it seeks to respect the understandings of these communities, and could 
be used as a defence by those who resist commodification or other unauthorized uses 
of indigenous knowledge and culture. Similarly, this interpretation could be used as a 
defence against unauthorized and uncompensated appropriation of indigenous 
knowledge. 
For these reasons, it appears that the human rights narrative, at least as 
employed by the CESCR, has attempted to rely on the ICESCR rights, including 
Article 15, while seeking to avoid the imposition of western understandings of 
intellectual property universally. 
Owners‟ rights 
Okediji also notes that the commitment to Article 15 necessarily implies 
recognition of authors‘ and creators‘ moral and material interests; she views this as a 
potential pitfall of the human rights approach.
395
 This issue was discussed in Chapter 
6 as part of my discussion on Article 15(1)(c). 
Pitfalls: conclusions 
The criticisms and potential dangers of a human rights approach discussed in 
this section need to be considered, and avoided. It appears, however, that an approach 
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built on the ICESCR, and respectful of the various cultural and scientific traditions, is 

















My primary thesis is that it would be strategically advantageous for 
developing countries to adopt a human rights approach when negotiating the IP policy 
space available to them in terms of international IP rules.  
The establishment of a patent system involves important policy decisions. The 
underlying justification for the patent system is that it will encourage innovation from 
which society will benefit, thus furthering the public good and promoting 
development. But because it is based on market monopolies, the patent system entails 
inherent social costs, and states should attempt to achieve a balance between those 
costs and diffusion of the benefits the system generates. Patent monopolies may also 
sometimes impede rather than promote innovation – for xample, by limiting access 
to important upstream research and tools. In both cases (the balance between social 
costs and benefits, and the internal balance required to maximize innovation) 
economists are unable to determine optimal levels of protection. They agree, however, 
that optimal protection levels will vary for different goods, industries and economic 
contexts, and that protection levels deemed appropriate in developed economies are 
not appropriate for developing countries.  
Developed states, often encouraged by their own powerful knowledge 
industries, have negotiated international treaties which have raised IP protection 
standards in all countries. The treaties reduce the IP policy space available to 
countries by establishing minimum international protection standards and other rules 
which curtail developing states‘ freedom to set domestic IP policy in ways that will 
best promote innovation in their contexts or respond to urgent social needs such as the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic.  
Developing states have tried to regain the policy space within which to 
establish appropriate domestic IP policies, relying in international negotiations on 














At the Doha talks in 2001 and 2003, developing states relied on a ‗welfare 
enhancing‘ narrative, and on TRIPS Articles 7 and 8, which supported their claims 
that intellectual property protection must promote the public interest, and public 
health particularly. Their arguments were based on pressing public health needs – 
particularly the need to respond the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The Developing Countries 
Group pointed out that patent rights should be exercised in a way that achieves a 
balance between the rights of the patent-holders and the needs of the users ‗in a 




This was an ‗internal argument‘ based on first principles of the intellectual 
property system: the primary rationale for the IP system is to benefit the public good; 
governments must be able to adjust IP rules to ensure that the social costs of patent 
monopolies do not outweigh their benefits.  
Developed states did not dispute the public benefit objectives of the IP system. 
They agreed that this was precisely what the patent system was designed to achieve – 
the development of useful new technologies such as pharmaceuticals that benefit 
public health. However, they argued that high protection levels are necessary to 
ensure that the system fulfils this function. When developing states pointed out that 
TRIPS provides that the protection of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
social welfare,
2
 and that member states may adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health,
3
 the developed states countered that intellectual property protection 
itself promotes public health objectives by encouraging the development of useful 
new medicines, and is indeed essential to this end. This kind of circular discussion 
could continue forever because it is based on the inherent tension within the patent 
system – the balance between monopoly benefits and consequent social costs. 
Economists and other theorists are unable to resolve this tension by identifying 
optimal protection levels.  
However, economists have established the theoretical benefits of differential 
pricing to originator pharmaceutical companies, and it appears that neither the sale of 
discounted essential drugs in developing-country markets nor the manufacture of 
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generic copies under compulsory licence would have a negative impact on profits, or 
undermine the patent system‘s capacity to provide incentives to develop HIV/AIDS 
drugs. 
To a large extent, the weakness of the developing states‘ public health 
argument was that it attempted to balance the rights of patent-holders with the needs 
of consumers without supplying a mechanism for identifying a bottom line at which 
the immediate needs of the public to life-saving medicines become non-negotiable. 
Intellectual property theory itself is unable to provide a bottom line at which the short-
term social costs associated with patent monopolies must be deemed unacceptable, 
regardless of the anticipated longer-term benefits. 
. The human rights regime, on the other hand, provides measurable and non-
negotiable benchmarks, while offering greater clarity and detail, as well as the 
normative force of high-status and binding international treaties. 
Beginning in 2004 at the WIPO Development Agenda talks, the Group of 
Friends of Development broadened the developing states‘ negotiating stance to 
include more general ‗development‘ concerns. The GFD appear to have had in mind a 
people-orientated concept of ‗development‘, which focused on the importance of 
disseminating the products of the IP system (such as medicines). They repeatedly 
stressed the importance of improvements in health, public welfare, nutrition, and 
education, thus promoting the important human dimension of development – from this 
perspective, the key goal of development is to improve the quality of life for 
everyone.  
The developed states ignored the question of diffusion of IP goods, and 
continued to insist that IP protection in itself promotes economic ‗development‘, 
without critically examining economic studies showing a more nuanced picture, or 
analyzing the broader concept ‗development‘ itself. They appeared to view 
macroeconomic development as the end goal, and their focus was on growing the 
economy generally. Central to all this was the concept of ‗technological 
development‘, promoted by IP protection, as the engine behind the growth of 
industry, the expansion of trade, and macroeconomic growth. 
From this perspective, increasing the levels of IP protection is an inherently 













that intellectual property protection played in fostering economic development,‘ noted 
that WIPO‘s mission was ‗to promote the protection of intellectual property 
throughout the world,‘ and concluded that ‗because strong intellectual property 
protection [is] a fundamental part of any nation‘s sound economic policies, by its very 
nature, WIPO‘s mission, as currently elaborated, promoted economic development.‘
4
 
As a result of the Development Agenda discussions, the WIPO General 
Assembly adopted 45 specific Recommendations in 2007. If implemented, the 
Recommendations have the potential to solve some of WIPO‘s internal problems: 
they include mechanisms for evaluation, transparency, accountability, and more 
inclusive and informed decision-making and norm-setting, including participation by 
outside experts and non-profit NGOs.  
Despite these important gains, the Recommendations still offer no clear 
benchmarks against which to assess the ‗development considerations‘ which should 
be incorporated into WIPO‘s technical assistance programmes.
5
  In addition, while the 
Recommendations provide that norm-setting shall ‗take into consideration a balance 
between costs and benefits‘ and ‗take into account different levels of development‘,
6
 
they do not provide any non-negotiable benchmarks or bottom lines at which short-
term costs become unacceptable. Indeed, it is not clear that the Recommendations 
offer any more guidance than TRIPS‘s existing flexibilities, nor that they will avert 
the circular debate that characterized the WIPO Development Agenda discussions and 
the Doha talks. In all those discussions, members agreed that there must be ‗a balance 
between costs and benefits,‘ but could not agree on how this balance should be struck. 
My thesis is that an explicit human rights-based approach, linked to precise 
and binding norms, could prevent this kind of circular non-engagement by pointing to 
clear, absolute, and non-negotiable bottom lines that are less vulnerable to general and 
theoretical discussion. Developing states‘ arguments would be stronger if they were 
able to stipulate a legally binding non-negotiable bottom line at which the social costs 
of patent protection could no longer be considered acceptable or reasonable, but 
would constitute violations of binding international treaties. 
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The human rights system provides this bottom line. The 159 States which have 
ratified the ICESCR
7
 have binding obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the human 
rights set out in the treaty. The CESCR, ‗the most authoritative bod[y] … for 
determining the scope of the [ICESCR] obligations‘
8
 issues periodic General 
Comments, which are ‗the most authoritative interpretations of the provisions of the 
Covenant.‘
9
 Through the General Comments, the CESCR has successfully provided 
specific and non-negotiable benchmarks that states must meet to avoid violating their 
ICESCR commitments.  
The CESCR‘s General Comment 14 on The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, for example, identifies a specific, measurable, non-derogable 
minimum core right to essential medicines, including certain antiretroviral medicines 
required for combating HIV/AIDS.
10
 While available resources may make it 
impossible for states to purchase and distribute HIV/AIDS drugs immediately to all 
who need them, they must make the best effort possible within their resources, 
including efforts to obtain essential medicines at affordable prices. In this regard, 
states have immediate and non-derogable minimum core obligations to adopt and 
implement pharmaceutical strategies aimed at acquiring essential medicines from 
reliable suppliers at the lowest possible prices, thus ensuring that essential drugs are 
available and affordable, particularly to the poor. The ability to issue compulsory 
licences for generic medicines is a crucial component of such strategies. Developing 




Beyond policy, developing states also have minimum core obligations to 
actually provide essential medicines to their residents. Resource constraints may make 
it impossible for them to provide universal access immediately, but they will violate 
their obligations of respect if they adopt policies that actively impede access to 
essential medicines, for example, by adopting policies that make access to generic 
drugs more difficult. States also have an obligation to protect their residents from 
excessive pricing of essential medicines by private pharmaceutical companies. One 
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way to control prices is through compulsory licensing. States will violate their 
obligation to protect if they adopt policies which make such means of control as 
compulsory licensing more difficult. 
Thus, in order to comply with their ICESCR obligations, developing states 
must ensure that they retain enough IP policy space to pass domestic laws allowing 
them to develop pharmaceutical policies that provide access to generic drugs where 
necessary. They will violate their ICESCR obligations if they enter into other treaties 




Most of the developed states also have ICESCR obligations. With regard to 
the right to health, the developed states‘ extraterritorial obligations of respect mean 
that they must not conduct themselves in ways that impede access to medicines for 
people living in developing countries. It is a principle of international law that states 
which have ratified human rights treaties violate these treaty commitments if they 
enter into other treaties which are inconsistent with their existing human rights 
commitments.
13
  States violate their ICESCR obligations if they conclude agreements 
with developing countries that make it more difficult for those countries to provide 
access to essential medicines or to adopt and implement suitable pharmaceutical 
strategies. Developed states also violate their ICESCR obligations if they conclude 
agreements with developing countries that make it more difficult for them to 
manufacture generics, or to find a foreign country from which to import them. States 
should not, therefore, ratify treaties which oblige them to adopt intellectual property 
policies that infringe upon the right to health of people in other countries. Nor should 
they coerce other states to sign agreements which have the effect of violating the right 
to health of their residents. States‘ obligations to respect human rights extend to their 
participation in international organizations, where states must use their influence to 
ensure that the programmes and policies of organizations of which they are members 
do not violate human rights. 
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While the extraterritorial obligation to protect is less well-developed than the 
obligation of respect, it could be argued that developed states have an obligation to 
control excessive pricing practices by pharmaceutical companies in their jurisdictions, 
and that they should retain the necessary policy space to make this possible. 
Because the CESCR (an international Committee of high standing with de 
facto authority to pronounce on the matter), has specified the Article 12 right to health 
obligations in enough detail, the obligations can provide a very clear-cut bottom line 
for negotiations.  
Article 15 of the ICESCR has the potential to offer similar non-negotiable 
benchmarks regarding some of the other challenges facing developing countries, 
particularly research-tool patents, the fostering of local innovation, research into 
neglected diseases, and international cooperation. Article 15 could offer guidance on 
the development of optimal research models for the development of science and 
diffusion of its benefits. However, it remains a comparatively ‗―underdeveloped‖ 
human right, insufficiently analysed or discussed in State reports submitted to the 
[CESCR].‘
14
 The CESCR has not yet issued a General Comment on the parts of 
Article 15 relevant to research-tool patents, research models, and the development and 
diffusion of science and its benefit. General Comment 17 on Article 15(1)(c) is useful, 
however, for its recognition of community rights to creations and inventions; 
specifying the minimum core rights for individual authors and inventors at modest 
levels which will not, in practice, obstruct potentially the competing core rights to 
health and food; and clarifying that compulsory licensing should include the payment 
of reasonable compensation. 
I have argued that social and economic rights cannot be strategically useful 
unless they are perceived as precise obligations. Parties‘ obligations must be specific 
and detailed, and violations must be clearly identified.  While the CESCR has 
successfully specified the Article 12 obligations in enough detail that the obligations 
can provide a very clear-cut bottom line in negotiations, I do not believe that Article 
15 is yet sufficiently jurisprudentially developed to make as powerful a case based on 
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the right to ‗enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications,‘
15
 the  state‘s 
duty to promote the ‗development and the diffusion of science,‘
16
 and respect for ‗the 
freedom indispensable for scientific research.‘ Article 15 does not yet have the clear-
cut specificity that has been developed for Article 12, and is therefore is likely to be 
less useful in negotiations at present. 
Where rights have been as clearly specified as the right to health, they can be 
used as countering tools in international negotiations around IP policy space. For 
states that have ratified the Covenant, ICESCR obligations must prevail over 
trade principles, and intellectual property rules or policies that violate human 
rights must change so that they become human rights-compliant.
17
 
A human rights-based negotiating strategy has the following strategic 
advantages: 
[1] ICESCR obligations are binding: States which have ratified the 
ICESCR have binding obligations under that treaty to respect, protect, and fulfil 
ICESCR rights domestically, and to respect ICESCR rights extraterritorially. 
They violate these obligations if they assume obligations under new treaties that 
make it impossible or extremely difficult for them to meet their ICESCR 
obligations; or if they interpret treaties in ways that impede ICESCR obligations.  
[2] ICESCR obligations have international legitimacy and carry high 
status: Almost all WIPO and WTO states have ratified ICESCR
18
 and cannot 
deny the validity and legitimacy of the Covenant rights. The ICESCR has high 
status as part of the International Bill of Rights.  
[3] ICESCR obligations are objective, specific, and measurable:  The 
CESCR has clearly spelled out the duties of states and the conduct that will be 
regarded as a violation of treaty obligations for some ICESCR rights (including the 
right to health). It has reached its conclusions using clear, logical, legal reasoning. 
This particularity and specificity could greatly strengthen the negotiating position 
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of developing states by enabling them to identify particular clauses in existing 
treaties like TRIPS (or proposed clauses in new treaties like the SPLT), and then 
specify how their implementation would lead to a violation of the Covenant 
obligations shared by almost all of the negotiating parties.  
For these reasons, the ICESCR offers ‗an interpretative basis to legal 
actors that is missing in simple policy arguments about social concerns.‘
19
 
Human rights standards provide specific limitations on what is negotiable, while 
stating precise minimum conditions which are beyond negotiation. They provide 
‗a solid normative basis for values and policy choices which otherwise are more 
readily negotiable.‘
20
 Thus, human rights standards create a clear and non-
negotiable bottom line.   
In the Doha and WIPO Development Agenda debates, human rights 
obligations could have been used in discussions regarding an acceptable 
‗balance‘ between the costs and benefits of IP protection. For example, 
developing states could have pointed out that inter retations of TRIPS (or 
proposals at WIPO) which impede states‘ abilities to establish appropriate 
pharmaceutical policies or provide access to essential medicines violate the 
existing ICESCR obligations of most of the negotiating parties. In future 
negotiations, identifying access to essential medicines as a ‗minimum core‘ right 
could be strategically useful, because the minimum core concept adds importance, 
priority, precision and a useful bottom line to the claim for policy space necessary to 
widen access to essential medicines. This could be indispensable when discussing the 
balance between social costs and benefits in international IP negotiations. Less-
protectionist interpretations of TRIPS are mandatory for ICESCR member states to 
avoid violating their ICESCR commitments. 
As the Development Agenda Recommendations are implemented, 
developing states can avoid a regression to the circular ‗balance‘ and 
‗development‘ discussions that have characterized previous debates, and promote 
a positive agenda, by linking the Recommendations to the binding ICESCR 
obligations. They can also insist that, as a UN agency, WIPO is obliged to 
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promote the UN‘s human rights priorities, and should not, therefore, promote 
policies which violate international human rights treaties such as the ICESCR. 
States can negotiate protection levels, but ICESCR members must not insist 
on, or agree to, protection levels that have the effect of violating their ICESCR 
obligations. For ICESCR members at least, the universe of all possible policy options 
is reduced to those options which do not violate the ICESCR 
 In practice, a human rights-based approach could strengthen developing 
states‘ positions in international negotiating forums. When values are established as 
binding norms, they acquire important symbolic power.
21
 Liberal democratic 
governments are usually motivated to obey the law, and to appear to be law-abiding. 
Members of civil society expect their governments to be rule-abiding and to meet 
their international obligations. Conduct in violation of human rights might provoke 
moral outrage, but non-compliance with a binding rule of international law ‗carries its 
own, additional stigma, undermining the capacity of violators to defend their conduct, 
while enhancing the force of condemnation.‘
22
 Faced with a well-developed human 
rights-based case, liberal administrations will be obliged to account for their actions, 
and in most cases, will also feel obliged to meet their obligations.   
Many of the norm-based theories of state behaviour adopt a constructivist 
approach, which considers the importance of a state‘s ‗identity‘: its ‗sense of self 
as a nation.‘
23
 From this perspective, ‗norms do not merely constrain behaviour; 
rather they help shape agents‘ identities ….‘
24
 If a state perceives itself as law-
abiding, to live up to its self-expectations it will tend to comply with rules of 
international law even when these appear to conflict with other more immediate 
interests.
25
 Liberal democratic states tend not to violate international norms, 
including human rights norms, which have become sufficiently ‗internalized‘
26
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Developing countries could promote internalization of ICESCR norms by 
relying on them in international negotiation. Norm internalization can also be 
promoted by the activities of other actors (such as NGOs and human rights 
experts in the legal and academic communities, and in international 
organizations) who can explore and publicize the human rights implications of IP 
protection.  This leads to human rights consciousness-raising among the general 
public (which can put pressure on their governments) as well as within the 
governments directly.  
Although this is likely to be most effective in Europe and in other 
ICESCR member states that have long traditions of ESC protection, there is 
evidence of a growing awareness and acceptance of social and economic rights 
among civil society in the United States, and there is the possibility of a more 
norm-compliant United States administration in 2009. The United States is not an 
ICESCR states party, but it has signed the Covenant, and may not, therefore, take 
steps that defeat its object and purpose. Confronted with clear and specific 
human rights-based arguments backed by grassroots support, the United States 
will at the very least have to respond to the arguments, particularly if its 
developed-state allies have begun to do so. 
This dissertation does not claim that a human rights-based strategy is a 
‗miracle formula‘ that can prevent all further intractability in international IP 
talks. However, there is a strong human rights-based case in favour of preserving 
IP policy space, and rights-based arguments could significantly strengthen 
developing states‘ negotiating positions. Adopting such positions would also 
begin the process of norm-internalization by other negotiating parties and by 
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Appendix I: Drugs Table: Prices of Antiretrovirals 2005 
 
Sources:  
WHO Model List (March 2005) 
Médecins sans Frontières Untangling the Web of Price Reductions: a Pricing Guide for the Purchase 
of ARVs for Developing Countries 8
th
 ed (June 2005) 
DHHS Guidelines (October 2005) 
 
Figures denote the annual price of medication per patient in US dollars. 
‗1 cat‘ and ‗2 cat‘ denote category and one and two states as designated by the drug companies for their 
differential pricing schemes. 
 
PROTEASE INHIBITORS  
 
Name Abrev Generics Originator discounts 
amprenavir APV  GSK Agenerase® 












Merck 1 cat 400 
Merck 2 cat 686 
lopinavir + 
ritonavir 
LPV/r Hetero 1898 
Abbott Kaletra®  
1 cat 500 








Roche 1 cat 978 








1 cat 79 
2 cat 83 
saquinavir SQV Hetero 1022 
Roche Invirase® 
 
1 cat 989 
2 cat 1327 














NUCLEOSIDE REVERSE TRANSCRIPTASE INHIBITORS  
 







1 cat 887 
2 cat n/a 
abacavir + 
lamivudine 













GSK 1 cat 1241 




Aurobindo 1 cat 197  
Cipla 234  
Hetero 280  
Ranbaxy 321  
BMS Videx® 
1 cat 310  





Cipla 106  
Ranbaxy 146  
BMS Videx® EC 
1
 




emtricitabine FTC  Gilead Emtriva™ 
lamivudine 3TC 
Hetero 53  
Aurobindo 66  
Ranbaxy 69  
Cipla 73  
Strides 73  
GSK Epivir® 
 
GSK 1 cat 69  
GSK 2 cat n/a 
lamivudine + 
stavudine 
3TC + d4T 
Aurobindo 72  
Hetero 74  
Cipla 79  
Strides 113  






3TC + ddI + 
EFV 







3TC + d4T 
+ NVP 
Aurobindo 152  
Hetero 147  
Strides 168  
Cipla 175  




Aurobindo 14  
Hetero 21  
Strides 35  
Cipla 36  
Ranbaxy 36  
BMS Zerit® 
 
1 cat 48  
 


















TDF + FTC  
Gilead Truvada™ 
 
1 cat 362 










1 cat 301 
2 cat n/a 











1 cat 117  
 
2 cat n/a 
zidovudine + 
lamivudine 








GSK 1 cat 237 













NON-NUCLEOSIDE REVERSE TRANSCRIPTASE INHIBITORS (NNRTIs)  
 
Name Abrev Generics Originator 
delavirdine DLV  Pfizer Rescriptor® 
efavirenz EFV or EFZ 
Aurobindo 438  
Cipla 347  
Hetero 316  




Merck 1 cat 169  









1 cat 438 

















Appendix II: Drugs Table: Prices of Antiretrovirals 2008 
 
Sources:  
WHO Model List (March 2007) 
Médecins sans Frontières Untangling the Web of Price Reductions: a Pricing Guide for the Purchase 
of ARVs for Developing Countries 11
th
 ed (July 2008) 
 
Figures denote the annual price of medication per patient in US dollars. 
‗1 cat‘ and ‗2 cat‘ denote category and one and two states as designated by the drug companies for their 
differential pricing schemes. 
 
PROTEASE INHIBITORS  
 
Name Abrev Generics Originator discounts 
atazanavir ATV  
BMS Reyataz™ 
1 cat 353 














Merck 1 cat 394 









Abbott Kaletra®  
1 cat 500 








Roche 1 cat 1248 







1 cat 83 






1 cat 1127 
2 cat 2559 















NUCLEOSIDE REVERSE TRANSCRIPTASE INHIBITORS  
 









1 cat 437 
2 cat n/a 
abacavir + 
lamivudine 


















GSK 1 cat 653 




Aurobindo 219  
Cipla 166 
Hetero 160  
Ranbaxy 242  
BMS Videx® 
1 cat 310  





Cipla 103  
Ranbaxy 170 
Aurobindo 172 
Hetero 139  
BMS Videx® EC 
1
 









Hetero 37  
Aurobindo 40  
Ranbaxy 43  
Cipla 35  
Strides 52 







3TC + d4T 
Aurobindo 53  
Hetero 46  
Cipla 52  
Strides 53  
Ranbaxy 61 







3TC + d4T 
+ NVP 
Aurobindo 82  
Hetero 87  
Strides 102  
Cipla 96  
Ranbaxy 99 
















Name Abrev Generics Originator 
stavudine d4T 
Aurobindo 23  
Hetero 22  
Strides 27  
Cipla 19  
Ranbaxy 28 
Matrix 24  
BMS Zerit® 
 
1 cat 48  











1 cat 319 











1 cat 207 












1 cat 613 
2 cat 1033 
















































NON-NUCLEOSIDE REVERSE TRANSCRIPTASE INHIBITORS (NNRTIs)  
 
Name Abrev Generics Originator 
efavirenz EFV  
Aurobindo 158  
Cipla 170  
Hetero 146  
Ranbaxy 185 
Strides 180 




Merck 1 cat 237  











1 cat 219 
2 cat 438 
 
